THE STATE OF RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING
The Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

United Nations Development Programme
Regional Bureau for Arab States
Sub-regional Response Facility (Syria Crisis)
Amman, Jordan
The protracted nature and scale of the Syria Crisis is unparalleled in recent decades. Today, in mid-2016, over 4.8 million Syrian refugees have been forced to flee to neighbouring countries and further afield, and over 7.6 million Syrians have been displaced within the country. As the crisis stretches into its sixth year, the persistence and spillover from the crisis are rolling back development gains and threatening future generations across Syria and in neighbouring countries. Thus, this crisis necessitates a response which goes beyond humanitarian assistance, a response that integrates humanitarian priorities with development programming in a new resilience-based approach.

This resilience-based approach is a central element of the UNDP-UNHCR led Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) which is focused on strengthened humanitarian-development integrated responses to the crisis to better address the needs of refugees and host communities. A resilience-based approach grounded in development does not replace the necessity of humanitarian assistance but it aims to reinforce local, national, and regional capacities in creating more sustainable and self-sufficient livelihoods in refugee and host communities.

Finland is committed to promoting collaborative and integrated international action in response to the Syria Crisis. Through continued support for UNDP’s resilience initiatives and through the sponsorship of this report on The State of Resilience Programming in the 3RP, we aim to contribute to sustainable solutions to protracted crises. In these crises it’s usually the most vulnerable – most notably women and children – who suffer the most. Finland therefore welcomes the approach to properly assess the drivers of vulnerability and adapting the programming thereto.

Following UNDP’s Resilience Development Forum in November, 2015 in Dead Sea, Jordan, and the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 held in Istanbul, Turkey, it has become important to reflect and examine the importance of building resilience in the region. This report recognises the progress of resilience-programming achieved so far, highlights recommendations to improve and enhance the resilience building potential of 3RP going forward, and provide guidance on how resilience should be understood and measured.

We hope that this report will further the resilience agenda and reinforce the importance of an integrated response in addressing the Syria crisis.

Elina Kalkku
Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland
The Syria crisis, having now endured for more than five years, continues to cause enormous casualties, widespread destruction and massive displacement. As it persists it is rolling back development gains and threatening future generations across Syria and neighbouring countries.

The protracted nature of the conflict, its spillover and the need to go beyond humanitarian priorities, led UNDP to spearhead a new resilience-based approach to the crisis. Resilience has been defined as “the ability of households, communities and societies to cope with shocks and stresses, to recover from those stresses, and to work with households, communities and national and local government institutions to achieve sustained, positive and transformative change.” ¹

As a result of adopting this approach, in 2013 UNDP joined efforts with UNHCR, which guides the refugee response, and Governments of the Region to launch the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). The 3RP is an innovative response to the Syria crisis, focused on strengthening the humanitarian and development nexus within a single framework in order to better address the resilience needs of Syrian refugees, impacted host communities and national systems in neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. The 3RP framework was bolstered by a UN Development Group paper in October 2014 entitled “A Resilience-based Development Response to the Syria Crisis, which informed the launch of the 2015 3RP appeal.”

UNDP’s Resilience Development Forum, which was held in November 2015, and hosted by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, outlines in its outcome document – The Dead Sea Resilience Agenda – a number of key issues to improve the policy environment for increased synergies between humanitarian and development and approaches, including: prioritizing the dignity and self-sufficiency of affected populations; reinforcing, not replacing, local capacities; generating new and inclusive partnerships to build resilience; fostering innovation and relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; and safeguarding social cohesion.

This Report on The State of Resilience Programming in the 3RP, aims to contribute to evidence-based policy making around resilience-programming by highlighting a series of lessons learned and case studies. The examples have been collected from the large universe of partners that make up the 3RP such as the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; UN partners like the ILO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO:, international NGOs such as ACTED, CARE International, Concern International, the Danish Refugee Council, and Mercy Corps; and local NGO partners in Jordan such as Ruwwad, Luminous Group and the Jordan River Foundation.

I hope that this Report proves to be a valuable tool for decision-makers, policy developers and practitioners working to improve international responses whether to the Syria crisis or protracted crisis elsewhere.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat for organizing the consultations that informed this report, and the Government of Finland for its financial support, as part of its broader advancement of the resilience agenda in the region.

