NATIONAL RESILIENCE PLAN

2014-2016

DRAFT

Proposed Priority Responses to Mitigate the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities

January 2014
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# ACRONYMS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFEX</td>
<td>Arab Future Energy Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Aqaba Water Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Compact Fluorescent Lamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Service Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Concentrated Solar Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUMERC</td>
<td>Columbia University for Social Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERfKE</td>
<td>Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSR</td>
<td>Emergency Services and Social Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Family Protection Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Society for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Health Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCP</td>
<td>Host Communities Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCSP</td>
<td>Host Community Support Platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIES</td>
<td>Household Income and Expenditure Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMIS</td>
<td>Health Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRH</td>
<td>Human Resources for Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUDC</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCS</td>
<td>Islamic Charity Center Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPD</td>
<td>Juvenile Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPJHS</td>
<td>Jordan Population and Family Health Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRF</td>
<td>Jordan River Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOED</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOMA</td>
<td>Ministry of Municipal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Mega Watt</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWI</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Irrigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>National Aid Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Needs Assessment Review</td>
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<td>NEEAP</td>
<td>National Energy Efficiency Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFE</td>
<td>Non-Formal Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Resilience Plan</td>
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<td>NRW</td>
<td>Non-Revenue Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Primary Health Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QLI</td>
<td>Quality of Life Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLDP</td>
<td>Regional and Local Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Regional Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCADA</td>
<td>Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWM</td>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAD</td>
<td>Transboundary Animal Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAJ</td>
<td>Water Authority of Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWTP</td>
<td>Waste Water Treatment Plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YWC</td>
<td>Yarmouk Water Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL REFUGEE POP. BY GOVERNORATE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This National Resilience Plan (NRP) provides a three year programme of high priority investments by the Government of Jordan in response to the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities and the Jordanian economy.


Critical investments are needed in Education US$394.8 million; Energy US$110.1 million; Health US$484.1 million; Housing US$5.3 million; Livelihoods & Employment US$140.8 million; Municipal Services (including Solid Waste Management) US$205.9 million; Social Protection US$314.0 million, and; Water & Sanitation US$750.7 million. In addition to these investments supplementary budget support totaling US$758 million and US$965.4 million is sought to compensate for additional subsidies and security costs borne by the government as a direct result of the Syrian crisis. The complete budget breakdown of annual sector requirements is illustrated in Table 1 below.

The interventions included in the plan are only those that can be realistically implemented in the time period. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>110,250,000</td>
<td>126,500,000</td>
<td>158,000,000</td>
<td>394,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>35,300,000</td>
<td>44,840,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>110,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>154,207,600</td>
<td>162,217,000</td>
<td>167,702,000</td>
<td>484,126,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1,913,000</td>
<td>1,714,000</td>
<td>1,629,000</td>
<td>5,256,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods &amp; Employment</td>
<td>50,150,000</td>
<td>53,800,000</td>
<td>36,800,000</td>
<td>140,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
<td>79,834,800</td>
<td>72,895,000</td>
<td>53,124,000</td>
<td>205,853,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection &amp; Social Protection</td>
<td>113,533,136</td>
<td>114,483,136</td>
<td>85,994,549</td>
<td>314,010,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>186,036,000</td>
<td>365,018,000</td>
<td>199,670,000</td>
<td>750,724,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total: NRP Programmatic Response</strong></td>
<td>731,224,536</td>
<td>941,467,136</td>
<td>732,919,549</td>
<td>2,405,611,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total: Subsidies for Syrian Refugees</strong></td>
<td>208,000,000</td>
<td>250,000,000</td>
<td>300,000,000</td>
<td>758,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total: Security Support</strong></td>
<td>291,650,000</td>
<td>320,815,000</td>
<td>352,896,500</td>
<td>965,361,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>1,230,874,536</td>
<td>1,512,282,136</td>
<td>1,385,816,049</td>
<td>4,128,972,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

majority build on existing programmes, where implementation capacity is present, or can quickly be ramped-up to accelerate delivery. Interventions have been designed through the resilience-based development approach, which provides phased assistance to enable a focus on 'coping', 'recovering' and on 'sustaining' the benefits provided within the timeframe of the response.

The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has provided the leadership in directing and coordinating the overall response formulation. It established the Host Communities Support Platform (HCSP) in September 2013 - a strategic body comprised of government line ministries, donors, UN agencies and INGOs. Through the HCSP a Needs Assessment Review (NAR)
was undertaken in October and November of 2013, followed by the NRP preparatory process. Five Task Forces, led by line ministries, set about formulating sector strategies to respond to the crisis, engaging all major stakeholders in a participatory exercise. Attention was placed on the identification of priority responses to address the emerging needs into which additional funds could be channeled quickly and effectively. The primary target for assistance being Irbid, Ma’al, Amman and Zarqa Governorates in which the majority of the Syrian refugee population is hosted, with special attention placed on supporting vulnerable groups within these governorates.

The resulting portfolio of initiatives takes account of existing government programmes and budgets within the primary sectors covered by the NRP. It also takes into consideration the main humanitarian support package of the Regional Response Plan (RRP6). The NRP does not therefore include any of the measures proposed under the RRP6, so as to avoid duplication. The figures above represent the sum total of additional or supplementary financing that is sought from the international community for the implementation of the NRP from January 2014 until the end of December 2016. It is a statement of the gap in funds needed to ensure a realistic, proportionate and deliverable response to the crisis in the affected areas of Jordan and through which the NRP outcomes set out in Table 2 below will be attained. Direct support to the budget is also included for the government to be able to meet the additional subsidies and security services provided as a direct result of hosting the Syrian refugee population.

Donors wishing to make a financial contribution to any of the priority programmes of the NRP are invited to make direct contact with the Office of the Minister for Planning and International Co-operation. The Government of Jordan prefers that national treasury systems and national programmes be utilized as the primary conduit for financial contributions. In some instances, after consultation with the above ministry, an alternative financial and implementation modality may be pursued, such as via UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOs (national or international), or other entities, subject to their comparative advantage in the particular sector and their adherence to the principles of transparency, accountability and aid effectiveness.
# National Resilience Plan 2014 - 2016

## Sector Overall Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To provide access to quality inclusive education for all children – particularly the most vulnerable – through formal, non-formal and informal opportunities. (US$394,750,000)</td>
<td>To address the increased demands for energy arising as a result of the arrival of the Syrian refugee population through innovative and sustainable solutions. (US$110,140,000)</td>
<td>To improve the health of citizens residing in the areas most affected by the Syrian crisis. (US$ 484,126,600)</td>
<td>Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians. (US$ 5,256,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Sector Specific Objectives

| 1.1 Strengthening the capacity of the educational system to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services. (US$2,800,000) | 1.1 Rapid sustainable energy solutions to offset incremental energy demand (short-term). (US$50,140,000) | 1.1 Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost incurred as a result of Syrian crisis. (US$433,200,000) | 1.1 Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing. (US$4,506,000) |
| 1.2 Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis. (US$391,950,000) | 1.2 Solar energy solutions for growing energy supply needs (medium-term). (US$ 60,000,000) | 1.2 Gap in medical specialties facing shortages filled in. (US$23,040,000) | 1.2 Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups. (US$750,000) |
| 1.3 Absorptive capacities of MOH hospitals and health centres, especially in areas with high concentration of Syrians scaled up. (US$20,900,000) | 1.4 Critical equipment, ambulances and vehicles needed to MOH hospitals and health centres provided. (US$ 4,060,600) | 1.5 Ongoing MOH projects and activities strengthened and sustained. (US$2,926,000) |  |
Table 2: NRP Over-arching Objective 2014-2016
To successfully mitigate the effects of the Syria Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian Host Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Overall Objectives</th>
<th>Municipal Services</th>
<th>Social Protection</th>
<th>WASH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The capacity of poor and vulnerable households in host communities is strengthened to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods. (US$140,750,000)</td>
<td>The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens and communities needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. (US$205,853,800)</td>
<td>Vulnerable groups affected by the crisis have access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis. (US$314,010,821)</td>
<td>To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water &amp; Sanitation services. (US$750,724,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Specific Objectives</th>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
<th>Municipal Services</th>
<th>Social Protection</th>
<th>WASH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Create more and better job opportunities for the poor and the vulnerable (women and youth). (US$ 64,000,000)</td>
<td>1.1 Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis. (US$ 179,507,000)</td>
<td>1.1 Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups. (US$ 13,960,000)</td>
<td>1.1 Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of Water Delivery. (US$ 310,254,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for poor and vulnerable households (women and youth). (US$ 37,000,000)</td>
<td>1.2 Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees. (US$ 14,502,800)</td>
<td>1.2 Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people at national and sub-national levels. (US$ 299,680,821)</td>
<td>1.2 Expanding and improving Sanitation services. (US$ 395,430,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources. (US$ 19,100,000)</td>
<td>1.3 Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework. (US$ 11,844,000)</td>
<td>1.3 Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between GoJ &amp; community based mechanisms. (US$ 370,000)</td>
<td>1.3 Addressing Cross Cutting WASH Issues. (US$ 12,000,000)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.4 Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households. (US$ 20,650,000)</td>
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</table>
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
1.1 Overview of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan

After nearly three years the crisis continues to deepen, protract and escalate. It comprises many dimensions that span the political, security, economic and social landscape, demanding an unprecedented level of international co-operation, both regionally and globally, to be able to respond to its complexity. Those countries most severely impacted by its spillover are those directly bordering Syria. By establishing the HCSP, facilitating the NAR and initiating a participatory process for the development of the NRP, the government has taken a leadership role in seeking to mitigate the consequences of the crisis in the region and in the Kingdom. It is working in partnership with national, regional and international organisations in an attempt to grapple with the short, medium, and longer-term risks and implications arising out of the crisis. Concerns are apparent for national and local institutions and systems as well as for those most-affected communities.

Jordan has shared significantly in bearing the brunt of the crisis and in shouldering its burden on behalf of the international community. From a humanitarian perspective, and in recognition of the human tragedy unfolding within Syria, the government has maintained an open border policy to Syrians seeking refuge, protection, and safety from the conflict. Within that same humanitarian spirit the government and the people of Jordan have extended public services, facilities, resources and hospitality in an attempt to accommodate the most pressing needs of the Syrian refugee population now in its midst.

A massive influx of over 575 thousand registered refugees\(^1\) has so far occurred, over 50 percent of which are children. Approximately 80 percent of all refugees are hosted within Jordanian communities and the remaining 20 percent are accommodated within camp settings. The sheer volume of numbers has placed a critical pressure on social, economic, institutional and natural resources systems ability to cope. Jordanians residing within these locations have been impacted to different degrees by the process. Their livelihoods, opportunities, and rightful access to quality public services have been detrimentally affected, in particular with regard to the most vulnerable segments of the population, an important portion of whom are present in the governorates that are host to the highest numbers of Syrian refugees, namely Irbid, Mafraq, Amman and Zarqa.

Despite graciously hosting the Syrian refugees, Jordanians have also found themselves confronted with additional competition from Syrians in local job markets, with a worrisome increase in child labour. This has put downward pressure on local wages and caused food, fuel, rent and in some cases, water, price inflation. In some areas rents alone are reported to have increased by up to 300 percent. This has placed a squeeze on household budgets and living standards. Vulnerabilities among Jordanians are beginning to reappear in households that had not long since escaped poverty. In those areas most affected by the refugee influx all population segments are affected in some manner. But as in all crises, it is the poorest and most vulnerable Jordanian households, and the most vulnerable people within them, that are impacted the most.

The government has granted access to local public goods and services to Syrian refugees. This encompasses schooling, health care, municipal and social services, food and fuel/electricity subsidies, as well as water supply and sanitation. At the same time, this has placed an additional strain on local services and infrastructure, some of which were previously deficient in quality, or inadequate in capacity, to meet the needs of the local pre-crisis population.

As the crisis continues unabated it is likely to produce further flows of refugees. Host communities, institutions, systems, infrastructure and services will soon reach their absorption capacities. In some localities, these thresholds have been stretched to breaking, whilst in others they
have already been exceeded. In municipal services for example, in particular solid waste management, the system is unable to keep pace with the increased demands placed upon it.

Absorbing such a vast number of Syrians within what was already the poorest part of the country is thereby having a profound impact on the demographic and socio-economic landscape of Jordan. Tensions in some areas have become palpable. These can be expected to build as long as the crisis endures. Urgent action is needed to address these challenges and to prevent the prospect of an inter-generational reproduction of the crisis, which is an increasing risk the longer the crisis continues. Whilst the impact of the crisis appears to be predominately urban in nature, rural livelihood systems have also begun to suffer. Public health concerns raise the alert of the possible spread of animal and crop trans-boundary diseases and pests resulting from the collapse of Syrian veterinary and phytosanitary services.

The crisis and its regional ramifications have also cast a shadow over the performance of the Jordanian economy and the health of public finances. At the macro- or national level, Jordan’s public and private sectors have been significantly impacted by the crisis by virtue of the integrated nature of regional trade, markets and cross-border transit routes, which have been severely disrupted. GDP growth has been directly affected by the crisis, reportedly by about 2 percent in 2013, depressing it downwards to 2.7 percent in 2012 from an average of 6.6 percent in the 2000 – 2008 period. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has dropped off dramatically and is at its lowest for five years. In the past three years the trade deficit widened from JD6 billion in 2010 to JD9 billion in 2012. The annual budget deficit rose from US$1.05 billion in 2010 to US$1.8 billion in 2012 and public debt has now risen beyond the 60 percent stipulated in the Public Debt Law as the debt to GDP ratio; increasing from 61.1 percent in 2010 to 75.5 percent in 2013. Furthermore 14 percent of the population is below the poverty line, 57 percent of which are children, a reality that does not augur well for the future.

Faced with a straightened economic outlook and with limited fiscal space in which to manoeuvre, between 2009 – 2012 the government resolved to reallocate funds from its capital investment programmes to its operating budget to enable it cope with the sudden effects of the crisis. This included transfers for energy and food subsidies to Syrian refugees, and increased financing to offset additional demands for services in respect to education, health, water supply, wastewater and solid waste management. The direct cost of extending these public services to Syrian refugees within Jordanian host communities continues to accumulate. Yet these additional measures still fall considerably short of the level and quality of services that are required to meet all of the basic needs, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable groups (children, women, youth etc.) in the most affected governorates. In addition, a number of social challenges such as domestic violence, violence in schools, child labour and early marriages are reported to be exacerbated by the current situation. This adds a further strain upon the Jordanian social protection services.

The government has also been mindful to protect its previously hard-won human development accomplishments, such as in some of the MDGs over the past decade (i.e. infant and maternal mortality). Given the extent of the impact of the crisis at the structural, governorate and host community levels, there is now a considerable risk that if critical investments in the priority interventions set out within this three year national resilience plan are not forthcoming, then Jordan’s human development trajectory could be jeopardised.

Given all of these factors, the Syrian crisis and impact present very real fiscal ramifications for the country. Since there is no prospect of an immediate solution to the crisis or swift return of Syrian refugees to their homeland in the near future, it is important to stress that the government’s fiscal and administrative capacity is limited. A comprehensive response that supports
The NRP has been designed to complement, rather than compete with, existing and planned humanitarian programmes. The government is grateful to the humanitarian agencies and to a generous international donor community for supporting the plight of Syrian refugees, both within camps and in the efforts that have been made to extend some of that support to the host communities themselves.

More generally, it is widely acknowledged across all parties responding to the crisis that the current levels of financing and modus operandi of humanitarian aid are unsustainable in their present form. An array of critical issues, including those of political, macro-economic, social cohesion and stability, notwithstanding the stress placed on national and local institutions and budgets to sustain a decent service to the combined refugee and hosting populations, all stretch beyond the mandate and reach of conventional humanitarian approaches.

A comprehensive strategy that brings humanitarian and development programming under a common resilience-based frameworks required, integrating the strongest elements of both perspectives, as complementary features of the same desire to ensure a human rights based approach, the preservation of human dignity, the extension of protection measures and equality of access assured to all to the full spectrum of basic services.

Moving forward, the NRP represents an important strategic part of that framework. As a focused three year endeavour it is intended to link to the immediate measures contained in the Regional Response Plan 6 (RRP6) provided by humanitarian agencies. It has been designed to complement and underpin humanitarian efforts by promoting a longer-term, development-oriented approach.

Through the Task Forces, supported by the HCSP Secretariat based in the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MOPIC), practical efforts have been made by the technical teams in the NRP preparatory process to map existing, on-going and planned humanitarian programmes (including within the RRP6) and identify gaps that exist as expressed in the recently completed NAR. In parallel, efforts are being made to adjust existing development programmes to correspond...
better to the emergent priority needs. This may entail building on, extending or expanding such programmes and activities, whether these be government, donor, UN, or NGO implemented initiatives, or a combination of agencies dependent on the particular arrangements that prove to work most effectively in each sector or geographic area. Where possible it proposes to utilize partnership vehicles and operating structures already in place, or innovate new initiatives specifically tailored to the crisis. The objective is to ‘fast-track’ the delivery of priority measures set out in the sector responses contained within the plan.

The NRP therefore establishes the entry point for the resilience-based framework to be applied alongside and in coordination with the humanitarian track. The two tracks will continue to operate in a complementary fashion as they are gradually brought together under one roof. In that process, incremental steps towards the harmonization and alignment of these two programme streams will take place. In the meantime both the humanitarian and development programmes will need to continue to forge ahead with their separate programmes and delivery mechanisms, with the minimum of overlap, especially on the ground.

The interventions selected and prioritized within the scope of the NRP have pursued a ‘resilience’ approach. That is, they been broadly designed to enable households, communities, services and institutions initially to ‘cope’, gradually to ‘recover’, and, ultimately to strengthen and ‘sustain’ their capacities, thereby deepening their resilience to future shocks. Among other virtues of following this approach it may also serve to prevent the inter-generational reproduction of the effects of the crisis.

The strength of the approach is that at the household, community, local and national institutional level the NRP aims to:

1. Achieve high impact rapid results in the short-term by injecting additional direct support to reinforce local coping mechanisms, by providing urgently needed equipment, tools, medicines, cash transfers, staffing etc.