Sima Bahous
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General
UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of Regional Bureau for Arab States
Chair of Regional UNDG for Arab States, Middle East and North Africa

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<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
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<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>AFAD</td>
<td>(Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı) Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Turkey)</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Climate Change Adaptation</td>
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<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General of Migration Management (Turkey)</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DWCP</td>
<td>Decent Work Country Programme</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International NGO</td>
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<td>JRP</td>
<td>Jordan Response Plan (a nationally led chapter of the 3RP)</td>
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<td>LCRP</td>
<td>Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (a nationally led chapter of the 3RP)</td>
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<td>LDU</td>
<td>Local Development Unit</td>
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<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<td>LHSP</td>
<td>Lebanon Host Communities Support Project</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MEHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Lebanon)</td>
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<td>MoIM</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (Lebanon)</td>
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<td>MOMA</td>
<td>Ministry of Municipal Affairs (Jordan)</td>
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<td>MoNE</td>
<td>Ministry of National Education (Turkey)</td>
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<td>MoPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health (Lebanon),</td>
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<td>MOSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs (Lebanon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRR</td>
<td>Map of Risks and Resources</td>
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<td>MSME</td>
<td>Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAJMAH</td>
<td>National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (Jordan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>R_UNDG</td>
<td>Regional United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>RACE</td>
<td>ReachingAllChildrenwithEducation (Lebanon MEHE Program)</td>
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<td>RBAS</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for the Arab States (UNDP)</td>
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<td>RDF</td>
<td>Resilience Development Forum</td>
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<td>Regional Technical Office</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>UNDP Sub-Regional Facility (Syria-related crisis)</td>
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<td>TAD</td>
<td>Trans-boundary Animal Diseases</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United National Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UoM</td>
<td>Union of Municipalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Vocational Training Corporation (Jordan)</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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This report is an assessment of the state of resilience-based programming within the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), and is intended to help efforts to improve such programming and to build resilience within the region.

Background

Launched in 2015 in response to the crisis affecting Syria and its neighbours, the 3RP has been a paradigm shift from previous regional response plans, in both intervention strategy and aid architecture. The plan has been guided by the growing movement to build the resilience of the region and to better integrate humanitarian and development approaches to addressing the needs of both Syrian refugees and impacted host communities.

Following the completion of the first year of the 3RP, and the launch of the second year, it is important to pause and reflect on what has been done and learned so far in the efforts to apply a resilience framework within the 3RP and, in short, build resilience in the region. UNDP has therefore produced this report in order to examine some of the ways in which resilience in the context of the Syria crisis is understood and measured, and to examine how resilience has been addressed in programming and activities under the 3RP. The report explores resilience-based programming in the 3RP through a number of case studies of initiatives undertaken by 3RP partners, including the governments of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, the ILO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, international NGOs such as ACTED, CARE International, Concern International, the Danish Refugee Council and Mercy Corps, and local NGOs such as Ruwwad, Luminous Group and the Jordan River Foundation.

Resilience in the 3RP

The Regional United Nations Development Group (R-UNDG) for the Arab States has provided guidance on the adoption of a resilience-based approach in the context of the Syrian crisis. It has defined resilience as:
“The ability of individuals, households, communities, and societies to withstand shocks and stresses, recover from such stresses, and work with national and local government institutions to achieve transformational change that supports sustainability of human development in the face of future shocks.”

It has also defined a resilience-based development approach as “a set of principles and conceptual framework necessary to achieve resilience in sustainable human development”. The framework comprises the ideas of coping, recovering and sustaining. The principles that should inform the design and implementation of assistance include: local and national ownership and leadership of intervention; context-specific design; the integration of longer-term and short-term perspectives; thinking in terms of the whole system; financial sustainability of responses; the embedding of human rights and gender equality; sensitivity to conflict and conflict risks; building strong and innovative partnerships among stakeholders; and the close monitoring of both interventions and trends.

While the definitions, frameworks and structure of the 3RP are not perfect, it is important to recognize the progress achieved so far in translating the concept of resilience into an actionable plan. This includes: (i) the formal adoption of an integrated collective regional response; (ii) the existence of a Sub-Regional Facility (SRF) for the Syrian Crisis which has endeavoured to provide tools and assistance to guide the common resilience framework; (iii) preparation of guidance documents; (iv) a resilience “lens” which was formally included in the 2016 planning process to guide programming in both the refugee and the resilience components of the 3RP; and (v) the adoption of the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda.

**Preparedness for resilience-based programming**

The report assesses preparedness for resilience-based programming, looking at the conditions for achieving collective impact, the results of a survey on 3RP preparedness, and other considerations. The survey conducted for the report measured, amongst other things, the levels of shared understanding of resilience, commitment to a common agenda, collaboration, and technical support, using a scale of 0 to 100%. Responses to the survey from 3RP partners (government, UN, INGOs and NGOs) indicated an average overall level of preparedness of 51%—neither very high, nor very low. This supports the conclusion that while progress in resilience-based programming has been made, much remains to be done before the 3RP partnership can be said to be delivering fully on collective resilience-based programming.

**Resilience measurement**

Resilience is a set of capacities to deal with shocks and stresses, and as such it cannot be measured directly. However, with donors and development agencies increasing their funding for resilience-enhancing interventions, there is a need to “measure” resilience, not only for evaluation purposes, but also as a guide to design. This report reviews some of the approaches to measuring resilience and the scope to make better use of existing tools. In all cases, it is essential to specify the risks and vulnerabilities being considered, the constraints of the system under consideration, and how these constraints can be addressed. Measurement will focus on different things and use different methods in each situation.

It is therefore not practical to impose a standard resilience measurement system for all 3RP interventions. Instead it is better to measure resilience taking into account: what risks a particular intervention is addressing; the vulnerabilities and capacities associated with these risks; the surrounding context; the intended outcome; and a few simple indicators in a good, standard M&E framework. The challenge now is to develop outcome indicators for these interventions that can show how much more resilient they made the individual, communities or systems they are seeking to help.

**The Resilience Lens**

The report then addresses the question of to what extent 3RP interventions follow clear resilience principles. A central element in answering this question is the “Resilience Lens”, which was adopted as part of the 2016 3RP planning process.
In its current form, the Resilience Lens cannot be used as a measure of progress. This, however does not mean that the lens is not useful. Indeed its usefulness is more as a design guidance tool and as a resilience narrative framework. For countries that chose to apply the Resilience Lens in 2016 planning, project outputs were rated on the extent to which they (i) strengthen national/local capacities and institutions, (ii) contribute to sustainable benefits, and (iii) contribute to social cohesion. These ratings can be found in the sector response matrices in each of those three country plans.

An analysis of scores for applying the Resilience Lens indicates that out of the three countries, application was strongest in Turkey. Analysis by sector indicates that application of the Resilience Lens was strongest in education projects, which is a reflection of how education projects often work with national systems, focus on sustainable benefits, and emphasise issues of social cohesion. Overall, the resilience component rated only slightly higher than the refugee component, indicating both that humanitarian activities have some resilience programming and that activities under the resilience components still have some way to go to fully develop these features.

**Case studies**

The report considers a number of case studies of the ways in which the principles of resilience-based programming are being applied in the 3RP. These include: an area study of the Government of Turkey’s response in the Municipality of Gaziantep; a UNDP initiative in Jordan, to build resilience through enhancing livelihoods and employment opportunities; a UN-HABITAT initiative in Lebanon, to enhance the role of unions of municipalities in responding to the needs of refugees and host communities; two UNICEF initiatives in Jordan; and UNHCR/WHO initiatives in support of the Ministry of Health in Jordan. The case studies highlight salient features of the interventions and point to potential improvements.

In chapters 4, 5 and 6, the report then explores aspects of 3RP initiatives that significantly contribute to sustainable benefits, align with and strengthen national systems, or contribute to social cohesion and stability. The examples taken illustrate how initiatives and projects can: adopt a risk orientation; target the most vulnerable; link short-term emergency action to longer-term benefits; develop individual, community and institutional resilience; integrate and make use of synergies across sectors; scale up innovations; align with national priorities; ensure government involvement, ownership or leadership; strengthen the capacity of a system; promote integration and partnership; understand the dynamics of social cohesion and risks to it; address social cohesion indirectly and directly.