2. Provide a subsequent boost to augment local services for infrastructure repair, extension, upgrading or enlargement of facilities, including the renewal, rehabilitation, restoration and recovery of infrastructure, capacities and services, including a continuation of beefed-up initial capabilities with skills training and service development allied to the aims of the programme.

3. Lay foundations for the longer term strengthening of local institutions, capacity development, partnerships, and participatory working for the sustained effective and efficient delivery of services. The latter might align with previous or on-going programmes of reform, such as decentralization etc. This also entails support to national government budget/institutions (subsidy and security) and partners to enable contingency and crisis planning and mitigation in the future. Strengthened systems and capacities in critical areas reinforce its own resilience over time.

4. Fully incorporate and focus attention on a vital range of cross-cutting issues essential to human wellbeing and development. This incorporates gender equality, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. It also ensures an approach that increasingly targets social and economic assistance to vulnerable groups, women, youth and children though all of the main public programmes and services - health, education, water and sanitation, livelihoods and social protection etc.
1.3 NRP Formulation Process

The NRP has emerged through two distinct phases:

1. The Needs Assessment Review (NAR) – undertaken between October and November 2013
2. The NRP Preparation Process – pursued between November 2013 and January 2014

The NAR laid the foundations necessary for advancing an evidence-based planning exercise.

The NRP Preparation Process

The second phase of the formulation process related to the sector response planning exercise. This was formally inaugurated by MOPIC at the same HCSP meeting on 28 November 2013 as the immediate successor to the NAR. Guidance was issued from the HCSP Secretariat to all line ministries and UN technical support agencies to the five Task Forces outlining:

1. ‘The Purpose and Parameters of the NRP’ – a short three page briefing note outlining the Government’s rationale for undertaking the NRP at the present time;
2. The ‘Timeline’ for the initial NRP formulation and consultation process - commencing 30 November 2013, concluding with the High-level Pledging Conference for the Syria crisis (Kuwait II Conference) in mid-January 2014;

3. A Sector Strategy Template to ensure consistency was circulated and subsequently completed through a series of Task Force consultations to which all members contributed;

4. Guidance on prioritization criteria for the selection of response options and their hardening into concrete interventions. This was also provided to the Task Forces, based on, for example:
   i. evidence of a clearly identified need/vulnerability/geographic focus;
   ii. priority endorsement from national or local authorities;
   iii. ability to deliver quickly and locally upon existing institutional arrangements, etc.

5. Critical consultation points were included in the timetable. This complemented the participatory process that engaged line ministries, donors, UN agencies, international and national NGOs in the work of the Task Forces in helping craft the sector strategies. For example:
   i. A donor and INGO consultation meeting took place on 10 December 2013 on the overall NRP preparation process and its aims.
   ii. A meeting for Heads of UN agencies based in Amman followed on 17

The Needs Assessment Review

In October 2013 the HCSP, led by MOPIC, and represented by donors, the UN, national and international NGOs jointly undertook the NAR. This involved all of the major agencies engaged in the implementation of humanitarian and development programmes, in particular those with a focus on the most-affected host communities, in sharing and distilling key findings from independent research and analysis that had hitherto been undertaken on either a geographic and sectoral basis. The work culminated in the production of a detailed NAR report which was subsequently validated at a workshop hosted by the Secretary General of MOPIC on 19 November 2013 and attended by donors, line ministries, UN agencies, and national and international NGOs. The NAR was then formally launched in the second meeting of the HCSP chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation on 28 November 2013.

Completion of the NAR generated a reservoir of critical data, pooled in one place, which for the first time since the crisis began helped to generate an overall picture of the most critical tangible, and some of the more subtle effects of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities and central services.
6. Each sector strategy was subject to an independent cross-check of preliminary costing at the specific intervention level.

7. The first complete ‘Consultation Draft’ of the NRP was issued to all partners for comment on 23 December 2013.

8. MOPIC hosted a review workshop on 5 January 2014 to incorporate the comments on the Consultation Draft of the NRP.

9. The Final Draft NRP was issued to the members of the HCSP in time for its meeting on 9 January 2014.

Throughout the formulation process the five government-led Task Forces and three ‘Reference Groups’ (see Management section 3.1 below) met on numerous occasions for the drafting of the sector strategies until consensus was reached that each reflected the best and most effective programme that could be advanced to respond to host communities needs over the three year period.

## 1.4 The NRP Contribution to Existing National Plans

The primary Jordanian national plans and strategies are the National Agenda (2006 – 2015) and the Executive Programme (2011 – 2013). The Government of Jordan has also submitted a number of projects in the value of US$413.7million for financing within the RR6. As a result, those projects listed in the RR6 for 2014 have not been included within the NRP.

The Executive Programme of the Government complements the National Agenda by providing a series of clearly delineated development streams. Those most relevant for the purposes of the NRP are:

1. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);
2. Poverty alleviation and local development;

Five out of the seven programmes contained within the current Executive Programme also find strong expression within the NRP. Those sectors are:

1. Social welfare (including healthcare, poverty, social development and local development);
2. Employment and training;
3. Education;
4. Infrastructure (including housing, water and sanitation, and energy);
5. Public finance, including fiscal stability.

Whilst the programme outlined in the NRP is national in its design, its focus is directed specifically towards mitigating the Syria crisis, whose impact is most sorely felt in the northern governorates, and on the local host communities and public services within those locations.

***Jordan’s Executive Program aims at:***

*stimulating economic growth, increasing the welfare of Jordanians by reducing poverty and creating jobs through sustained and broadly shared growth, while achieving fiscal sustainability and external balance through boosting investments and enhancing exports, as well as lowering inflation, budget deficit, and public debt, in addition to developing water resources and alternative energy resources, and developing human resources.*

Contrary to the above set of aspirations the negative consequences of the crisis are having the reverse effects. Economic growth is dwindling, the welfare of Jordanians is
beginning to suffer, especially those most vulnerable inhabiting the affected host communities. Vulnerability within those communities is predictably reported to be on the increase. Studies at the household level soon to be undertaken will reveal more about the extent. Economic and fiscal conditions are also pressing and local public services, such as those mentioned, including key municipal services, are under considerable pressure. Hence the global economic crisis, which had already brought a downturn in the overall fortunes for the Kingdom have been compounded by the Syrian crisis across all of these fronts.

### 1.5 Cross Cutting Issues

Three cross cutting issues have been identified within the design of the NRP. These relate to gender equality, social cohesion, and environmental sustainability. Within all of the sector domains of the NRP these three cross cutting themes can be characterized as ‘work in progress’ since further work is required to do full justice to their importance. The cross cutting issues will feature as an integral part of the Annual Work Plans and monitoring and evaluation framework that will be completed upon finalization of the NRP. Greater emphasis on them is required. Notwithstanding this, the foundations on which to strengthen them in the course of the detailed design stage phase which is set to immediately follow on from the production of the NRP are so far as follows:

- **Gender Equality**

  The gender dimensions of the impact of the Syria crisis on Jordanian host communities is so far only partially understood, both in the NAR and in the NRP. Further research is required as the crisis continues and as the response to it materializes. The Social Protection, Education and Health sector strategies are more advanced in giving attention to the importance of gender equality within their analysis and proposed response interventions. The Employment and Livelihoods, and Water and Sanitation sectors also make good reference to considerations of gender equality in their initial designs. However, further work is needed within all sectors to ensure that issues of gender and women’s participation and empowerment evolve as a central tenet in the detailed design, management, implementation and monitoring for the success of the NRP. There are also critical implications for the NRP M&E system to ensure that gender features prominently across all sectors for result setting and reporting.

- **Social Cohesion**

  Issues of social cohesion will gain in ascendency as the protracted and escalating nature of the crisis becomes more apparent with the passage of time. All NRP sectors have been tasked to give consideration to how their response interventions mitigate the prospect of increased tensions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. From a conflict-sensitive perspective, the design, implementation and management of interventions can constructively build trust and understanding between communities. If treated insensitively however projects can inadvertently fuel agitation between communities and refugees. The two sectors of the NRP have so far assumed to jointly lead on social cohesion are that of Local Governance/Municipal Services and Social Protection, both of which outline strong content in this regard. The Housing sector also has a dedicated section on social cohesion within its responses. Within Municipal Services, a clear undertaking to civic and community participation...
emerging within that programme provides an important basis for ensuring that the design of interventions pays regard to issues of social cohesion in urban settings. Beyond those two sectors, Employment and Livelihoods, Education and aspects of the Water & Sanitation programme have given indications that they are alive to the issues of social contest, social justice and social cohesion. Criteria for measuring and monitoring social tensions and social cohesion within the most-impacted communities will also be included in the M&E plan of the NRP.

**Environmental Sustainability**

Five sectors have made a very clear and conspicuous commitment to ensuring a premium is placed on environmental sustainability. These are Employment and Livelihoods, Local Governance/Municipal Services, Water & Sanitation, Energy and Housing. Employment and Livelihoods have dedicated sections of their programming oriented towards the preservation of precious, fragile, and finite natural resources, principally from a rural perspective. Municipal Services and components of the Housing response meanwhile are chiefly concerned with ensuring that appropriate controls are maintained over the planning, construction, and the quality of the built environment and urban public spaces. The energy sector proposes innovations in renewables and energy saving measures that would propel the Government toward meeting the additional energy demands placed on the country as a direct result of the Syrian crisis. In these respects also it is acutely aware of Jordan’s overall environmental vulnerability and the risks presented by climate change. Benchmarks for measuring the environmental sustainability of the NRP will also be incorporated in the M&E.
2.1 Education

Situation Analysis

The Government of Jordan has allowed all those who have missed less than three years of schooling to enrol, unburdened by school fees, in Jordanian schools in order to ensure that refugee children enjoy the right to basic education. As of 22 December 2013, 106,269 refugee children have enrolled in public schools; 85,493 in host communities, 20,776 in camps, and a further 3,350 placed on waiting lists. In order to respond to the increased demand for education, second shifts were introduced in 78 schools, over 7000 additional teachers hired (2,312 teachers specifically for double shifted and camp schools), three new schools built in refugee camps and additional prefab classrooms installed in 28 schools.

While the greatest effect of the crisis is seen in terms of the rapid expansion of the education system, the crisis is also likely to have less immediately visible effects on the quality of education. The introduction of double shifts in schools reduces the instructional time available to both shifts; larger classes and heightened levels of conflict and bullying in schools also affect the quality of the learning environment as do the many newly recruited teachers. While double shifting has been a critical factor in terms of job creation in the sector, these new recruits present a challenge in terms of training. Students’ exposure to traumatic incidents and the resulting effects on the capacity to learn, a wider spread of achievement levels and educational experiences all place additional pedagogic and classroom management demands on teachers.

Constraints and challenges facing the education sector as a result of the crisis in Syria

Since the onset of the crisis, government spending on education has increased by JD200 million, with the bulk of this increase having been spent on primary and – to a lesser extent – on secondary education. From 2011 – 2013, the MOED budget increased by 17 percent.

It is estimated that 36 percent of the refugee population are school-aged children, (out of which an estimated 25 percent are eligible for formal education and 11 percent are not eligible) who will need to be provided with access to education. As of 2 December 2013, there are an estimated 30,000 children out of school who are eligible for formal education and 60,000 out-of-school children who are not eligible for formal education. As refugee numbers rise, so too will the demand for access to schools and alternative education programmes for those not enrolled in the formal system. It is anticipated that over the next three years, refugee numbers will rise further, placing additional pressure on the schooling system to retain those already enrolled and accommodate additional students. It needs to be recognized that in 2013 an estimated 35,000 children moved from private to public schools, further straining the system. This is a trend which is likely to continue as long as the economic environment continues to deteriorate.

The crisis has had an impact on the implementation of the Government’s

Baseline indicators (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Indicator</th>
<th>2012/2013</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of schools (public, private, UNRWA, Military Culture)</td>
<td>6,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of MOED schools</td>
<td>3,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of enrolled students in all schools (excluding Syrians)</td>
<td>1,725,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of enrolled students in MOED schools (excluding Syrians)</td>
<td>1,173,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of teachers (all managing authorities)</td>
<td>110,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of double shift schools</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of students in double shift schools</td>
<td>231,494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
long-term education reform strategy (Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy – ERKE) although the quality of education has been an enduring concern, particularly in light of the declining scores on international assessment studies. The rapid expansion of the system has meant that it has not been possible to provide systematic training to newly appointed teachers, particularly those appointed on contract. The double shifting of schools has meant reduced time-on-task for each subject, further aggravating the quality delivery of teaching. The crisis has resulted in delays in key ERKE implementations related to improving the quality of teacher candidates and related professional development and career path frameworks. This has a direct impact on the quality of education services and the achievement of ERKE objectives.

A 2011 study found that 36 percent of schools were overcrowded, with the highest incidence of over-crowding in Ma'arqa, Irbid, Zarqa and Amman, which are also the four governorates in which refugee concentration is highest; a 2013 analysis undertaken by UNICEF and the MOED found that 41 percent of schools were overcrowded, with limited capacity to absorb additional students. Increased student numbers and the introduction of double shifts places greater strain on the educational infrastructure, particularly sanitation and hygiene facilities in schools, increasing maintenance demands and shortening the life-span of school furniture. While a stressed infrastructure is only one manifestation of the crisis, it contributes greatly to quality and must be addressed.

It is unclear how the crisis has affected already under-served groups, particularly the coverage and quality of pre-school or kindergarten programmes, and the quality of educational support provided to children with special educational needs. There is insufficient data to support effective planning for service delivery to out-of-school children and youth.

### Overview of the humanitarian response

The humanitarian response in host communities, led by UNICEF, has sought to ensure that all children have access to education and has therefore focused on assisting the MOED to increase the absorption capacity of the system through the introduction of second shifts in selected schools, provision of additional learning spaces (through school construction and prefabricated classrooms) and small-scale school renovation. At the same time, it is recognized that there are considerable numbers of children who may never filter through the formal system requiring the provision of effective non-formal (NFE) and informal education opportunities. The MOED has developed a certified NFE program which can be delivered through centres attached to public schools or through home-schooling. Given the current crises, there is a need to build on and scale-up this already successful NFE program. Vulnerable children have also been provided with school uniforms and basic school supplies. Several organisations have offered supplementary instruction programmes in order to prepare children for entry into the school system. Training has been offered to newly-appointed teachers and teachers in schools hosting large numbers of Syrian students (approximately 2,550 teachers in 2013); training has also been offered to 450 MOED officials to enhance their capacity to support teachers in schools affected by the crisis. The humanitarian response has also sought to assist out-of-school children and youth through informal and non-formal education programmes, but this component needs considerable scaling up given the numbers of children illegible for formal schooling.

The humanitarian response has focused on the immediate needs of both refugees and the education system in order to cope with increased levels of demand. It, however, does not have the remit to address longer-term development implications of the rapid expansion of the system on educational quality or to ensure that progress made in implementing systemic reform strategies (particularly the ERKE programme) is not negatively affected.
**Sector Objectives**

The NRP contributes directly to the GOJ’s ability to provide access to quality inclusive education for all children – particularly the most vulnerable – through formal, non-formal and informal opportunities. This is equally the focus of Jordan’s ERiKE program (Phase 1 2004-2009, Phase 2 2010-2015) and also the focus of the 2013-2020 National Poverty Strategy (NPS). ERiKE’s over-riding goal is to reform the public education sector so it produces graduates able to contribute to Jordan’s development through a knowledge economy. Both ERiKE and the NPS recognize the need to strengthen the delivery of basic education (grades K-10) access and quality as the foundation for a healthy democratic society.

**Specific Objective 1:** Strengthening the capacity of the MOED to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.

**Specific Objective 2:** Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly the most vulnerable and excluded children.

At the foundation of these strategic objectives is the ability of the GOJ and its MOED to respond to emergencies such as socioeconomic and political shocks with efficient surge modalities. This plan will strengthen the GOJ’s resilience capacity to apply lessons learned from the past refugee crises, ensuring adaptability and quality of its education system to any new crisis context. This must happen on two fronts.

First, the readiness and ability of the MOED to respond to sudden man-made and natural crises through the development of an emergency focused policy and resources framework, and an enhanced information management and utilization system to support strategic response planning.

Second, the continued delivery of quality education services for all children based on two main pillars: access to and quality of education (formal, non-formal and informal) through the expansion of the absorptive capacity of schools in most affected areas; and the professional development (both induction and in-service) on inclusive education and psychosocial support as well as social cohesion topics to ensure a conducive learning environment.

**Response Plan**

**Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the educational system to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.**

**Rationale:** Over the last few decades Jordan has received successive waves of refugees as conflicts intensified in different parts of the region. It is anticipated that Jordan will retain its position as a relatively safe and stable country, which will make it a suitable refuge for asylum seekers. It is therefore suggested that in order to build Jordan’s resilience to these events, strategies, policy options, human resources and information management and utilization systems be strengthened in order to lessen the impact of emergencies (both natural and conflict-related) on the delivery of educational services.

**Intervention 1.1:** Develop policy frameworks that can be implemented during times of crisis.

**Intervention 1.2:** Enhance information management, analysis and utilization capacity of the MOE to support effective strategy and response planning.

**Intervention 1.3:** Enhance management and supervision capacity of the MOED during times of increased demand for educational services.
Specific Objective 2: Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis

Rationale: At a time of crisis, the government is responsible for ensuring service delivery to both its citizens and also refugees. One of the priorities during such periods is to ensure that the quality of services, particularly in poor and under-served areas, does not deteriorate.

Intervention 2.1: Increase the absorptive capacity of existing schools.

Intervention 2.2: Expand and enhance the provision of early childhood education in most vulnerable communities.

Intervention 2.3: Provide teacher training and professional development programmes.

Intervention 2.4: Expand current alternative, certified pathways for out-of-school children and youth.

Intervention 2.5: Create violence-free schools that cater to psycho-social needs of children.

Intervention 2.6: Strengthen inclusive education programmes for learners with short- and long-term special educational needs.

Proposed Interventions

The intervention plan is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the interventions sheets included in the annex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Education Sector Proposed Interventions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 1:</strong> Strengthening the capacity of the MOED to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Strengthening the capacity of the MOED to respond to emergency situations to ensure the continuous delivery of quality education services.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Intervention 1.1:** Develop policy frameworks and operating procedures that can be implemented during times of crisis through the establishment of consultative fora within the MOED and key education actors.

**Intervention 1.2:** Enhance information management, analysis and utilisation capacity of the MOED to support effective strategy and response planning.

**Intervention 1.3:** Enhance management and supervision capacity of the MOED during times of increased demand for educational services.

**Specific Objective 2:** Ensuring access to quality educational services for all, particularly those living in areas that have been most affected and made more vulnerable by the refugee crisis

**Intervention 2.1:** Increase the absorptive capacity and utilization of schools.

**Intervention 2.2:** Enhance and expand the provision of early childhood education in most vulnerable communities.

**Intervention 2.3:** Provide teacher training and professional development in emergencies.

**Intervention 2.4:** Establish alternative, certified pathways for out-of-school children and youth.

**Intervention 2.5:** Create violence-free schools that cater to psycho-social needs of children.

**Intervention 2.6:** Strengthen inclusive education programs for learners with short- and long-term special educational needs.

| Total | 110,250,000 | 126,500,000 | 158,000,000 | 394,750,000 |
2.2 Energy

Situation Analysis

Jordan has been facing a convergence of supply disruptions of energy imports from Egypt, alongside rising local demands in Jordan owing to a large influx of Syrian refugees and forced migrants. While not a primary driver of systemic energy sector challenges in Jordan, the Syrian crisis is a significant exacerbating factor. Given the centrality of energy to the public budget, and risks from rising energy costs to the State budget, decreasing fiscal space to respond to overall development challenges could jeopardize the trajectory of the country unless urgent actions are taken. Securing a sustainable energy pathway is thus critical for achieving all goals of the National Resilience Plan, with solutions for energy demand and supply challenges a top priority from both short-term and medium-term perspectives.

In terms of energy supply, Jordan has traditionally relied for 80 percent of its electricity generation on natural gas imported from Egypt, but this has declined by up to 70 percent in recent times. In response, Jordan shifted to crude oil imports, rising to 42 percent of energy imports in 2012 and adding approximately US$2 billion/year to Jordan’s import bill with overall energy costs likely to reach US$18 billion in 2013. This decreases fiscal space to respond to overall social development and resilience goals.

In terms of energy demand trends, residential consumption rose 9.44 percent from 2011 to 2012, compared to just 5.9 percent growth 2010 to 2011. Meanwhile, diesel consumption rose 34.48 percent from 2010 to 2011, and 22.43 percent from 2011 to 2012; kerosene 8 percent from 2010 to 2011, and 7.41 percent from 2011 to 2012; and oil consumption rose 11.98 percent from 2011 to 2012. This further burdens Jordan’s energy subsidy system, with the 2013 electricity subsidy bill expected to be US$1.8 billion, almost matching Jordan’s forecasted 2013 deficit of US$2 billion.

Over 600 thousand Syrians have so far arrived in Jordan. The numbers could surpass 1 million Syrians during 2014 according to Government forecasts. This would reflect a cumulative addition of approximately 15 percent to the national population of approximately 6.38 million. Around 80 percent of Syrians now reside in Jordan’s cities and towns, adding pressures to residential energy consumption, including demands on the power grid and needs for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for domestic cooking, the only fuel derivative which remains subsidized by the government. Meanwhile 20 percent of Syrians inhabit refugee camps across the north of Jordan, including the Zaatri Camp, now the world’s second largest refugee camp and the fourth largest settlement in Jordan.

While there is diversity within the Syrian community in Jordan, according to Government statistics average per capita energy intensity among Syrians living in cities and towns is 25 percent less than that of the general population. As refugees and forced migrants, many fall within the lower-income bracket and utilize energy access for basic household needs, while some retain higher levels of income and energy consumption levels. Syrian refugees and forced migrants on average remain less impactful on the broad energy challenges in Jordan relative to core energy users in the country. While as noted above there has been a residential energy consumption rise of 9.44 percent from 2011 to 2012, compared to just 5.9 percent growth from 2010 to 2011, the share of this attributable to Syrian refugees and forced migrants has yet to be defined in trend analyses.

In response to the Syrian crisis, new public expenditures have been made in 2012 and 2013, with over US$251 million allocated in 2012 for services and basic needs for Syrians in cities and communities in the form of regular expenditures and specific subsidies. In 2013, this cost could reach
over US$85.15 million, with government estimating further needs of US$152.4 million to further expand public services in 2013 to the growing Syrian population. Of this latter figure, 72 percent would be needed for energy services, including US$9.36 million for electricity and US$16.6 million for household cooking gas.17

● Sector Objectives

The objective is to scale up and accelerate responses to Jordan’s energy crisis in a way that addresses incremental demand pressures from Syrian refugees and forced migrants. Within Jordan’s broad strategy for transformational change in both energy supply and demand dynamics, two key objectives of relevance to the Syrian crisis are: (i) sustainable energy solutions to meet rising residential energy demands in the short-term, and (ii) expand renewable energy solutions to growing pressures for energy supply expansion in the medium-term.

The long-term vision to shift to a broader energy supply mix is reflected in the National Energy Strategy, including a diversification of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports from alternative sources in the region, alongside exploring new oil import options and shale potentials.18 From the service provision perspective, recent times have also seen significant reforms to Jordan’s domestic energy subsidy system, shifting from universal subsidies to increased use instead of cash transfers targeted to those in need of support, now reaching 70 percent of the national population.19

A top national objective to increasing energy security is the goal of scaling-up sustainable energy solutions including renewable energy and energy efficiency solutions. The new 2013 Arab Future Energy Index (AFEX) shows how Jordan is making positive progress, now ranked 2nd in the Arab region for renewable energy trends and 3rd for energy efficiency.20 Renewable energy solutions have become more cost effective in recent years.21 The 2012 Energy Efficiency and Renewable

Energy Law is now a key enabler providing incentives for sustainable energy solutions as Jordan has the objective of growth of renewable energy from one percent of energy mix in 2010 to 10 percent by 2020 and energy efficiency expansion by 20 percent by 2020.22 The new 2013 National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) is a key policy tool in this regard, identifying interventions to achieve Jordan’s sustainable energy goals. The objective of this plan is to support those identified responses which can be scaled up and accelerated, in order to address emerging risks from the Syrian crisis.23

The convergence of rising energy consumption trends alongside decreasing security of energy supply is impacting public budgets, fiscal space for broader development goals, and ability to ensure energy services. With the Syria crisis exacerbating this situation, this plan proposes sustainable energy solutions at both short-term and medium-term levels with the goal of accelerating and scaling-up energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions. With Syria crisis impacts likely to remain uncertain for some time, additional pressures on energy systems can be expected in coming years. Acceleration of energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions can be of great benefit in this regard, helping to reduce the social and economic risks of growing energy insecurity.

● Response Plan

With regards to increased energy demands from Syrian refugees and forced migrants in cities and towns, two key response options are suggested: (i) acceleration of energy efficiency and renewable energy measures in buildings and residences across Jordan to offset increased power demands from the Syrian crisis (short-term coping), and (ii) establishing new renewable energy power supply capacities to bolster pressures on the power grid (medium-term, from recovering to sustaining)

The Government foresees additional power demand in cities and towns as a result of the Syrian crisis to be approximately

Residential energy consumption rose

9.44% from 2011 to 2012
225MW, with estimated capital investment to meet this additional demand estimated at US$37.5 million.\textsuperscript{24} Separate to this are needs for bringing power to the Zaatri Camp including new power needs of 46MW costing US$14 million in capital costs and US$5.6 million per month in operational costs. With regard to expanding access to water in the Zaatri Camp, the Government also estimates demand in power of 500 kilowatt needed to power two planned wells for the camp, which sits over the country’s largest aquifer. Within this process, renewable energy options could be explored based on initial successes by the donor community in supporting solar lighting in Zaatri Camp and solar energy in Azraq Camp.

Given the estimated levels of incremental power needed for response to the Syrian crisis of 225MW for cities/towns, responses can align to and benefit from the new strategic investments planned within Jordan’s overall drive for sustainable energy solutions. Instead of developing new import-dependent power capacities, the suggestion is to meet extra loads through energy efficiency and renewable energy solutions. A focus on accelerating energy efficiency and renewable energy gains in strategic sectors would be a sustainable and resilient approach to freeing power capacity and offsetting new power demands from the Syrian crisis.

### Proposed Interventions

**Table 4: Energy Sector Proposed Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 1: Rapid sustainable energy solutions to offset incremental energy demand (short-term)</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Deployment of 38,000 solar water heaters in residences to offset part of the incremental power demand arising from the Syrian crisis</td>
<td>35,300,000</td>
<td>14,840,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27,900,000</td>
<td>7,440,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Deployment of 3 million energy efficient lights into buildings and residences to offset part of the incremental power demand arising from the Syrian crisis</td>
<td>7,400,000</td>
<td>7,400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,800,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 2: Solar energy solutions for growing energy supply needs (medium-term)</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Pilot concentrated solar power (CSP) 10MW small-scale facility for sustainable energy supply to host communities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>60,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 35,300,000 | 44,840,000 | 30,000,000 | 110,140,000 |

---

**Prioritisation**

One significant deployable and low-cost priority in line with the 2013 NEEP\textsuperscript{25} is to install 38 thousand solar water heaters in buildings and residences (cost of US$35.34 million), freeing up 7.3MW and reducing electricity costs by US$20 million.\textsuperscript{25} A second significant deployable and low-cost priority would be to replace 3 million inefficient lights in residences and buildings with new compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) (cost of US$14.8 million), freeing up 144MW of power in the years 2014 and 2015, while also creating US$50 million in energy subsidy savings.

Both solar water heaters and CFLs have a good basis for production and with deployment readily available locally in Jordan, these two very cost-effective
Priorities from the NEEAP could be rapidly implemented in 2014-15 to free up 58 percent of new Syrian crisis-related energy demand in the year 2014 and up to the full need in the year after 2015. Further scaling up of these capacities planned in 2015-16 could fully cover all new energy demands expected from the Syrian crisis, and would be also bring long-term benefits for Jordan’s sustainable energy vision, outlasting the risks from the Syrian crisis.

Addressing new demands in ways that do not built up greater levels of energy import dependence would be a strategic approach. Rapid energy efficiency and renewable energy gains could also be coupled with a third priority – the expansion of new grid-connected concentrated solar power (CSP) capacities with more medium-term benefits given what may be more long-term impacts of the Syrian crisis. The new 2012 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Law enables more rapid deployment of CSP and related solutions, with support helping accelerate on-going plans to generate 1,000MW of solar power over the coming several years. Through support for a small-scale pilot CSP initiative, 10MW of this intended capacity (US$60million for investment costs) could be accelerated as part of Syria-crisis response to meet the new power loads among host communities in cities, and could also bring co-benefits to large camps like Zaatari and other poor communities in the country.
### 2.3 Health

#### Situation Analysis

From a health perspective there are a number of important implications of the Syrian crisis for the sector. These relate to: (i) the immediate increased prevalence and risk of diseases among Jordanian host communities; (ii) the increased demands placed on health services, infrastructure and medicines, with commensurate financial consequences; (iii) a projected reversal in some of the most important indicators of health anchored in the MDGs.

The full impact of the influx of such large numbers of Syrian refugees is not yet known. However, a notable increase in the infectious diseases incidence rate in Jordan such as TB, measles, hepatitis A, cutaneous leishmaniasis respiratory tract infection, diarrhea and other notifiable diseases have been reported. The potential re-appearance of polio in Jordan also presents a risk as some polio cases have been detected in Syria. Twelve percent of Syrians suffer from diabetes mellitus, 30 percent suffer of hypertension and a growing number of Syrians have needed kidney dialysis. Furthermore, war-related health conditions such as traumas, amputations, bullet wounds, and mental disorders were also registered.

The GOJ is not only faced with the challenge of meeting the financial gap required to cover the healthcare costs of Syrian refugees, but also with responding to the urgent health care needs of Jordanian host communities. The greatest challenges relate to meeting the heightened demand for health services through the extension of services and/or expansion of facilities. In parallel, accelerating efforts to protect the significant progress Jordan has achieved towards reaching national goals as well as MDGs by the year 2015, which Ministry of Health (MOH) officials suggest have already been jeopardised.

In sum, the influx of Syrian refugees places significant additional pressure on an already under-resourced MOH healthcare delivery system. These can be summarized as follows:

- **Human resources for health (HRH):** The five northern Jordanian governorates (Irbid, Mafraq, Zarqa, Jarash and Ajloun) reported severe shortages in the following specialties: dermatology, gynecology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, functional therapy, emergency, orthopedic, anesthesiology, internal, ophthalmology, family medicine, pediatrics and dentistry. This situation has resulted in a sharp increase of the daily workload of existing specialists, which cannot be sustained at their current levels of demand.

- **Drugs, medicines and vaccines:** All five governorates reported serious deficiencies in the supply of vaccines, delivery-related medications, cardiovascular drugs and oral rehydration therapy.

- **Medical equipment:** Clinics throughout all five governorates reported variations in access to medical equipment. Most lacking were delivery tables, delivery sets, vacuum extractors, emergency trolleys and pulse oximeters, antenatal, postnatal equipment in addition to equipment needed to surgical, orthopedic, internal, radiation departments and medical laboratories (as per attached list), in order to maintain an acceptable level of health care delivery.

- **Capacity of facilities (hospitals and health centres):** Some hospitals such as Princess Basma, Princess Rahma, Ramtha (Irbid Governorate) and Mafraq hospital have recorded 100 percent bed occupancy rates. At the health centre level, the daily workload has increased by up to 50 percent in some centres in Ajloun and up to 9 percent in other governorates.

Primary impacts of the Syrian crisis on the health sector include:

- **the immediate increased prevalence and risk of diseases among Jordanian host communities;**
- **the increased demands placed on health services, infrastructure and medicines, with commensurate financial consequences;**
- **a projected reversal in some of the most important indicators of health anchored in the MDGs.**
Government response

Although the Jordanian healthcare sector faces significant financial and logistical challenges, the Government of Jordan’s policy is to grant Syrian refugees free access to national health care services as per the Cabinet Decree of 16 May 2012. In order to meet the increased demand for health services, the MOH mobilized additional human resources to serve in the most affected areas and almost doubled its procurement of vaccines also with the support of international agencies. Overall drug procurement increased by 18 percent to keep pace with actual needs. In order to cope with the increased flow of patients that the crisis has given rise to, the MOH has set out an urgent plan to rehabilitate some of its existing facilities and infrastructure within the areas most affected. In the main, the program will entail making better use or expansion of existing facilities. As a last resort, and in some exceptional instances where demand greatly outstrips capacity, new facilities will be constructed.

• **Direct cost of the treatment of Syrian refugees:** This was estimated to be around US$167 million and the cost of purchasing additional drugs and vaccines to meet the increased demands at US$58.1 million in 2013. These costs are exclusive of recently recruited additional doctors and nurses, and associated infrastructure costs.

**Humanitarian response**

The influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan since 2011 resulted in massive a collaborative effort between the donor community, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, community-based organizations, refugees and Jordanian communities. In September 2013, the Government of Jordan launched the HCSP as the coordinating mechanism to initiate a policy dialogue, provide strategic guidance and to develop a new Resilience Plan addressing the emerging needs of the host communities in order to meet refugees’ needs and mitigate the impact of refugee influx on the country and host communities. UNHCR and UNDP are leading the efforts in partnership with MOPIC. In November 2013, RRP6 for the year 2014 was launched.

The humanitarian response included direct and indirect interventions, technical and financial assistance, aimed at strengthening the health system in service delivery capacity, strengthening coordination capacity as well as responding to the rising trends of communicable and non-communicable diseases risks among both Syrian refugees and their Jordanian host communities.

**Problem statement**

Jordan is host to about 580 thousand Syrian refugees, 80 percent of whom live in non-camp settings in rural and urban areas. Women, children and the elderly constitute a high percentage. Furthermore, the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan are highly vulnerable due to their hard socio-economic, health, and psychological situation. This influx has placed additional strains on an already stressed system due to the structural financial and economic crisis Jordan faces. Thus, the Jordanian health system falls into a three-dimensional dilemma. That is:

1. How to cover the financial gap required to cover the healthcare needs of Syrian refugees;
2. How to retain sufficient capacity to respond to healthcare needs of Jordanian host communities, and;
3. How to maintain the significant progress in health that Jordan has achieved over the past decade in order to reach its national targets as well as MDGs by the year 2015.
**Sector Objectives**

The overall national health goal is to improve the health of all Jordanians.

**General Objective 1: To improve health system performance in terms of equity, accessibility and quality.**

- **Indicators:** Per capita health care expenditure; hospital bed density per 10,000; doctors density per 10,000; number of hospitals accredited; number of health centres accredited; anaemia prevalence rate among children under five.

**General Objective 2: To control and direct health expenditure.**

- **Indicators:** Public pharmaceutical expenditure as percent of total pharmaceutical expenditure; percentage of public health expenditure allocated for primary health care services.

**General Objective 3: To control communicable and non-communicable diseases.**

- **Indicators:** Tuberculosis (TB) incidence rate; incidence rates of vaccine-preventable diseases; number of behavioural risk factors surveys conducted; prevalence of diabetes mellitus among adults.

**Specific Objective 1:** Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to fill in financial gap incurred as a result of the Syrian crisis.

- **Indicator:** Amount (US dollars) allocated to the MOH annual budget to cover additional health needs incurred as a result of the Syrian crisis.

**Specific Objective 2:** Gap in specialties facing shortages filled in.

- **Indicator:** Number of specialists recruited in each medical specialty.

**Specific Objective 3:** Absorptive capacities of MOH hospitals and health centres is scaled up, especially in areas with high concentration of Syrian refugees.

- **Indicator 1:** Number of health centres expanded.
- **Indicator 2:** Number of hospitals expanded.
- **Indicator 3:** Hospital bed occupancy rate of hospitals in northern region.

**Specific Objective 4:** Critical equipment, such as ambulances and vehicles, needed in MOH hospitals and health centres are provided.

- **Indicator:** Quantity of equipment, ambulances and vehicles provided to MOH.