**Conclusion**

From the examples discussed in the report, it is clear that many 3RP interventions, in both their “refugee” and their “resilience” components, have resilience-building features; that valuable lessons about what resilience-based programming means in practice are being learned; and that creative approaches, with wide-ranging impact, are being adopted and scaled up. It is clear, too, that the Resilience Lens, with refinements, can be useful for shaping the resilience contribution of an initiative, analysing and highlighting its resilience-building features, and guiding resilience programming. But it is also evident that the levels of understanding about resilience and the levels of preparedness for collective action need still to be increased, and that it would therefore be good to strengthen discussion among 3RP partners about resilience, and work towards greater unity of vision and action.

The report concludes with the following recommendations for steps to improve application of the 3RP resilience principles and to enhance the resilience-building potential of its interventions:

- (i) Clarify that the resilience framework applies to both the refugee and resilience components of the 3RP
- (ii) Adopt a common resilience narrative tool
- (iii) Agree upon and develop the 3RP resilience monitoring and evaluation system
- (iv) Adopt a systematic collective learning process about resilience-based programming in the 3RP
- (v) Seek opportunities for integrated programming, in particular in employment creation
- (vi) Adopt more flexible funding mechanisms which support adaptive design and implementation.
1. **INTRODUCTION**

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), launched in 2015 in response to the crisis affecting Syria and its neighbours, represents a paradigm shift from previous regional response plans, in both intervention strategy and aid architecture. It is guided by the emerging resilience discourse and attempts to integrate humanitarian and development approaches into a common set of mutually-reinforcing interventions to address the needs of both Syrian refugees and host communities.

Following the completion of the first year of the 3RP, and the launch of the second year, it is important to pause and reflect on what has been done and learned so far in the application of the resilience framework in the context of the 3RP. The purpose of this document is to clarify some resilience concepts, propose a framework for assessment of resilience programming and illustrate some ways in which resilience thinking and programming have manifested themselves in the activities undertaken under the 3RP, with the hope that this will provide a further boost to their refinement and wider application. It is intended as one more contribution to the ongoing resilience discourse within the 3RP and beyond, which was recently moved forward by the Resilience Development Forum (RDF) held in November 2015 and the adoption of the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda and given added impetus at the London “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference held in February 2016.

It is important to note at the outset that this paper is not a comprehensive or representative review of resilience programming in all 3RP.

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1. For both of these, refer to the RDF website http://www.resilience-forum.org.
activities, nor is it a formal set of case studies offered as best practice. Rather, it is limited to a few illustrations based on a small number of case studies, as a contribution to the refinement of resilience-based thinking and action in the 3RP. The case studies are selected from initiatives undertaken by partners in the 3RP, including the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, ILO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, international NGOs such as ACTED, CARE International, Concern International, the Danish Refugee Council, and Mercy Corps, and local NGO partners in Jordan such Ruwwad, Luminous Group and the Jordan River Foundation.

The protracted nature of the Syrian crisis and the impacts of Syrian refugees on host communities and national systems has required addressing the needs of both refugees and of impacted countries in a common coherent framework that maximizes the effectiveness of the response and builds capacity to sustain it. The 3RP therefore brings two interconnected components under a common umbrella: a refugee protection and humanitarian assistance component (the Refugee Component), which addresses the protection and assistance needs of refugees living in camps, settlements and local communities in all sectors, as well as vulnerable members of impacted communities; and a resilience and stabilization component (the Resilience Component), which helps communities to cope with and recover from the refugee crisis in all sectors by building the resilience of households, communities and national systems affected by the crisis, and providing strategic, technical, and policy support to advance national responses.

While the distinction between the two components is helpful for some agencies to be able to track against their core mandate, it is important to note that resilience is not a programming area, as such, but a programming “lens”. This paper therefore also addresses some misconceptions about resilience as a common programming lens in the 3RP.

In the next section, some key resilience concepts are reviewed and clarified, and the resilience strategies that have been adopted in the context of the Syrian crisis and articulated in the 3RP are briefly reviewed. The conceptual framework and the assessment methodology used in this study are presented in Section 3 together with the results of a survey on preparedness for resilience-based programming and a discussion of the use and refinement of the Resilience Lens. The application of three dimensions of resilience in a set of case studies is then illustrated in Section 4 (Contribution to Sustainable Benefits), Section 5 (Aligning and Strengthening National Systems) and Section 6 (Contributing to Social Cohesion and Stability). In Section 7, based on observations, some recommendations are made about ways to move forward with the application of the resilience framework in the 3RP.