**Specific Objective 5:** Ongoing MOH projects and activities strengthened and sustained.

- **Indicator 1:** Number of studies and surveys conducted.
- **Indicator 2:** Number of activities and systems computerised.
- **Indicator 3:** Number of targeted hospitals and health centres implementing diabetes mellitus and hypertension guidelines.
- **Indicator 4:** Number of ongoing MOH projects and activities that continue to function as planned.

**Response Plan**

General points:

- MOH has a unique network of hospitals and health centres dispersed throughout the Kingdom. First priority should be given to supporting existing facilities with emphasis on rural areas and where possible to expanding MOH facilities rather than create new ones.
Due to high concentration of Syrian refugees in the northern governorates and the high percentage of poor households in Irbid, Amman, Mafraq, Jerash and Ajloun Governorates, any response strategy should give priority to these areas which are experiencing the highest rates of demand.

In order to integrate Syrian refugees’ health information and data into the Jordanian Health management Information system (HMIS), strengthening HMIS is of high importance.

It is important to strengthen the existing overall health system in Jordan rather than create a new one for refugees alone, as refugees utilize all Jordanian health facilities in all subsectors.

**Response options according to objectives**

**General objective 1: To improve health system performance in term of equity, accessibility and quality.**

Recognizing that primary health care is the most cost effective approach to achieving health system goals, the following response options should be implemented:

- Strengthening of existing primary healthcare programs, including reproductive health programs, school health, newborn screening program, ante and post-natal services, and integrated mental health programs, etc.

- Scaling-up primary and comprehensive health centres as a primary point of contact with local communities.

- Establishment of outreach clinics and activities.

- Strengthening of the existing referral system.

- Building the technical and managerial capacities of HRH.

- Maintenance of optimal medical staff and hospitals bed density in affected communities.

**General Objective 2: To control and direct health expenditure.**

The following options are found to be applicable:

- Increase allocations for Primary Health Centres (PHCs) services.

- Increase allocations for HR management and scaling up.

**General Objective 3: To control communicable and non-communicable diseases.**

The following three options are applicable:

- Strengthening of the national immunization program, communicable and non-communicable diseases surveillance systems, and cancer screening program.

- Conduct a behavioural risk factor survey as the latest data on this issue belongs to 2007.

- Strengthening of the HMIS.
## Proposed Interventions

The interventions plan is a recapitulative matrix of the information provided in the interventions sheets located in the annex.

### Table 5: Health Sector Proposed Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 1: Urgent financial support to MOH budget provided to cover the cost incurred as a result of Syrian crisis.</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Provision financial assistance to MOH equal to 15% of its annual budget to cover the cost of treatment of Syrian patients and to maintain regular health services provided to Jordanian population.</td>
<td>137,400,000</td>
<td>142,700,000</td>
<td>153,100,000</td>
<td>433,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 2: Gap in medical specialties facing shortages filled in.</th>
<th>2,680,000</th>
<th>10,180,000</th>
<th>10,180,000</th>
<th>23,040,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Recruitment of additional specialists and technicians.</td>
<td>2,680,000</td>
<td>2,680,000</td>
<td>2,680,000</td>
<td>8,040,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.2: Offer incentives (one extra monthly salary/person/year) to HRH working in the most affected areas for a total of around 10,700 employees.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 3: Absorptive capacities of MOH hospitals and health centres, especially in areas with high concentration of Syrians scaled up.</th>
<th>8,800,000</th>
<th>8,500,000</th>
<th>3,600,000</th>
<th>20,900,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.1: Expansion and development of MOH health centres, hospitals, emergency departments and kidney dialysis units.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>13,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.2: Establishment of 3 mobile medical clinics (GP, Dentistry, MCH) for Mafraq, Irbid and Balqa governorates.</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.3: Construction and equipment of 11 new health centres and one public health laboratory.</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 4: Critical equipment, ambulances and vehicles needed to MOH hospitals and health centres provided.</th>
<th>4,060,600</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>4,060,600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.1: Provision of medical equipment and instruments (as per attached list).</td>
<td>2,450,600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,450,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.2: Provision of 20 ambulances.</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.3: Provision of 10 transportation vehicles for northern region.</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Objective 5: Ongoing MOH projects and activities strengthened and sustained.</th>
<th>1,267,000</th>
<th>837,000</th>
<th>822,000</th>
<th>2,926,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.1: Establishment of Nutrition Surveillance System.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.2: Execute 2nd (final) phase of computerization of Jordan Cancer Registry (to link 60 recent hospitals with central cancer registry).</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.3: Electronically link breast cancer screening fixed and mobile units in governorates with King Hussein Cancer Centre to provide technical assistance in reading mammograms.</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.4: Conducting National Baseline Behavioural Risk Factor survey.</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.5: Establishment of 60 new clinics for Integrated NCD Services.</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.6: Provision of Lab. Materials for the use of Newborn Surveillance Program (detection of PKU, G6PD and HT) to include Syrian newborns and to increase coverage of Jordanian newborns.</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>297,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.7: Purchase additional quantity of micronutrients for the use of flour Fortification Program.</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.8: Purchase additional quantity of Vitamin A for the use of Vitamin A Supplementation program to cover Syrian children.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.9: Training of MOH medical and managerial staff on the integrated nutrition Infant and Youth Child Feeding approach (IYCF).</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.10: Establishment of Maternal and Child Deaths Surveillance System.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 5.11: Provision of technical and financial support to school health activities</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154,207,600</td>
<td>162,217,000</td>
<td>167,702,000</td>
<td>484,126,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Housing

Situation Analysis

The Syrian crisis is unfolding amidst a chronic shortage of affordable housing in Jordan. The humanitarian response has been impressive, providing shelter assistance to an estimated 73,508 Syrian families as at November 2013. Nevertheless, the lack of adequate and affordable housing has emerged as one of the two main causes of social tension between Syrian refugees and host communities. If properly supported, the housing sector has the potential to contribute to a wide range of positive outcomes, including: physical security, reduced social tension, increased employment and economic growth, and increased tax revenue for the Government of Jordan. The NRP advocates (i) expanded support for humanitarian shelter; particularly those initiatives that bring additional housing units onto the market; (ii) a large scale affordable housing programme involving private-public partnership; and (iii) institutional reform to address structural weaknesses in the housing market.

The influx of Syrian refugees is severely straining the absorption capacity of the Jordanian housing market. Based on Ministry of Interior figures, some 600,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan need housing, which translates into approximately 120,000 housing units. The Jordanian housing sector, meanwhile, has produced an annual average of 28,600 units during the period 2004-11 against a total demand of 32,000 units. Moreover, supply is not well aligned with demand, with an oversupply at the middle and upper end of the market and some 18 percent of the housing stock remaining unoccupied. As a result, rental has been the main source of affordable housing for almost half of the poorest 10 percent of Jordan’s population.

The immediate humanitarian response has focused on camp settings with some support extended to host communities. As of November 2013, UNHCR estimated that some 420 thousand refugees (or 80 percent of the then 567 thousand registered refugee population) live outside camps. Zaatari has been upgraded to an infrastructure and basic services camp capable of hosting some 110 thousand people. A new camp, Azraq, has also been developed, capable of hosting 52,000 people. For host families, 1,326 unfinished homes have been completed and cash support for rent has been provided for highly vulnerable households. For the second half of 2013, 61 percent of the targeted population was reached with shelter support, mainly through camps. An increased focus on host communities is foreseen in the 2014 Jordan Response Plan shelter strategy.

The 2013 NAR noted that available vacant housing stock has largely been exhausted. The supply side response has included: increasing rental prices, subdividing existing units, converting basements, garages, storage spaces and farm buildings into rental accommodation, and some construction of rental units by private individuals. To date there has been no large scale private sector response, despite the fact that the construction sector alone accounts for 5 percent of Jordan’s GDP. Meanwhile the government, including the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) has been reluctant to engage with this issue, as their mandate is focused on housing for Jordanians, not Syrians.

Some of the negative impacts of the Syrian crisis include the following:

- Depletion of household savings: According to CARE, rental prices have reportedly increased in the north from pre-crisis levels of approximately JD50 per month to JD101-200 per month, with rent being the single largest item of household expenditure.
- Evictions of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families: While no quantitative data are available, anecdotal reports suggest a rise in the eviction of tenants by landlords in search of higher rents.

Accommodating 600,000 Syrian refugees requires approximately 120,000 housing units.
- Increased tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanians: Competition for affordable housing and jobs represent the two chief sources of tension between refugees and host communities. The two issues are related. High rents compel refugees to seek work in the informal sector. This surge in labour supply is lowering salaries. There are also reports that the shortage of housing means that young men cannot get married, as they do not have a house for their new family.

- Increase in sub-standard shelter solutions and growth of informal settlements: As families’ savings are depleted, they compromise on their choice of shelter solution, resulting in over-crowding, unhealthy living environments, and contributing to increased domestic violence.

  - Strained urban infrastructure and services: Solid waste management, water supply, waste water treatment, roads, schools, clinics can no longer cope with the surge in population. Guiding the location of new housing to align with infrastructure and service expansion will be critical.

- Urban sprawl: Jordanians with access to land are building housing to rent to refugees. While the supply side increase is necessary, if left unguided, this process can lead to urban sprawl and dramatically increase the cost of extending infrastructure and services.

It is clear that the Syrian refugee crisis has severely strained the supply of affordable housing for both refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families alike. There has been no significant Government response to date, either through direct provision of housing or through the creation of incentives for the private sector to engage at scale. The humanitarian response has focused largely on camp-based solutions and has not been able to meet the broader shelter needs of off-camp refugees and host communities. This has left ordinary Syrians and Jordanians to lead the response. While Jordanian hospitality has been generous, this generosity is reaching its limits.

**Problem statement:** The Syrian crisis has exacerbated the shortage of affordable housing in Jordan, raising rental prices, increasing social tension, straining urban infrastructure and services and contributing to unsustainable settlement growth.

**Sector Objectives**

**Overall Sector Objective:** Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have improved access to affordable and adequate housing within a housing sector that helps meet the housing needs of all Jordanians.

**Specific Objective 1:** Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian households have increased access to affordable and adequate housing.

**Specific Objective 2:** Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups.

These objectives are designed to complement expected humanitarian shelter programming in a way that addresses the structural issues affecting the housing sector in Jordan. At the end of the three year NRP period, the initiatives initiated under the NRP will be institutionalized to enable the work to continue independent of additional grant finance.

**Indicators**

The following indicators will be used to measure progress towards these objectives.

- **Indicator 1:** Number of affordable housing units produced annually in the areas most heavily impacted areas of the North.

- **Indicator 2:** Number of vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian households/people with access to affordable and adequate housing options attributable to a national programme.

- **Indicator 3:** 60 percent beneficiary satisfaction rate with the quality of the
affordable housing (owner and tenant).

**Indicator 4:** Number of affordable housing loans outstanding under a national programme.

**Indicator 5:** Priority legal, regulator, and institutional issues affecting the housing sector are addressed.

### Response Plan

**Response options**

To meet the two objectives outlined above, the response options include: (i) the coping strategies of Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities – the main actors responsible for addressing shelter and housing needs; (ii) private sector led initiatives; (iii) humanitarian shelter strategies; and (iv) Government-backed initiatives.

### Shelter Strategies of Refugees and Host Communities

Individual Jordanian host communities will be responsible for delivering the bulk of affordable housing in 2014. Refugee households, however, are prohibited from owning property in Jordan so cannot contribute to increasing the supply of housing. Building permit data from the NAR suggest that Jordanians may have built some 3,700 to 5,600 additional units in Mafraq since the start of the refugee crisis.\(^{4}\) Irbid Municipality reports a 10 to 20 percent increase in building permits issued. These figures suggest that individual Jordanians are investing in new housing construction, but not at significant scale. Accordingly, this response will not lead to a significant increase in the production of affordable housing (objective 1), nor will it address institutional issues in the housing sector (objective 2).

### Humanitarian Response

Humanitarian shelter strategies are summarized in the 2014 Jordan Response Plan. The plan projects a total refugee population of 800 thousand by the end of 2014, an increase of nearly 250 thousand from the total number of refugees registered in November 2013. This includes some 197 thousand women (26 percent), 167 thousand men (21 percent), 210 thousand girls (26 percent) and 218 thousand boys (27 percent).\(^{49}\)

On this basis, of the 800 thousand refugees, the plan assumes that 75 percent of refugees will be accommodated outside camps (600 thousand), while 25 percent will be accommodated inside camps (200 thousand). The camp solution will meet international humanitarian standards for camps. As such, they will contribute to the affordable housing supply (objective 1), albeit on a temporary basis as these units are designed to be disassembled and eventually taken back to Syria. They will not contribute to meeting the annual national demand of 32,000 housing units in Jordan.

Of the 600 thousand non-camp refugees, which is based on Ministry of Interior figures, the plan targets 30 percent of the most vulnerable families for support (180 thousand people or 36,000 households).

Support to families hosting Syrian refugees includes three main tracks:

1. Upgrading sub-standard shelter to SPHERE standards through repair of broken walls, windows, improved sanitation, etc. (US$2,500 per refugee family accommodated). The target figure for this option is 9,900 households.

2. Adaptation of unfinished units/buildings; (US$2,500 per refugee family accommodated). The target figure for this option is 12,600 households.

3. Winterization support.

Beyond this 36,000 target population, two additional response options are proposed:

1. Conditional cash support for most vulnerable families (3 months; JD120/hh/month)

2. Information and legal assistance to support refugees rights, including their right to housing.

Option 1 will increase the number of adequate units, but will not increase the
overall affordable housing stock. Option 2 will bring new stock onto the market and will relieve some pressure on the demand side. Option 4, short term cash assistance, should not have a significant market impact if limited in scale and carefully targeted to the most vulnerable families. Option 5, information and legal assistance, can play a critical role in reducing evictions and social tension. It will also support legal and policy advocacy, but is not meant to deliver long-term institutional reform.

It is worth noting that this assessment is based on the assumption that the shelter sector will be fully funded. The fifth Jordan Regional Response Plan (RRP5), however, was only 61 percent funded as at November 2013. In addition, the shelter response, as noted above, was broadly oriented towards camp solutions.

While the above data is incomplete, it is clear that even if fully funded, less than 50 percent of the total needs for adequate and affordable shelter will be met. Two additional response strategies are discussed below: private sector engagement and targeted government support.

**Private Sector and Public-Private-Partnership Response**

Despite their significant capacity, the private sector has not yet engaged in the refugee response. Meetings held with key housing sector stakeholders, including contractors, investors, the land department and the HUDC have identified the following challenges in the housing sector: (i) the high cost and poor location of available land, particularly around Amman; (ii) the lack of suitable mortgage products; (iii) high levels of security required by banks when giving loans to lower-income groups; (iv) high cost of labour; (v) building codes and regulation that are not geared to deliver affordable housing; and (vi) Jordanian expectations that a housing unit must be 120 square meters in size, with three bedrooms.

The private sector actors also offered different solutions to the above challenges and confirmed their willingness to work with the government and the banking sector to develop new models for affordable housing delivery. Collaboration between these sectors holds significant promise.

One model that has been discussed is a large-scale affordable housing programme. The aim is to produce 30,000 new units of affordable housing through a partnership between the government of Jordan, the construction sector and Jordanian banks. Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families will be able to rent adequate and affordable housing. Jordanian landlords, meanwhile, will ultimately benefit by increasing their household assets and more rapidly paying down mortgages. The GOJ will also benefit from increased tax revenue from sales tax, building permits and property tax. More broadly, the initiative will stimulate growth in the construction and banking sectors. As Syrian labourers are active in the construction sector, it is likely that the initiative will also increase the household incomes of Syrian refugees.

The programme will contribute to the easing of tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities. Many Jordanians feel that “aid has not been distributed in a fair manner... [in] blatant disregard of the Jordanian community’s needs.” Through this initiative Jordanians will benefit from long-term asset accumulation, property being the preferred savings vehicle. Young Jordanian men will also be able to marry and start a family, as additional housing units are brought onto the market.

**Government institutional, legal and policy reforms to support affordable housing**

To complement these interventions, and to address some of the long-term structural challenges in the housing sector, a programme of legal, institutional and policy reform is also required. The affordable housing programme described in section (iii) above will proceed independent of these reforms, but its lessons will inform the sector reforms.

Activities will include: the preparation of a new national housing strategy to replace the one developed in 1989; the adoption of new housing law, clarifying the respective roles of the public and private sectors; and strengthening the capacity of the HUDC, and
related institutions, in line with the new policy and law.

**Prioritisation**

For government, humanitarian and development partners interested in simultaneously impacting issues of shelter, social cohesion, unemployment, economic development, municipal services and government revenue, the housing sector represents a strategic entry point.

It is also evident from the analysis above that the housing component of the NRP must integrate humanitarian and development responses. The massive scale of the refugee influx, combined with the lead-time required to increase the supply of adequate and affordable housing, necessitates the continued engagement of humanitarian actors, quite possibly through the entire NRP period. The challenge lies in coordinating the interventions to ensure short-term needs are met while also addressing supply-side shortages and institutional issues.

Interventions outlined have been considered against the following prioritization criteria:

1. Clear link to critical unmet need.
2. Strategic intervention with the potential to contribute to a wide range of objectives across the NRP.

**Proposed Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian families have secure access to affordable and adequate housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Emergency adaptation of existing housing to accommodate Syrian refugees.</td>
<td>Covered under RRP6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Affordable housing for social cohesion and local economic development</td>
<td>1,663,000</td>
<td>1,464,000</td>
<td>1,379,000</td>
<td>4,506,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 2: Housing-related institutions, regulations and policies enable housing markets to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and all Jordanians, including vulnerable groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Jordan housing sector reforms</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,913,000</td>
<td>1,714,000</td>
<td>1,629,000</td>
<td>5,256,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Demonstrable impact within short period of time (within three months to three years), be highly cost effective, achieving the best value possible for funds invested.

4. Reinforcing humanitarian activities to ensure that short-term measures in the housing sector are complemented by medium-term interventions (affordable housing programme) and longer term resilience (legal, institutional and policy reform in the housing sector).

5. Address clearly identified and measurable vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups by the hosting effort.

6. National stakeholders from the construction sector, banking sector and government indicate that support for the response is a top priority.

Three interventions are included in the NRP: (i) specific programme targeting the adaption of existing housing stock to increase the supply of affordable housing (described in Jordan Response Plan 2014); (ii) affordable housing programme; (iii) institutional, policy and legal reform in the housing sector. These are detailed in section 3.4 below.
2.5 Livelihoods & Employment

Situation Analysis

The assessment conducted by the UN in November 2013 on the effects of the influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates that poor and vulnerable Jordanian households are the most impacted with regard to livelihoods and employability; particularly, in the four governorates of Amman, Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa. The employment and livelihood conditions for a significant proportion of Jordanians were already dire prior to the influx of Syrian refugees. High youth unemployment rates had become ‘structural’ and a drag on the economy. These factors co-exist with the prevalence of low quality and low productivity jobs, which are occupied by non-Jordanian workers, pushing wages down. The percentage of working poor was already high, possibly due to a large informal economy, and the total number of poor households has been steadily increasing. The fragility of Jordan’s agricultural sector, which employs a significant number of Jordanians and which is heavily dependent on exchanges with Syria, has been exacerbated by an increased pressure over the natural – including pastoral - resources and productive base, while Syria’s has been exacerbated by drought. Furthermore, food prices have been affected by pre-existing government austerity measures implemented over the past two years to reduce subsidies on food and fuel. All of the above increases Jordanians’ vulnerability to shocks, but especially that of communities hosting large numbers of refugees.

The influx of Syrian refugees is undeniably affecting the labour market and livelihood opportunities in several ways. The impact on labour supply is especially high in the four main host governorates where Syrians are estimated to constitute around 8.4 percent of the total potential active labour force and as much as one-third of all the unemployed. Indeed, the unemployment rate in the four governorates increased from 12.2 to 12.4 percent between 2010 and 2012, while on a national level, the unemployment rate rose from 12.7 to 13.1 percent in the same period.

Evidence suggests that the main impact of the increasing number of the Syrian workers in the labour market has been to put significant downward pressure on wages, which has led to an enlarged informal economy. Several surveys and assessments indicate that male Syrian refugees are being employed in specific localities, with concentrations in informal agriculture, construction, food services and retail trade; suggesting that, to an extent, Syrian refugees have displaced Jordanian labour. This takes place predominantly in local and informal settings, where seasonal irregular work is found. It is also as a result of weak enforcement of laws, which gives employers the ability to hire informally and below the national minimum wage. This situation gives rise to labour exploitation and deteriorating working conditions, including an increase in child labour, which disproportionately impacts the most vulnerable. Given that more than half of the poor are working, and that about half of the total income of the poor is derived from wages, it can be safely stated that this downwards pressure on wages threatens to intensify the degree of poverty and vulnerability among Jordanians in host communities.

Vulnerable local communities are also experiencing reduced access to social safety nets. This is largely due to the increased competition between Syrian refugees and the poorest segments of host communities for informal charitable and relief services, and scarce natural resources. This is compounded by the sizable competition for low-level employment or income generating opportunities, and accompanied by weak income support services such as employment and business development services, economic empowerment opportunities, and the capacity of local markets to create new jobs. These factors deepen the vulnerability of the local population rendering them unable to withstand the shocks brought about by the Syrian crisis.
Vulnerable women, whether looking for income earning opportunities or dependent on dwindling social support, are particularly impacted. Among Syrian women, there has been some limited development of home-based activities such as taking on sewing, cooking, baking and cleaning for Jordanian households, as well as running informal hair salons. While some of these activities may have augmented local services, rather than displacing existing Jordanian informal activities, there is some evidence that poorer Jordanian women—particularly those who head households—may face increasing competition in home-based production activities from Syrian women.

The negative impact of the crisis on the agricultural sector creates challenges for Jordanian livelihoods, especially in rural areas. There are increased unfettered movements of livestock and crops across borders from both Syria and Iraq into Jordan. This represents a major concern because Syrian livestock and crops have not been vaccinated or treated against trans-boundary animal and crop diseases for at least 24 months. This can lead to serious loses of productive assets for Jordanian farmers, further undermining their capacity to produce, which significantly reduces their income and places their food and nutritional security at risk. This problem is exacerbated by the insufficient resources of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to control such threats. As a result the Jordanian agricultural sector, which already experiences low levels of productivity by global standards and has been struggling to cope with the challenges of climate change, is exposed to increased risk.

The serious decline in (formal and informal) trade between Jordan and Syria and the closure of important trade routes passing through Syria has resulted in a significant increase in the cost of production inputs. Jordanian smallholder farmers, of which there are many, are now unable to get their perishable horticultural produce to market, resulting in an overall fall in farm-gate prices. The direct impact is a reduction in the income of already vulnerable families of landless, marginal and small-scale farmers from host communities, worsening their living conditions. The knock-on effects reduce their ability to purchase safe and nutritious foods products, which in turn impacts their diet, caloric intake and nutritional security.

Finally, the increasing risk of land degradation in the Badia rangelands of Mafraq Governorate further threatens people’s livelihoods. Because nomadic and transhumant herds are not able to seasonally migrate to Syria, they stay in the Badia for longer periods and overgraze the fragile pastures. The limited water resources of the Badia are also at serious risk as a result of increasing demands from refugees and livestock populations.

**Sector Objectives**

**Overall Sector Objective:** *The capacity of poor and vulnerable households in host communities is strengthened to cope with and recover in a sustainable way from the impact of the Syrian crisis, and mitigate future effects on their employment and livelihoods.*

**Specific Objective 1:** Create more and better job opportunities for the poor and the vulnerable (women and youth).

**Specific Objective 2:** Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for poor and vulnerable households (women and youth).

**Specific Objective 3:** Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources.

**Specific Objective 4:** Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households.

**Response Plan**

**Prioritisation**

Under the resilience approach which guides the vision of the present plan, interventions are tailored to address both the impact of...
the crisis and the underlying vulnerabilities that exacerbate its effects. Thus, ideally, short, medium and long-term interventions should be mutually supportive and implemented simultaneously.

In line with the resilience vision, immediate attention is given to those interventions directed at supporting affected and vulnerable populations coping with the effects of the crisis in the short-term, through protecting people’s livelihoods and income-generation capacity, as a way to avoid further depletion of their assets. Informed by assessments carried out prior to this planning exercise, the following priorities are addressed:

1. Generating immediate job opportunities to absorb the high unemployment among the low skilled jobseekers in poor and vulnerable households simultaneously supporting local infrastructure, public works, and agricultural initiatives;

2. Address the serious threat posed by animal and crops trans-boundary diseases and pests affecting assets and productivity through supporting MOA in animal health & production challenges;

3. Immediate preservation of productive and income generation capacities to access food and basic services (food vouchers or direct distribution or cash for food, integrated homestead farming and emergency on-farm job creation), while also protecting the natural resource base on which livelihoods depend (through community-based water harvesting and range management practices).

The implementation of more detailed food security and livelihoods assessments is also regarded of the highest priority, to ensure proper targeting geared towards the poorest and most vulnerable, hence efficient and effective action on the ground. This will, in turn, better inform future planning and make available additional information for well-informed prioritization of actions.

Simultaneously, interventions supporting recovery should also receive adequate attention. Taking into account, inter alia, criteria related to the cost-effectiveness of the different response options in addressing the problems identified from different perspectives, priority should be given to: providing employment services that result in successful placement for youth and women through comprehensive active labour programs; micro-capital investments in micro and small business projects that empower the poor and create employment opportunities; strengthening national capacities for animal and crop diseases and pests surveillance and control; expansion of integrated homestead farming with added value created from community-based agro-processing and marketing; application and validation of good practices for the restoration of rangelands and water resources; systems for managing food supply and subsidies; demonstration of climate-smart technologies and practices for increased agricultural production and diversification.

The guiding principles of resilience suggest that all interventions be formulated with a continuum lens with a focus on longer-term action for building national and local capacity to scale up and sustain recovery efforts and development gains. At the same time there will be periodic monitoring of food security vulnerability and institutional support to agricultural and food security policies, e.g. regional TAD control, value chain development through public-private partnerships, national farmer field school programme for agricultural diversification and intensification and Badia rangeland improvement/enhanced livestock production.
### Table 7: Livelihoods & Unemployment Proposed Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods &amp; Employment</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 1: Create more and better job opportunities for the poor and the vulnerable (women and youth)</strong></td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>64,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Short-term job creation for poor and vulnerable households in host communities</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Development of an integrated active labor program to support permanent employment for job seekers in host communities</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>38,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.3: Enhance labor market governance for an effective response to the employment challenges exacerbated by the influx of Syrian refugees</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 2: Revive the local economies of the most-affected areas through support to existing and new micro and small enterprises for poor and vulnerable households (women and youth)</strong></td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
<td>37,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Support micro, small and medium income generating projects for poor &amp; vulnerable households</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.2: Promoting new economic opportunities through the development of value chains linking local capacities with local, national and international markets</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.3: Improve Rural Income Generation and Employment through Integrated Homestead Farming, Agro-processing and Marketing</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 3: Restore and preserve pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources</strong></td>
<td>6,600,000</td>
<td>7,750,000</td>
<td>4,750,000</td>
<td>19,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.1: Strengthen Control of trans-boundary animal diseases (TADs) and improve animal health services</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>3,450,000</td>
<td>3,450,000</td>
<td>9,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.2: Strengthen community based Natural Resource Management in the Badia rangelands of Jordan</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.3: Restoration of forestry, rangeland, and water harvesting assets through community based cash-for-work</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 4: Improve food security for poor and vulnerable households</strong></td>
<td>8,550,000</td>
<td>7,050,000</td>
<td>5,050,000</td>
<td>20,650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.1: Diversification and intensification of smallholders agricultural and food production through the promotion of climate-smart technologies</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>7,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.2: Transfer of unconditional food assistance to food insecure Jordanians in the form of food or cash</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.3: Support food security analysis and information systems and strengthen national capacities and policy formulation accordingly</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.4: Support the national capacity in the management of bread subsidy, food security strategy, and food security monitoring system</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 4.5: Strengthen the control, reporting and early warning of trans-boundary plant pest and diseases</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50,150,000</td>
<td>53,800,000</td>
<td>36,800,000</td>
<td>140,750,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6 Local Governance & Municipal Services

Situation Analysis

Jordan’s sub-national governance system has struggled to cope with the challenges imposed by the Syrian crisis, which has exacerbated a range of systemic and capacity deficiencies that prevent governorates and municipalities (newly-elected Municipal Councils) from meeting the demands placed on its services. The pre-crisis challenges confronting governorates and municipalities were already great, however the crisis has ensured that service delivery and local development planning requirements have been far exceeded.

The crisis has brought to the fore deficiencies in the capacities of Jordanian municipalities. Prime among them include: limited attention to service delivery performance, standards and outcomes; out-dated equipment and logistical means to ensure delivery and maintenance of services and assets; insufficient capacities underpinned by a freeze on public recruitment and a patronage-based system of recruitment; limited attention to unplanned urban growth resulting in increased informal settlements; limited participation especially in local development planning; out-dated financial management practices and systems; de facto authority vested in the hands of the Mayor with limited checks-and-balances; and inadequate civic engagement. There has been a steady decline in approval ratings.

The financial situation in most municipalities exacerbates these problems further: many are faced with a crippling salary burden and unsustainable debt service; own revenue generation is limited and constrained by legislation and vested interests; the current transfer system for funds to municipalities is unpredictable, insufficiently transparent and does not clearly address equalization requirements; and, consequently, municipal authorities have little, if any, investment capacity to respond to the growing needs of the population (or indeed, the recent surge in populations brought on by the Syrian crisis in some areas). The above picture is by no means uniform, with large variations, dependent on the size and capacity of municipalities. To compound these challenges, there is an insufficient regulatory framework to guide municipalities in their administrative duties and insufficient clarity in role division between governorates and municipalities.

UNHCR figures indicate that 80 percent of Syrian refugees have settled in non-camp settings in urban and rural areas. Across Jordan’s 12 governorates, 129 thousand (22.5 percent) are living in Irbid, 187 thousand (32.6 percent) in Mafraq, 143 thousand (24.9 percent) in Amman, 50 thousand (8.7 percent) in Zarqa and 65 thousand (11.4 percent) are spread across the rest of the country.53 All municipalities in Irbid and Mafraq Governorates have witnessed an increase in population as a result of the crisis, while some have experienced an unsustainable population surge (Mafraq – 128 percent; Ramtha – 47 percent; Al Serhan – 45 percent). Consequently, initial assessments on the impact of the crisis have focused almost exclusively on municipalities in the two northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq. More data is required in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the effect of the crisis on the overall local governance system, and on affected populations. However, it is evident that the sudden Syrian population influx has contributed to the following notable impacts:

- Heightened pressure on municipalities to deliver more and better municipal and social services, address housing deficiencies, induce local economic development, and support social cohesion of communities.
- Increased local tensions particularly from Jordanian citizens in host communities that are starting to demand a more effective response to
their own needs from state institutions and local authorities, particularly in smaller communities.

- Temporary reprioritization of electoral and planned development programmes and investment frameworks in affected areas, with the longer-term potential to derail efforts to introduce and sustain a new system of horizontal sub-national planning.
- Critical decisions on the future shape of sub-national governance threaten to be delayed further as a consequence of the urgent need to respond to the pressing needs of host communities.

The number of Syrian refugees residing outside the refugee camps in Jordanian communities adds additional pressure to municipalities already struggling to provide essential services. Solid Waste Management (SWM) is a particular concern; the influx of refugees means in principle an increase of an estimated 340 tons of waste to dispose of daily. Prior to the crisis, SWM capacity was in many respects already exceeded, logistical means were out-dated and insufficient, financial means overwhelmed by increasing fuel cost, and technical and institutional processes inefficient – and environmentally not sustainable. There are other major resilience (sustainability) challenges related to the full optimization of provisions of the Law of Municipalities (i.e. the role of Joint Service Councils in the latter stages of the SWM cycle - handling, volume reduction and treatment and landfilling).

A number of other municipal services and planning functions are impacted directly by the crisis: (i) urban management capacity and development control (related to urban growth and new construction); (ii) lack of roads, storm water drainage and street lighting in new settlement expansion areas; (iii) road degradation as a result of heavy transport loads; (iv) overutilization of public spaces and parks as transit areas for refugees; (v) inadequate capacity of municipal cemeteries; (vi) inadequate housing solutions; (vii) poor water and sanitation conditions as a result of inadequate infrastructure (provided by central government agencies); (viii) lack of prioritization of earlier LED gains/initiatives as urgent service delivery, humanitarian assistance, and social cohesion efforts take priority, etc.

Municipal services have been adversely affected by the Syrian crisis, and delivery performance is, in the most affected areas, for the most part, rapidly declining. Without a significant adjustment to the mechanisms for calculating, collecting, and utilizing own-revenues and transfers, the outlook with regard to municipal service delivery will remain bleak given the prospect of a sustained increase in the refugee population in affected areas. Jordanian host communities are witnessing declining service levels and social tension is rising.

A number of interventions have been, or are about to be, initiated that support Municipalities to overcome some of the above challenges, albeit with varied geographic targeting. The EU have been piloting local economic development and municipal capacity building respectively through the Baladyati and PLEDJ programmes in five governorates, and will soon initiate a new programme supporting national policy dialogue on decentralisation. The Regional and Local Development Programme (RLDP) is implemented by MOMA and the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB) with funding from the World Bank and AFD. The project has been providing a wide range of support to municipalities across Jordan, including for the procurement of equipment and building capacity. Amongst its closing activities, it is expected to finance the development of a solid waste management strategy for Jordan and to procure SWM equipment at a cost of US$ 2 million. However, this equipment is not explicitly targeted at Northern municipalities. The World Bank is also implementing through MOMA and CVDB an Emergency Services and Social Resilience Program (ESSRP) with funding from the UK, Canada, and Switzerland through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. ESSRP is aimed at helping Jordanian municipalities and
host communities address the immediate service delivery impacts of Syrian refugee inflows and strengthen municipal capacity to support local economic development.

Through the provision of direct grants, the project will help municipalities bring back their service delivery levels to pre-crisis levels through improvements in solid waste collection, waste water management, rehabilitation, street lighting, and bringing back an overall improvement in the quality of life. It will also support municipalities in revising their local development plans by taking into account the new challenges and paving the way for improved investments that could generate employment opportunities for the local communities. These interventions will help address the rising community tensions resulting from the present crisis, thereby bringing stability into the northern region and help improve the capacity of local institutions in managing similar future crises. Since ESSR will be dependent on the articulation of specific needs by concerned municipalities, the exact focus of investments towards SWM and different municipal services is still to be defined.

UNDP has initiated several phases of support to improve the system of property tax management and collection, and recently initiated the Host Communities Programme (HCP), with a focus on institutional coordination, municipal services, livelihoods, community participation, and social cohesion with initial seed funding of US$4 million from the Government of Japan. New donor funding (e.g. Japan, Switzerland, and Canada) has been committed through HCP based on articulated Government plans for a range of municipal services (e.g. SWM equipment, landfills and roads). UNDP is expected to provide technical assistance to the ESSRP. SDC already allocated US$2 million through HCP/UNDP. The government of Japan provided US$10 million to the government of Jordan to purchase equipment and machinery. On behalf of the German government, GIZ will provide technical assistance through workshops equipped to train municipality staff on solid waste equipment maintenance. Italy also will also provide around US$1.5 million of support to MOMA.

The humanitarian response has primarily targeted Syrian populations living in the camps, and to a lesser extent in Jordanian communities, although some small-scale interventions have been provided towards municipal infrastructure and services. With regard to the overall local governance system, there have been a number of national and local interventions aimed at supporting local public sector service delivery and local development, but these remain insufficient to address growing municipal needs at the short term, and less sufficient at the medium term.

Problem statement: Municipalities do not have the requisite capacity (finances, human resources and expertise, and equipment) to meet key service delivery and local development priorities stemming from the Syrian crisis and the sub-national planning and execution machinery is out-of-sync with current development and crisis mitigation challenges.

Sector Objectives

Overall sector objective: The Jordanian local governance system is responsive to host citizens’ and communities’ needs identified in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis.
The following indicators may be used to measure progress towards these objectives:

1. Crisis-affected populations benefiting from improved service delivery in 50 most affected Municipalities (27 in Irbid and Maqra Governorates and 23 in other Governorates). (Baseline: No improvements in service delivery in 2013 in host communities).

2. 70 percent of northern municipalities ensuring pre-crisis levels of service delivery in one or more areas: (i) solid waste; (ii) local roads; (iii) street cleaning; (iv) parks/recreational space; (v) community services. (Baseline: 20 percent of northern municipalities maintain pre-crisis service delivery rate in SWM in 2013 - UNDP survey).

3. At least five service delivery chains benefiting from technical improvements, new partnership arrangements or other interventions which result in at least 25 percent cost-efficiency gains.

4. 70 percent of northern municipalities with service delivery budget increase (2015 vs. 2013) by rate equivalent to at least half of their demographic growth rate (Baseline: 38 percent of northern municipalities with budgets increased in 2014 by more than half of their demographic growth rate - MOMA data 2013).

5. 30 municipalities benefiting from direct financial support clearing annual technical audits without adverse opinion (Baseline: No municipalities benefiting from block grants or direct project support in 2013).

6. 75 percent satisfaction rate with municipal service delivery among host communities (Baseline: 50 percent satisfaction rate with municipal services in survey conducted in July 2013 - Global Communications).

7. 15 municipalities (five in Irbid; five in Maqra; five from surrounding area) have updated spatial plans, including 60 community-level plans, to support coordinated implementation of humanitarian, government and development projects (Baseline: eight municipalities with plans).

**Response Plan**

**Response options**

As outlined in the situation analysis, Jordanian municipalities do not have the requisite capacity to respond to key service delivery and local development priorities stemming from the Syrian crisis. The sub-national planning and execution machinery is out-of-sync with current development and crisis mitigation challenges. These issues cannot only be resolved at the sub-national level given that there remain a number of unresolved challenges within the wider local governance system.

Specific objectives outlined for the local governance sector will help mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis in host communities whilst also contributing to Jordan’s national development priorities. In this regard, they are designed with a resilience-based approach in mind:

**Coping**

- **Specific objective 1:** Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.

- **Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.

**Recovering**

- **Specific objective 1:** Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities to respond to the crisis.

- **Specific objective 2:** Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.
**Sustaining**

- **Specific objective 2: Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.**

- **Specific objective 3: Local governance systems become more resilient to crisis over the long-term as a result of better performance in core functions and more enabling legal and fiscal framework.**

Within these objectives, six broad interventions are foreseen that will target host communities in the most affected municipalities of Jordan. Options exist to implement these interventions either as large or small programmes or projects. Most of the interventions will target 27 municipalities in Mafraq and Irbid Governorates (this excludes municipalities targeted by the WB funds through the ESSR Programme). Interventions will also target the 23 most affected municipalities in other governorates although the emphasis on providing equipment and works throughout the whole SWM cycle (including the rehabilitation and upgrading of nine landfills) will mean that additional municipalities will be reached in other governorates. Support may be provided to municipalities in additional governorates given sufficient justification.

Interventions will target urgently required investment and capacity building in municipal services and infrastructure, with a particular focus on SWM. Many of the investments foreseen in this plan respond to needs that have been identified during the process of preparing Governorate Development Plans. Options exist to disburse funds through existing or new donor grant mechanisms in the immediate **coping** phase while, for the **recovering** phase, the GOJ has committed to a gradual increase in the transfers pool for municipalities during 2014 and 2015. Debt relief may be considered for municipalities facing the biggest service delivery gaps. In addition to these investments, interventions will also address immediate and longer-term capacity development requirements related to the different stages of the SWM cycle (handling, treatment and disposal), and other municipal service lines (road maintenance and development, street lighting, small/storm water and sewage maintenance works, parks and public space maintenance, slaughterhouse improvements and development), while significant efforts will be made to support concerned Joint Service Councils to fulfill their mandate as prescribed by the Municipalities Law.

In the immediate **coping** phase, rapid planning and coordination support will be provided to municipalities and communities in affected areas. Subsequent inputs targeting **recovering** will capitalize on, improve or initiate new community and city-level plans that are responsive to the needs of the population and the development challenges imposed by the Syrian refugee influx into municipalities. In the first year, two person teams will be deployed to the most heavily impacted municipalities. In Year two, two person teams will also be deployed one, will receive mobile teams to sustain the work. In years two and three, support can reduce incrementally with greater emphasis on mobile teams to ensure capacity is built, not replaced. Technical assistance will also be provided to strengthen capacity and planning/implementation linkages in governorate and municipal Local Development Units (LDU), with a particular focus on proactive LDU roles in capturing local needs. With regard to **sustaining** local development, Local Economic Development (LED) plans will be supported using a value chain methodology, while wider efforts will be provided to ensure access to funding for identified sectors, pursue public-private-partnerships, as well as improving business licensing processes.

The third objective will focus on **sustaining** resilience through interventions that will support the creation of an enabling environment for local public sector performance improvement. Technical assistance will be provided to municipalities in affected areas that
will target organisational development, financial management and fiscal autonomy. An assessment will also be made of the overall local governance system’s response to the refugee influx, mandates and inter-relations between different actors, human resource systems and capacities, service requirements/performance and local finance systems, including crisis preparedness. MOMA will receive support to define a set of municipal service standards, identify local governance capacity building needs, assess progress under the system of Governorate Development Plans, as well as the implementation of new Urban Planning Management Strategy and Regulatory Framework in Mafraq Governorate.

The above interventions take account of various cross-cutting considerations including vulnerability, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. In addition, they are designed to facilitate the coordinated investment of resources – whether from government, humanitarian or development sources – in line with municipal plans and policies.

## Prioritisation

Interventions outlined in this Sector Plan have been considered against the following prioritization criteria:

1. Clear link to sector objective and critical unmet need and/or gap in service provision that no agency is already undertaking or planning to undertake, complementing humanitarian activities.

2. Address clearly identified and measurable vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups by the hosting effort.

3. National or local authorities indicate that support for the response is a top priority.

4. Demonstrable impact within short period of time (within three months to three years), highly cost effective, and achieving the best value possible for the funds invested.

5. Potential to contribute to interventions across all sectors of the NRP.

6. Potential to demonstrate decentralisation in practice and support longer-term institutional reforms.

All included interventions have been identified by national and local authorities as top priorities. Prioritisations has also been made within different objectives and interventions based on these criteria. For example, while the option existed to develop a new landfill site with longer-term capacity potential, a resilience approach was applied which targets the alternative of upgrading and rehabilitating of nine landfill sites that can service large areas of the north affected by the influx of Syrian refugees and, in so doing, contribute to meeting critical unmet gap in service provision, as well as addressing vulnerabilities among the poorest and most severely affected groups living in close proximity to existing landfills. Other interventions have been selected to ensure a demonstrable and cost-effective impact within a short period of time, such as the selection of direct donor funding mechanism to municipalities in the initial coping phase, followed by an increased share of central government transfers in the subsequent recovering phase.

The Local Governance Task Force co-chaired by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs reviewed the interventions for municipal services proposed in the RRP6, where similar interventions are presented for the improvement of service provision and purchase of equipment (Vehicles, maintenance and operating cost for machines, and the purchase SWM equipment). The task force reviewed the needed equipment in the RRP6 (US$56,123,000) which only accounts for 30 percent of the total needed support, submitted by municipalities. The task force confirmed that the proposed support within the NRP under objective 1 covers 50 municipalities in the most affected 4 governorates (13 municipalities in Irbid, 14 in Mafraq and 23 affected municipalities in other governorates) to complement the RPP6 without any duplication, and to provide different types of machinery needed (compactors, containers).

Interventions under this section also do not cover construction machines (as in
RPP6, and maintenance of the main roads connecting governorates and main cities. Furthermore, the RRP6 addressed the use of modern technology in waste disposal, while the NRP focused on nine landfills in the North addressing landfill mining, recycling units, collection and transfer units, composters, and digesters, which also complements the RRP6 and does not duplicate. The same logic applies to support under interventions related to local governance systems.

Proposed Interventions

Table 8: Municipal Services Proposed Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal Services</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 1: Municipal service delivery performance is improved in host communities</td>
<td>70,744,000</td>
<td>61,744,000</td>
<td>47,019,000</td>
<td>179,507,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Improved service delivery (in SWM) based on participatory planning, provision of needed equipment and machinery, technological enhancements and new partnerships</td>
<td>44,444,000</td>
<td>40,494,000</td>
<td>33,169,000</td>
<td>118,107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Improved non-SWM services</td>
<td>26,300,000</td>
<td>21,250,000</td>
<td>13,850,000</td>
<td>61,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 2: Local development priorities, projects and processes reflect and respond to socio-economic changes and priorities induced by the arrival of Syrian refugees.</td>
<td>5,371,800</td>
<td>5,741,000</td>
<td>3,390,000</td>
<td>14,502,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Rapid Planning and Coordination Support to Municipalities and Communities</td>
<td>2,871,800</td>
<td>2,564,000</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
<td>7,325,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.2: Local development planning (including economic aspects) aligned with new context</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>3,177,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>7,177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective 3: Local governance systems more resilient to crisis over the long-term</td>
<td>3,719,000</td>
<td>5,410,000</td>
<td>2,715,000</td>
<td>11,844,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.1: Targeted support to organisational development, financial management and fiscal capacities of Municipalities</td>
<td>2,719,000</td>
<td>3,925,000</td>
<td>1,715,000</td>
<td>8,359,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.2: Creating enabling environment for local public sector service delivery</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,485,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>3,485,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79,834,800</td>
<td>72,895,000</td>
<td>53,124,000</td>
<td>205,853,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following a very detailed, transparent, and participatory needs study and costing exercise, the task force was able to come up with the proposed total cost of US$205,853,800. This requested support, in addition to the RRP6 proposed support of US$103,123,000 would still be below the actual needs of the municipal services sector related to the Syrian crisis.
2.7 Social Protection

Situation Analysis

The Syrian crisis has put pressure on the coping mechanisms for the most vulnerable groups, i.e. poor households, female headed households, survivors of violence; children deprived of parental care; children in conflict with the law; child labour and persons with disabilities, as well as social services available to support these groups. There have been three main impacts in terms of protection services, social protection, and social cohesion. Firstly, national and local protection services, which were previously under-resourced, have been put under further immense strain. Secondly, social protection mechanisms have also been put under strain by an increasing caseload, and thirdly, social tensions have led to an atmosphere of increased violence and unrest in host communities.

There has been an increased caseload for Jordanian protection services due to the Syrian crisis. The majority of Syrian refugees are constituted of vulnerable groups, including women, children and youth. Refugees have quite urgent needs, as they have already eroded their coping mechanisms (limiting their ability to survive without assistance) and are thus in more desperate conditions when they reach Jordan. The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) estimates an extra JD8 million in 2013 being spent because of the crisis, out of a total budget of JD110 million. The Family Protection Department (FPD), which addresses violence, reported a ratio of one social worker for 400 cases illustrating the low level of human resources available. Syrian cases represented 7 percent of the caseload of the FPD so far in 2013, demanding a range of resources, including placing Syrian women and children in protective shelters. There is also a general lack of mental health and psychosocial services available to families that are referred to FPD. Juvenile services have also been demanding extra resources from already stretched social workers and the juvenile system. The economic strain related to the crisis is increasing the numbers of children engaged in child labour for both Jordanian and Syrian children. The MOSD expects an increase in the number of Syrian children requiring care either through fostering or institutional care increasing the case load on MOSD overtaxed resources. and at the same time, resources for other vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled are already stretched and will be impacted by the increased caseload.

Social protection mechanisms such as cash assistance and social security were not planned for the Syrian influx. The National Aid Fund (NAF) which targets the poorest families in Jordan estimates the indirect and direct impact of the Syrian crisis have resulted in an extra 20,000 Jordanian families in their assistance programmes (cash for work, micro-finance, cash assistance) which results in an extra JD3 million required for their budget annually. Children are insufficiently targeted, with only 28 percent of NAF beneficiaries being children, despite the fact that 57 percent of the poor are children. The working poor also miss out on this cash assistance and make-up 55.2 percent of the working-age population living underneath the poverty line. The working poor are often in competition with Syrians in the informal labour market where wage pressure and competition for jobs is impacting the opportunities available for women and youth, both of which had very high pre-crisis unemployment rates. A need has emerged to evaluate the NAF to improve targeting and ensure sustainability of supported families, reducing their dependency on the fund for sustenance. The increase in unemployment is impacting the social security system and continued initiatives in Social Protection could better address these impacts on the most vulnerable.

Community-based mechanisms are also weaker than before, with social tensions and the diversion of resources lowering their capacities. With no visible end to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, as time goes by, the dynamics of the host community has been altered with observed levels of
tension, accentuated by increased economic pressures and decreased access to public services, leading to increased levels of insecurity, fear, and risk of violence between the communities and within households. Jordanians sense that their living situation has deteriorated. The crisis has also accentuated the perceived lack of sufficient participatory governance at the local and national level with host communities feeling that their needs are not taken enough into account by their institutions and/or that their capacity to solve pressing issues is too limited.

The influx has affected both the Syrians and Jordanians in host communities, particularly the groups who were already vulnerable in pre-crisis Jordan. Over-crowding in the school system due to the crisis has exacerbated violence levels in schools, crippling MOED capacity to address this problem. In response to these needs, the humanitarian community is providing safe spaces for children, women and youth (young boys and girls) in host communities and some protection services are available. Through partnerships between GOJ, UN agencies and CSOs, community centres are being strengthened to offer a multi-sectoral response to children and women survivors of violence and those at risk. However, these interventions do not have the scope to address pre-existing institutional gaps in services for the most vulnerable Jordanians to ensure a more resilient community.

The efforts through the NRP Protection sector objectives will complement the humanitarian efforts through RRP6 that emphasise social cohesion and strengthening community based protection especially against SGBV and child protection as its significant protection components. These objectives recognise the large scale of socio-economic impact of the Syrian crisis on the host community and the support needed by the host country and international aid actors.

Objectives will be reached through strengthening existing networks of service providers and planners capable of ensuring the delivery of timely responses and proper case management to ensure the protection of women and children’s rights. Thus, the key relevant ministries are Ministries of Education, Social Development, Justice, Interior, Health, and Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Public Security Directorate/Family Protection Department & Juvenile Police, Department of Statistics and Chief of Islamic Justice, National Aid Fund, Zakat Fund, National Council for Family Affairs, Judiciary Council, and the Jordanian National Commission for Women, National Centre for Human Rights. This will be done in collaboration with NGOs such as JRF, ICCS, Family Guidance and Awareness Centre, Family Protection Society and from the UN side: UNICEF, UNFPA, UN WOMEN and ILO. In addition, cooperation will be strengthened with the academic and research centres such as Hashemite and Jordan Universities as well as the Columbia University for Social Work (CUMERC).

**Sector Objectives**

**Overall Sector Objective: Vulnerable groups affected by the crisis have access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis**

**Specific objective 1:** Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups in the governorates most affected by the crisis.

**Specific objective 2:** Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people affected by the crisis.

**Specific objective 3:** Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between GOJ & community based mechanisms.

The following indicators may be used to measure progress towards these objectives:

1. Number of survivors of violence receiving improved protection services (Baseline: TBD, target: 30,000 survivors)
of violence, exploitation and neglect and child labour).

2. Number of institutions with improved capacities to deliver protection services. (Baseline: Nine FPD, one shelter; one JPD, 10 Health Committees (HC). Target: 11 FPD, three Shelter; 11 JPD, 70 HC)

3. Communities have improved knowledge to prevent and address all kinds of violence (Baseline: TBD, 10 percent of population).

4. Number of schools implementing plans to reduce violence (baseline: 50%, target 80% of schools)

5. Diversion and foster care programmes implemented (baseline: programmes implemented in 3 governorates; target: programmes implemented in 6 governorates)

6. Family Violence Tracking System operational (baseline: operational in Amman; target: operational in 4 governorates)

7. Number of poor people benefitting from improved social protection services including cash assistance and housing (Baseline: 7 percent of poor population, target: 10 percent of poor population).

8. Number of disabled persons benefitting from community-based rehabilitation services (Baseline: TBD, Target: 60,000 disabled persons).

9. Number of communities and institutions linked to the Early warning systems on social welfare indicators (Baseline: none, target: ten institutions).

Prioritisation Criteria

1. Clear link to sector objective and critical unmet need and/or gap in service provision that no agency is already undertaking or planning to undertake, complementing humanitarian activities.

2. Demonstrable impact within a short period of time (within three months to three years), be highly cost effective, achieving the best value possible for funds invested.

3. Support from the national authority (MOSD) has been indicated for every intervention proposed.

4. The representation of civil organisations, the GOJ and the UN has been wide and participatory, ensuring institutional arrangement long-term to implement interventions.

5. Objectives are firmly linked to the National Agenda and complement efforts within the RRP6.

6. Interventions improve the long-term resilience of the GOJ to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.

Extended criteria - Vulnerable groups

Vulnerability is a particularly important criterion for each intervention as this section targets the most vulnerable groups. Below are criteria for the sector as a whole which each intervention has considered in its design and targeting. Details on particular targeting, including the level of targeting according to vulnerability are identified in more detail in the intervention sheets.

1. Areas of highest refugee concentration: Governorates and districts with the highest numbers of refugees, namely Irbid, Ma’arqa, Zarqa, Jerash, Balqa and Amman. These populations have been most affected by the crisis and require resilience-building mechanisms to address the consequences of the crisis.

2. Poverty: Areas and households (across Jordan) with the highest
rates of poverty will be particularly targeted using the indicator for those below and close to the poverty line (2012 Household Income and Expenditure Survey HIES) and the Jordan Population and Family Health Survey JPFHS 2012 indicator on wealth and the Ministry of Planning and Department of Statistics Quality of Life Index (QLI). This indicator will be used on the levels suitable to the intervention (governorate, district, and household) and according to the available information. These areas and households are impacted directly and indirectly by the crisis and require support to cope with this impact.

3. Groups with **reduced access to material resources & services**

(i.e. people with disabilities, poor households, households displaced due to economic pressures)

4. Groups that have **low levels of participation** (i.e. women, girls, youth, children, people with disabilities).

The inter-linkages between these factors will be encouraged in identifying those most in need in the identified population. Given that vulnerability is experienced at a localized level, contextual analysis of vulnerability, based on participatory assessments will be implemented to target the most vulnerable and address existing social and cultural practices that may marginalize certain groups in specific locations.
## Table 9: Protection and Social Protection Proposed Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection &amp; Social Protection</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 1:</strong> Strengthen and expand national and sub-national protection systems to meet the needs of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>4,040,000</td>
<td>5,030,000</td>
<td>4,890,000</td>
<td>13,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.1: Institutional capacity development for governmental and CSO working in the field of protection of vulnerable groups such as women and girls at risk; survivors of violence; children deprived of parental care; children in conflict with the law; child labour and the disabled.</td>
<td>1,865,000</td>
<td>3,010,000</td>
<td>3,170,000</td>
<td>8,045,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Expand and improve the security forces (FPDs, police, juvenile police etc.) capacity to respond to all protection concerns in gender sensitive, child friendly manner.</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>2,040,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.3: Establish and strengthen community based protection mechanisms to address negative social norms, strengthen prevention efforts and response services.</td>
<td>625,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>2,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.4: Expand and enhance the management information systems to improve decision making; track and monitor protection cases and effective reporting and response.</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 2:</strong> Improve social protection and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people affected by the crisis.</td>
<td>109,343,136</td>
<td>109,343,136</td>
<td>80,994,549</td>
<td>299,680,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.1: Improve and increase the coverage of the cash assistance (NAF &amp; Zakat) to include all poor in Jordan</td>
<td>45,792,711</td>
<td>45,792,711</td>
<td>45,792,711</td>
<td>137,378,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.2: &quot;Better than Cash&quot; Support Mechanism</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.3: Expand housing for the poor for 11,000 poor families.</td>
<td>56,497,175</td>
<td>56,497,175</td>
<td>28,248,588</td>
<td>141,242,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 2.4: Expand and improve social services for the older people and disabled.</td>
<td>6,853,250</td>
<td>6,853,250</td>
<td>6,853,250</td>
<td>20,559,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 3:</strong> Mitigate violence and reduced social tensions through increased coordination between Government of Jordan &amp; community based mechanisms</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.1: Increased capacity of Government of Jordan in conflict sensitive approaches to be able to strengthen their early warning and early response.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention 3.2: Design and implement advocacy strategies to address social cohesion.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>113,533,136</td>
<td>114,483,136</td>
<td>85,994,549</td>
<td>314,010,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.8 Water & Sanitation

Situation Analysis

Jordan is the fourth most water scarce country in the world. Even a modest increase in population has a dramatic effect on the supply of water. The increase in demand from the burgeoning Syrian refugee population has impacted the amount and frequency of water available for Jordanians. Almost all Jordanians can access water, but the quantity supplied per capita has recently decreased in some cases even to 30 l/p/d while WAJ standard is 100 l/p/d. This decrease in quantity is also manifest through more stringent imposition of rationing. For example, the frequency of water supplied to consumers has reduced from once per week to once per month in some of the northern governorates. Furthermore, ground water in certain areas is depleting at a rate of 1-1.2 meters per year. The general state of the network of water pipes is outdated and under-sized and in serious need of rehabilitation, reinforcement, repair, and maintenance. Forty to fifty percent of water produced is non-revenue water (NRW) lost through network breakdowns, leakages and through illegal consumption and even higher rates of loss occur in parts of the northern governorates. Not least, there are increased competing pressures for water from agriculture and industry. In addition to dilapidated billing system, Jordanians perceive that the water authority is not providing adequate amount of water that is worth paying water fees. One meter cubed of water costs approximately JD2 (extraction, treatment/disinfection, operation & maintenance).

The northern governorates have experienced a particularly high reduction of water supplied per capita as over half of the Syrian refugees are located in this area. This increase in population growth has reduced the amount of water available per person. The largest refugee camp, Za’atari, with a population exceeding 100 thousand refugees is also located in the north and there are particular concerns regarding stress on the aquifer in this area due to the enormous and sudden demands that have been placed upon it. In addition, there are also concerns on the potential pollution of the aquifer due to increased quantities of unregulated wastewater discharge. A number of Jordanians and Syrian refugees have begun resorting to buying drinking water due to the actual or perceived water quality issue.

Wastewater disposal increases pressure, both on sewerage systems and wastewater facilities in the northern governorates. According to the Yarmouk Water Company (YWC), only 43 percent of Jordanians are connected to a sewage network system in the north. More septic tanks and cesspits are likely to be in use and at higher frequencies due to the influx of Syrians, with multiple families often living in a single residence. The main risk is the unsafe disposal of excreta, as the high cost of emptying septic tanks by trucks is prompting house owners to dispose of the effluent illegally. Also wastewater treatment plants are receiving increased sewage loads and some of the plants are already working at their maximum capacity both hydraulically and biologically, and most are in the need of expansion and rehabilitation according to the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ). Schools are accommodating additional students as a consequence of the crisis, causing increased pressure on their water and sanitation systems, with approximately 68 percent with poor or not available septic tanks and 16 percent of schools do not have internal sewerage networks or in bad condition requiring upgrading to be able to cope.

Water sector governance is led by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and the WAJ. At the local level the WAJ and other state-owned companies such as the YMC, Aqaba and Miyahuna are providing services. YWC manages water supply and sewage systems in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Jerash and Ajloun. The other governorates are managed by WAJ local branches with the exception of Amman and Aqaba, where water and sewage systems are managed by Miyahuna and Aqaba Water Company (AWC) respectively. Besides the
government agencies there are a number of donor agencies and governments involved in supporting the water & sanitation sector in Jordan, and all of them channelling their assistance through MWI and WAJ. More recently UN agencies and in particular UNICEF along with some international NGOs are playing more prominent roles in the water sector. Within the Task Force UNICEF is the focal point for the UN agencies while German Embassy is the donor focal point and Mercy Corps represents the NGO sector. However, the support of UN agencies and NGOs is still modest and does not meet the overall needs of the water and sanitation sector.

However, UN agencies and NGO’s so far only provide a minor input compared to the overall needs of the water and sanitation sector.

In 2013 the humanitarian community provided water and sanitation services mainly to refugees, but also responded to some water and sanitation needs in Ramtha (Irbid Governorate) and Mafraq in host communities. For 2014, UN agencies and INGOs budgeted US$153,793,612 in the WASH RRP6 in response to the immediate relief needs mainly in camps, and increased its focus on Jordanians directly impacted by the Syrian refugees in the hosting communities by improving water and sanitation for Jordanians, and conducting hygiene promotion, mainly in Northern governorates. Jordanian children in schools are targeted to improve their access to WASH facilities and hygiene promotion, which doubled and tripled the number of students are now attending same WASH facility. On the other side, NRP envisions to stretch the system to help both Jordanians and Syrians to receive water and sanitation services. Gaps remain in the state of the water network and larger infrastructure, such as the development of additional water resources, restructuring, reinforcement and rehabilitation of water supply infrastructure, extension of sewer systems in towns, construction, rehabilitation and expansion of Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP). The water and sanitation sector of the NRP therefore targets those systems which enable critical aspects of the system under most pressure to cope and recover, supported by longer term measures that seek to build greater sustainability. This supports the resilience of the local network and institutions, and more generally the GOJ and Jordanian communities to absorb and sustain the impact of the refugees.

**Sector Objectives**

Jordan’s ‘Water for Life: Jordan’s Water Strategy 2012-2022’ builds on the vision that, by 2022, Jordan will have: an adequate, safe and secure drinking water supply; greater understanding and more effective management of groundwater and surface water; healthy aquatic ecosystems; sustainable use of water resources; fair; affordable and cost-reflective water charges in place; measures implemented mitigating effects of increased population growth and economic development across all sectors which impact the water resources and their users; prepared and adapted to challenges triggered by climate change; efficient uses of water and reuse of treated water in irrigation are optimized.

Jordan has experienced several waves of refugees entering the country over the past decades. This has placed exceptional and accumulated stress on the overall water supply and sanitation systems. As a result, the water sector has never been able to move onto a more predictable and sustainable level of service. It would be more accurate to say that it has remained in a permanent state of crisis. The latest influx of Syrian refugees in such large numbers, with limited financial and personnel resources, have added a significant additional burden that necessitates a fresh injection of financing to address. Without new levels of investment in the sector, the further decline in service levels can be fairly guaranteed.

**Overall Sector Objective:** To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and in particular the Host communities
Northern governorates have experienced a particularly high reduction of water supplied per capita as over half of the Syrian refugee population is located in the region to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation service.

This would be achieved through the following specific objectives:

**Specific Objective 1:** Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of water delivery.

**Specific Objective 2:** Expanding and improving sanitation services.

**Specific Objective 3:** Addressing cross-cutting water and sanitation issues.

### Response Plan

#### Response Options

A key issue is the limited capacity of YWC to carry out donor-funded programs and to adequately maintain the existing and future infrastructure. This issue needs to be addressed to achieve sustainable impacts.

The following response options have been considered to address the impact of the Syrian crisis on water and sanitation in Jordan, but require in parallel additional provision of adequate implementing capacity in WAJ, if to succeed within the defined three years’ duration:

### Water

#### Water Conservation

Non-revenue water, meaning water losses, stands at an alarming 50 percent. That is - water leakage, illegal consumption, and limited financial resources to reinvest in operations and maintenance due to low tariffs and low revenue collection. This situation warrants urgent attention and specific projects are included below to stem the major losses from the system in the northern governorates and to improve the efficiency of the water network. These include projects on leakage control, rehabilitation of worn-out distribution networks, network restructuring/reinforcement to reduce excessive pressure and energy consumption due to pumping into undersized networks, containment of illegal extraction, rationing of water and provision for rainwater collection tanks at the community levels. These are practical and feasible measures that can be swiftly introduced, subject to attracting financing.

**Water quantity and quality**

To augment the above, a small number of specific initiatives have been selected below that would immediately increase water quantity and improve water quality in the areas where supplies are most stretched. Such projects, already in the planning stage for covering the future needs from 2020 onwards, due to the Syrian refugee impact have to be implemented now. Special emphasis has been placed on the protection of ground water resources from over extraction from illegal wells, assessing safe aquifer extraction levels, and pollution prevention measures through implementation of watershed management, enforcement of protection zones around water resources and enhanced laboratory services. This will safeguard precious supply where they exist and prevent their premature depletion or pollution.

### Sanitation

#### Sanitation Coverage

While the longer-term aim is to significantly expand coverage of sewerage networks in the areas most affected by the crisis, the short-term intervention that gains precedence within the context of the crisis is to investigate more closely household excreta disposal options in those areas not covered by networks. This is one of the priority areas for the sector under the NRP. It entails a three-fold approach: (i) the utilization of properly constructed and installed septic tanks according to the existing building code; (ii) making community/municipal connection systems available where connection to a wastewater treatment plant is possible within a short period of time; (iii) expansion of existing or the construction of new wastewater treatment plants where demands are at their greatest.
**Water Reuse**

As a substitute for fresh water irrigation, treated wastewater can have an important role to play in water resources management. As a result, projects for wastewater reuse options are being implemented and others have been proposed where it is felt they can have a positive impact on the crisis. These priorities take account the environmental implications of both untreated wastewater discharges and treated wastewater reuse on the ground water and public health. They also promote greater use of suitable wastewater as an alternative source of agricultural irrigation, community livelihoods and income generation. Further, the general lack of enforcement on the discharge of untreated wastewater and weak control of harmful discharges to the environment and into existing bodies of water is affecting the demand and supply balance both for governorates and refugee camps. Measures will be taken within the scope of the NRP to tighten up on enforcement where regulations are being conspicuously breached.

**Increasing Efficiency and Capacity**

As well as increasing the efficiency of the collection of wastewater, there is also a need to work on the efficiency of the wastewater treatment system. Wastewater treatment plants are not working optimally. In the refugee/host community areas most are either operating over design capacity - peak loads - or are in need of rehabilitation or upgrading in order to properly service the sanitary-household connection systems. On the capacity aspects, a number of treatment plants are currently receiving increased quantities (hydraulic) due to the dramatically increased populations inhabiting those areas. In parallel, increased biological loads (concentrations) are due to the increased number of sewage tanks, or intensity of their use in over-crowded households. Whilst the majority of wastewater treatment plants need rehabilitation according to WAJ’s annual report on the status of wastewater treatment plants, a number of those in the northern governorates have been prioritised within the NRP to help reduce pressure on the system in the highly impacted areas. Past experience has also shown improved wastewater treatment service delivery, as well as operation and maintenance when the private sector is engaged (i.e. public private partnerships, micro private sector participation) can be highly productive. Operating models involving the private sector will take equitable financial treatment of low-income communities into consideration and will form an integral part of the solutions set out below for the sector.

**Cross Cutting WASH Issues**

**Water and Sanitation in public institutions and places**

Water and Sanitation in public institutions, especially schools, represents an important component of the overall programme - although it is viewed as a ‘political orphan’. Specific projects have been set out below, in particular where both Jordanian hosting communities and Syrian refugee families are attending overcrowded and double shift schools in the most-affected areas.

**Capacity development**

Capacity development of service providers is required to address issues such as using PSP models for performance improvement, efficient operation of water & wastewater systems using SCADA & GIS based management systems, preventive maintenance & repair services, wastewater reuse, environmental impacts of waste water, best practices etc. Expansion of decentralized low cost wastewater treatment options with respective operation and maintenance support would be encouraged, providing job opportunities for (semi-) skilled labour in surrounding communities. This is an important feature that would enable the longer-term sustainability of interventions at the local level.

**Community participation in Water and Sanitation activities and awareness raising**

NRP priority interventions will promote the participation of local Jordanian population and Syrian refugee community
groups to work together. This would be through the introduction of governance aspects and engagement of community leaders to increase community buy-in and support of the water and sanitation efforts. Community participation can have a positive impact on different issues, such as making sure that households in host communities will conserve water, connect their cesspits for improved environmental protection and hygiene, that cesspools are designed properly so as not to contaminate underlying aquifers, or that tankers will dispose of septic waste at designated waste water treatment plants. Women and the poor bear a disproportionate share of the burden from scarce or mismanaged water resources. This is due to women’s prime role as management of the household and the poor in communities who often find it more difficult to fulfill their basic needs, such as access to dependable clean and safe supplies water. Therefore, any community WASH activities at the community level will be conducted with a special consideration of gender-relevant implications, as well as involving poorer Jordanian.

**Addressing impacts of climate change to the water sector**

Jordan relies heavily on the use of fossil fuel to generate electricity, frequent electricity cuts in summer especially in the Zaatari/Aqab area affect the well fields and WWTP operation. As WAJ is the main user of electricity in the area, the use of solar or wind power for generating electricity for water pumping would greatly assist in reducing CO2 emissions and increase reliability and efficiency of water and wastewater services in the area.

**Prioritization**

Under the resilience plan, response planning and interventions should all linked to serve and attribute to the main objective "**To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and in particular the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water & Sanitation services**".

Intervention priority criteria should include both quick impact on vulnerable and affected population areas in terms of having access to adequate amount of water and improved sanitation services. Jordan’s main water source is underground water and it is an interlinked water supply system crossing governorate boundaries to nationwide depending on the location of the aquifers and water basins. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of kilometers of transmission pipes carrying water to all Jordan towns and villages. Recovery and development should not be dropped as it builds Jordan’s capacity and gradually drives the country out from the emergency context. This will reinforce country stability in water and sanitation resources. Cost effectiveness is another factor and though this intervention may have high capital cost it is more cost effective on energy and operation costs in the long run.

- Prioritisation can be summarized as follow;
- Lack of access to safe drinking water
- Underground water pollution and transmission of water borne diseases due to lack or poor access to sanitation
- Vulnerability and number of population benefited from the intervention
- Sustainability
- Cost effectiveness and low operation and maintenance
- Environmental friendly
### Table 10: WASH Sector Proposed Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Objective: To enhance the capacity of the Government of Jordan and the Host communities to meet the increase in demand in the Water &amp; Sanitation services</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
<th>2015 (USD)</th>
<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>13,020,000</td>
<td>13,020,000</td>
<td>33,040,000</td>
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<td>Intervention G.1: Establishment YWC implementation capacity (IMU)</td>
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<td>2,520,000</td>
<td>7,140,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention G.2: Reinforce WAJ implementing capacity (OMS)</td>
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<td>2,800,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention G.3: Improved service delivery and enhanced efficiency</td>
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<td>17,500,000</td>
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### Specific Objective 1: Improving the quantity, quality and efficiency of Water Delivery

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<tr>
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<th>2014 (USD)</th>
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<th>2016 (USD)</th>
<th>All Years (USD)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention 1.2: Rehabilitation of wells indifferent governorate (Irbid, Jarash, Ajloun, Mafraq, Zarqa, Madaaba, Balqa)</td>
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<td>8,400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,800,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 1.3: Restructuring of transmission &amp; main distribution systems &amp; network reinforcement/ rehabilitation (Irbid, Jarash, Ajloun, Mafraq, Balqa)</td>
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<td>123,886,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 1.4: Water transmission pipe line reservoir (Karak, Madaaba, Ma'an)</td>
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<td>Intervention 1.5: Water Loss Reduction Programme Karak</td>
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<td>31,920,000</td>
<td>17,080,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 1.6: Supply of material &amp; equipment to YWC</td>
<td>8,568,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Intervention 1.7: Renewable energy supply systems for pumping</td>
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<td>14,000,000</td>
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### Specific Objective 2: Expanding and improving Sanitation services.

<table>
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<th>Specific Objective 2</th>
<th>2014 (USD)</th>
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<th>2016 (USD)</th>
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<td>Intervention 2.2: Mafraq city wastewater network expansion/ rehabilitation and effluent reuse</td>
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<td>22,120,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.3: Expansion Wadi Shallala WWTP</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.5: Karak sewer network</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.6: Al Azraq Wastewater Treatment plant and sewer network</td>
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<td>16,520,000</td>
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<td>15,330,000</td>
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<td>29,750,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.8: Closed Canal Box culvert from Ras Al Ein to Ein Ghazal</td>
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<td>9,100,000</td>
<td>25,900,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.9: Sewer network WWTP and effluent reuse for Bergesha</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.10: Sewer Network for Koforrakeb &amp; Beit Edes Villages</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.11: Maan Sewer Network</td>
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<td>7,700,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.12: Replacement Sewer force main, Taiba to Wadimousa</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.13: Sewer Network for Amman</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.14: 1200mm wastewater conveyor pipeline WZPS-Assamra</td>
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<td>Intervention 2.15: 500mm two wastewater conveyor pipelines EZPS-Assamra</td>
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<td><strong>Specific Objective 3: Addressing Cross Cutting WASH Issues.</strong></td>
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<td>12,000,000</td>
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<td>Intervention 3.1: Community Mobilization and Awareness</td>
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<td>Intervention 3.2: WASH in Schools</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>186,036,000</td>
<td>365,018,000</td>
<td>199,670,000</td>
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MANAGEMENT
3.1 Operating Structure

The Host Community Support Platform was established on 10 September 2013 to serve as a strategic partnership and coordination mechanism for the Government of Jordan, chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation. It consists of senior representatives from line ministries, UN agencies, donors and international NGOs. The HCSP provides overall direction and coherence to all partners working to mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian host communities. The work of the HCSP is supported by a Secretariat which provides technical and managerial support to the Platform.

To operationalize its work, five Task Forces with formal terms of reference have been established by the HCSP:

1. Employment, Livelihoods & Poverty;
2. Education;
3. Health;
4. Municipal Services;

Additional ad-hoc ‘Reference Groups’ have since been formed in relation to:

6. Social Protection;
7. Housing;

Each Task Force is led by the responsible line ministry, with key support provided by MOPIC. Donors, UN agencies, national and international NGOs are integral to Task Force membership and functioning.

The Task Forces were created to lead the NAR and take responsibility for generating priority response interventions within their sector for inclusion in the NRP. As a result the Task Forces have exercised a vital role. Firstly, in exchanging and pooling data for the creation of the NAR. Secondly, they were the engine rooms for consultation and crafting of the sector strategies – the main body of the NRP. Thereby, all members of the Task Forces have played an important role in arriving at decisions on the priority response interventions to the particular aspect of the crisis that their sector is charged with seeking to address. Current membership of the Task Forces is set out in Table 10 below:

Additionally, the membership of the three ‘Reference Groups’ is as follows:

- Social Protection: Led by the Ministry of Social Development, supported by UNICEF and UNWOMEN.
- Energy: Led by the Ministry of Energy, supported by UNDP and UNOPS.
- Housing: Led by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, in collaboration with the Housing and Urban Development Corporation, supported by UNHABITAT and UNOPS.

Whilst ownership of the content of each Sector Strategy resides with the government, each Task Force has shared in the responsibility for its production among its members, often working in sub-committees or teams, generating options and reaching overall consensus on its priorities. A collaborative, collegial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Line Ministry</th>
<th>UN Agency</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>INGO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>UNICEF &amp; UNESCO</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Health</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>USAID</td>
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<td>Livelihoods and Employment</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
<td>ACTED</td>
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<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Irrigation</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
effort characterized the process, which was an innovative one for the government. Designed as a strategic and technical partnership, the HCSP and the Task Force structure will continue to provide the overall guidance and consultative space for the next stage of the NRP as it moves into the detailed design of an Annual Work Plan for 2014 comprising specific projects and activities for immediate implementation. This phase will commence directly following the Kuwait II Conference, scheduled to take place on 15 January 2014.

The HCSP structure, partnership and operating arrangements will therefore continue to guide and provide oversight of NRP implementation as well as the subsequent monitoring of its performance. To be able to conduct these functions more effectively, the HCSP will consider strengthening the monitoring capacities of its Secretariat for the design of an appropriate monitoring and results reporting system to ensure the performance and accountability for NRP implementation.58

The HCSP will continue to meet regularly to receive reports of progress, identify bottlenecks, and consult and agree on remedies. A further development of the capacity of the Secretariat may include building on the functionality of the existing HCSP database hosted at www.hcspjordan.org as an integrated development results, project tracking and aid coordination system linked to NRP implementation. This would potentially contribute to improved data, reporting, mutual accountability and aid effectiveness.

As outlined above, in section 1.2 the HCSP will seek to achieve greater coherence between humanitarian support measures that impinge on Jordan that focus primarily on the Syrian refugees and the NRP programmes. It will gradually strive to put in place a more coordinated humanitarian and development framework, preferably under one roof, with the support of the respective UN agencies, donors and international/national NGOs. This will eventually enable a more complete oversight of all humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan in respect to the crisis, whether the assistance is targeted towards the Syrian refugees or Jordanian host communities, or both.

Ultimately to ensure its success the NRP needs to be financed. Without funds being made available from the international community, the NRP will be unable to deliver on the priority interventions contained in this document. Under such a scenario the host communities would remain denied the support that is critically needed. To neglect them at this point in time, as evidence of the impact of the crisis which they have shouldered to date is clearly documented, would be unconscionable.

Hence, the scope of its formulation and the timing of the release of the NRP is entirely appropriate. Donors wishing to make a financial contribution to any of the priority intervention responses contained within it are invited to make contact with the Office of the Minister for Planning and International Cooperation or with the Secretariat of the HCSP. In this respect the Government of Jordan urges donors to use existing or enter into new bilateral agreements through which financial support can be channeled directly to the national programmes through official treasury systems.

The Jordanian government also acknowledges that in some cases alternative financial and implementation modalities can also be instrumental in delivering the desired results and outcomes of the NRP. For this reason the HCSP and Task Forces have been established, so that partner organisations such as UN agencies, the World Bank or NGOs (national or international), can collaborate at all levels, including the important work associated with practical implementation of the NRP. Alternative implementation arrangements proposed to those of the Government should be based on the comparative advantage and expertise each partner possesses in any particular sector, accompanied by their co-operation and willingness to abide by principles of transparency, accountability and aid effectiveness. Further details on operational modalities and options can be found in the implementation, monitoring and accountability sub-section below.
3.2 Implementation, Monitoring and Accountability

Robust and clear implementation, monitoring, reporting and accountability arrangements are fundamental to the success of the NRP. Whilst the NRP document summarizes the overall assessment of the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan and Jordanian host communities, and sets out the priority programmatic responses including the oversight and management arrangements, it does not drill down into the practical operational structures and modalities that will ultimately be required to assure successful implementation. The stage of transforming the strategic and specific objectives and interventions contained within the NRP into realizable results entails further detailed planning over the weeks immediately ahead.

To outline how the NRP will be practically implemented through the HCSP and Task Forces, three aspects operationalization have been provided below. The first relates to the means by which the detailed planning, monitoring and reporting will be carried out and communicated. The second outlines the results hierarchy that will be pursued in the form of a logical framework. The third makes reference to responsibilities and accountabilities that apply during the course of NRP implementation. In all of these respects emphasis will continue to be on an ongoing collaborative approach between the government, the international community, and national partners, both at the level of the HCSP and through the Task Forces.

- **Planning, Monitoring and Reporting**

  1. **An Annual Work Plan** – will be prepared setting out a detailed, costed, sequenced and financed programme of priority interventions (projects), including the institutional roles and relationships between the main agencies in the sector required to realize the aims of the NRP.

  2. **An Annual Report of Results** – a compilation by sector of the results achieved in the course of the operating period together with an accounting of the financial resources utilized.

  3. **An Evaluation** - by the middle of 2016 an evaluation exercise will be initiated to take stock of the status and impact of the crisis on Jordan at that time and reflect on the effect of the NRP response interventions within each sector on mitigating its affects. Recommendations will be made at that time to conclude, extend, renew or redefine the NRP.

- **Results and Responsibilities**

  Within the NRP a hierarchy of outcomes, or results, have been established to ensure interventions across the NRP are directed and corralled towards achieving their ultimate purpose (see Table 2 in the Executive Summary above for the complete illustrative overview of the hierarchy of outcomes/objectives for the NRP). Within the four levels of objectives outlined below responsibilities are to be undertaken between the government and its international and national development partners working in close collaboration. Government remains at all times in the driving seat of the NRP process, with international and national partners required to play an important role in assisting NRP implementation, broadly as follows:

  1. **Level 1 Outcome**: This relates to the overall goal of the NRP. Its accomplishment depends on attaining the eight respective sector goals (level 2 outcomes below).

     Responsibilities for the Level 1 Outcome: Ultimate responsibility for ensuring the overall results of the NRP are secured rests with the government. However, the government acknowledges that it requires the sustained engagement of the international community to help it by providing political, policy, technical, programmatic and financial support. In this sense, there is a degree of mutual
accountability and interdependency involved between all partners engaged in the NRP. Whilst the government thereby exercises ultimate oversight and responsibility for the NRP, at the same time it regards the HCSP, chaired by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, as the high level consultative partnership between the government and the international community and as the main vehicle through which the NRP will be prosecuted. The HCSP is responsible for providing strategic guidance and direction in response to the Syria crisis through the design and implementation of the NRP – a collective process and undertaking based on consultation and consensus. Hence, the performance of the HCSP as a strategic mechanism between the government and international community is critical for mobilizing the necessary resources through which full and effective delivery of the NRP depends. For this reason, the HCSP is responsible for validating the NRP Annual Work Plan at the beginning of each year and for receiving the Annual Report of NRP results and expenditures, broken down by sector, towards the end of each year. Intervening meetings of the HCSP will be for results monitoring of progress and may concentrate on particular challenges or priorities that emerge through implementation.

2. **Level 2 Outcomes** – these represent the individual sector goals and are the primary areas of substantive contribution needed to underpin delivery of the NRP. Sector goal attainment depends on the successful implementation of the specific objectives contained within each sector (i.e. level 3 outcomes below).

Responsibility for ensuring success for level 2 outcomes rests with the lead line ministry, supported by the main donor(s) to the sector, the UN agency focal point, and national and international NGO collaborators, plus various implementing partners engaged in major aspects of practical delivery. The principal mechanism for ensuring a high level of programmatic coordination is via the Task Forces, led by lead line ministries and supported by their international and national partners (as set out in section 3.1 above). Each Task Force is responsible for the formulation of its own detailed sector-based Annual Work Plan and for its implementation, monitoring and reporting. Task Forces are expected to convene regularly through the process of detailed Annual Work Plan design and thereafter at least on a quarterly basis to monitor results. Task Forces will also submit an Annual Report of Results and Financial Expenditures to the HCSP Secretariat for compilation into the overall presentation of NRP accounting of progress for HCSP Information.

3. **Level 3 Outcomes** – these relate to the specific objectives set out within each of the sector strategies. The sum total of their implementation enables the sector outcome to be reached. They effectively represent a sub-component of the sector strategy and in most cases would take the form of a portfolio of individual projects. These would feature within both the Annual Work Plan of the sector and within the Annual Report of Results and Financial Expenditures prepared by the respective Task Force.

Responsibility for ensuring that specific objectives are attained is determined within the Task Force, depending on respective partner organisation area of comparative advantage. The Task Force as a whole will act to ensure that specific objectives outlined in the NRP and contained in the subsequent Annual Work Plans are fully furnished with the management arrangements, implementation capabilities and resources needed to ensure their realization.

4. **Level 4 Outcomes/Outputs** – these are individual project outcomes, or outputs that, when totalled, make up the whole NRP. They are the smallest, but arguably the most important unit
of implementation, since without their delivery, no results will be achieved at any of the levels outlined above.

Responsibilities for ensuring project outcomes/outputs are met requires practical attention to the assembly, appraisal, sequencing, funding and operationalization of individual projects or groups of projects under any particular portfolio or sub-component of a sector programme. Responsibility for determining the best and most appropriate division of labour for organising implementation can be directed by the Task Force, led by the respective ministry. In some instances it may entail the Programme Support Unit of the ministry, in others a sub-group of the Task Force meeting periodically to move projects forward, or in other cases a straightforward contracting relationship between government, donor, UN agency and/or implementing partner/s. It is the job of the Task Force to ensure that project development, financing, procurement and the appropriate management arrangements are in place for each project to be capable of rapidly responding to the priority needs within the sector. Periodic joint monitoring missions between Task Force member agencies to ensure the progress of key projects within each sector is also encouraged. Projects will be clustered under their sub-programme for inclusion in the Annual Work Plan and likewise results and expenditures reporting on project progress will feed into the sub-programme and sector reporting process on an annual basis.

The mutually reinforcing areas outlined above: i) detailed implementation planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation; ii) the organisation and hierarchy of results; iii) and an appropriate partnership based responsibilities and accountability framework, is thereby largely in place to ensure full operationalization of the NRP. Further work is required to finalize the exact nature of the monitoring and evaluation framework, which will be undertaken in the course of the weeks immediately ahead. The same is true for the elaboration of the Annual Work Plan of the NRP for 2014.

## 3.3 Next Steps

Preparation of the NRP is the third of a succession of stages that mark the government’s vision for mounting an effective response to address the effects of the Syria crisis on Jordan. Preceded by the establishment of the HCSP and the subsequent NAR, going forward, the NRP represents a collaborative venture by the government to rally its primary national and international partners around a unified plan for dealing with the immediate effects of the crisis. The NRP has particularly benefitted from the policy advice and technical input of donors, UN agencies and NGOs (both international and national), in the course of its preparation. The government looks forward to a similar degree of co-operation and engagement from partners as it embarks on the resource mobilization and implementation phase.

During the course of the period between 22 December 2013 and 2 January 2014, a wide range of comments were received by the Secretariat and systematically reviewed within MOPIC. The final drafts of the sector strategies were then validated at a workshop called and chaired by MOPIC on 5 January 2014 attended by all lead line ministries and UN focal points. A full final draft version of the NRP was then circulated to all members of the Host Communities Support Platform Meeting for consideration at its meeting on 9 January 2014. It was then finalized for presentation by the Minister of Planning and International Co-operation, as head of the Government of Jordan delegation to the Conference in Kuwait on the 15th of January 2014.

In the meantime and as suggested in the preceding section, the government is aware
that the NRP will continue to evolve and be strengthened as a national policy and programme instrument through the process of its implementation. Outlined below are some of the key next steps that will need to be taken since these activities form an important agenda of work for the HCSP, its membership and secretariat. The continued energetic participation of the donor, UN agency, INGO and NGO representatives in supporting the work of the HCSP and its Task Forces will remain critical to its success as it proceeds. Assistance is especially valued in regard to arriving at the right policy choices, and in helping to convert the priority response interventions contained within the NRP into fully fledged, technically sound, operationally and financially viable projects capable of delivering real results within those communities most affected.

In conclusion, the main thrust of the work in the period immediately ahead involves further concentrated efforts in six lines of action to advance the work of the NRP:

1. Detailing a robust, realistic and financed NRP Annual Work Plan for 2014. This is the logical next step that will emerge through a detailed planning exercise that rapidly advances the priority response interventions contained in the NRP into concrete projects for year one implementation.

2. Preparation of a communications and resource-mobilization plan in support of the NRP.

3. Finalizing the design of a straightforward monitoring and evaluation system for the NRP capable of tracking the full hierarchy of results outlined in Table 2 above at the overall, sector, programme and project levels, yet without becoming onerous or cumbersome to pursue.

4. Establishing clarity and understanding among all participants concerning the issue of vulnerability, which is central to the NRP, as it relates to households, communities, local institutions, and its definition within the scope of each sector. This needs to inform the baselines, targets and indicators within the Results and M&E Frameworks, currently being finalized.

5. Further work that serves to deepen knowledge and understanding of the three core inter-connected elements of the NRP that relate to:
   
a. The full integration of the cross-cutting issues: gender equality, social cohesion, environmental sustainability;
   
b. Application of the resilience approach: which entails placing the ‘coping,’ ‘recovering,’ ‘sustaining’ dimensions at the heart of the development-oriented programme of support to the host communities;
   
c. Strengthening internal synergies within and across the sector response priorities to effect transformative change where that is deemed most possible.

6. Upgrading the functions and database of the Secretariat of the HCSP to support the tracking of aid to Jordan in support of NRP implementation. The monitoring and evaluation mechanism will also benefit from an improved database of shared information.
Endnotes

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 11 Yusuf Mansur, Data compiled from MOH, 2013.
7. Expenditure has increased by JD200,573,500 since October 2013, Amman.
8. Figures supplied by Ministry of Education.
9. Ibid.
10. See IMF Jordan id:USU1802BM 20131013
11. See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/13/imf-jordan-idUSL1N0I208M20131013
12. Syrian Refugee Crisis Health Sector Summary. (UNFPA)
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
24. Mini
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
32. Reports submitted from health directorates in the field, MOH, 2013.
34. Biomedical Engineering Directorate, MOH, December 2013.
35. Estimate based on UNHCR Jordan RRP5 Update Sept 2013. Notes: (i) The September update includes figures for October and November 2013; (ii) the global figure does not include cash support for rent, which benefits Jordanian host families. Final figures for 2013 will be available in early 2014.
36. CARE Jordan, Syrian Refugees in Urban Jordan: Rapid Participatory Community Assessment, April 2013. Competition for jobs is reported as the second.
37. UNHCR Jordan Response Plan uses a planning figure of 5 people per refugee household, while ACTED (2013) reports an average Syrian refugee household size of 7.12.
38. Department of Statistics (DOS) and HUDC 2004-2011 Housing Sector Report
39. “Rapid Participatory Community Assessment, April 2013.”
40. HUDC Urban and Housing Indicators, August 2013.
41. UNHCR (2013) Jordan Response Plan
42. A joint Government of Jordan and UNHCR verification process in November 2013 estimated that some 75,000 refugees were living in the camp.
43. UNHCR (2013) Jordan Response Plan
53. Calculated from population figures from end of 2012 (DOS) and refugee figures from 1/2/2014 (UNHCR)
55. UNICEF 2011, Social Protection Review
57. Ministry of Water & Irrigation, 2012 (DOS) and refugee figures from 1/2/2014 (UNHCR)
58. A robust M&E system is an integral part of the NRP. M&E specialists from each of the Task Forces will be invited to work collectively to recommend a coherent design and system that enables the hierarchy of outcomes at the overall, sector, programme and project level to be assessed and reported on throughout the lifetime of the NRP. Refer also to the M&E sub-section below and to Next Steps.
59. All sector work plans will then be collated to produce the overall NRP Annual Work Plan for the year, which will then be submitted to the HCSP for validation.
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