3. See [3RP 2015]
2. RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

2.1 The concept of resilience

Over the past few years, interest in the concept of resilience-based programming has grown. For the humanitarian sector, a resilience-based approach is a way to address the chronic vulnerability of populations to recurrent shocks and stresses. For the development sector, it is a way to address risk explicitly in development planning and to address important aspects of development intervention that we have tended to overlook, particularly issues of social and economic equity, environmental responsibility, and governance and structural change, which are at the root of most vulnerabilities. This comes at a critical time, when, as a result of both local and international crises, a threshold has been reached that requires us to take actions we have previously been unable or unwilling to take. In short, business as usual is no longer acceptable.

The value of the concept of resilience lies partly in its intuitive appeal and the sense of hope it gives in the capacity to overcome crisis rather than focusing on vulnerability; partly in that it bridges the gap between humanitarian and development interventions, and between existing knowledge about complex systems and good development and its actual translation into action; and partly in that it offers a framework and vocabulary that facilitate cross-institutional and cross-disciplinary dialogue and learning.

While definitions and usage vary, resilience generally denotes a set of interrelated capacities to anticipate, mitigate, plan for, respond to,
learn from, take advantage of, and to the extent possible, influence the occurrence of shocks or stresses. These capacities are commonly classified as absorptive, adaptive and transformative, as summarized below:4

- **ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY**: the ability to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses through preventative measures and appropriate coping strategies to avoid permanent, negative impacts;
- **ADAPTIVE CAPACITY**: making proactive and informed choices about alternative strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions; and
- **TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITY**: the governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute the enabling environment for systemic change.”

The meaning of resilience is highly contextual. In all cases, however, analysing resilience in a particular context or system requires:

- Defining the **boundaries** of the system to be considered (from individual to global);
- Understanding the **risk landscape** for that **system** (what are the identified shocks and stresses, their patterns and probable evolution?), and its **vulnerability** (which people or what part of a system is the most vulnerable, in what ways, and how much?); and
- Identifying the **existing response capacities** and defining the ways in which these capacities need to be strengthened to arrive at a desired sustainable outcome.

Resilience is ideally built **before** a crisis and its effectiveness is either in preventing or reducing crises, or in the response: mitigation, rapid recovery or, better, transformation. However, it is often only a crisis, especially a recurrent or protracted crisis that may force us to take action to build resilience. Crises may also provide opportunities for transformation that were elusive under normal circumstances. Indeed, what was learned from a recent case study in Lebanon is that it is possible to identify a few transformational entry points in the dynamics of the underlying systems and to align the emergency response to them in order to make maximum use of their transformational potential.5

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide one over-arching longer-term framework for transformation, primarily in the areas of social and economic equity and of environmental responsibility. However, what is also needed are ways to connect the building of resilience over the short and medium term, to that longer-term framework for sustainable development. Ways to do this exist, as described in the following section. The challenge is to make their use more effective.

### 2.2 Resilience in the 3RP

The Regional United Nations Development Group (R-UNDG) for the Arab States has provided guidance on the adoption of a resilience-based approach in the context of the Syrian crisis. It has defined resilience as:

> “The ability of individuals, households, communities, and societies to withstand shocks and stresses, recover from such stresses, and work with national and local government institutions to achieve transformational change that supports sustainability of human development in the face of future shocks.”

It has also defined a resilience-based development approach as “a set of principles and conceptual framework necessary to achieve resilience in sustainable human development”. The framework comprises the ideas of coping, recovering and sustaining. The principles that should inform the design and implementation of assistance include: local and national ownership and leadership of intervention; context-specific design; the integration of longer-term and short-term

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4. For an elaboration of these concepts see for example [BENE 2012] and [CONSTAS 2014].
5. [CONSTAS 2014].
6. See [UNDP/MC 2015]
7. [UNDG 2014]
perspectives; thinking in terms of the whole system; financial sustainability of responses; the embedding of human rights and gender equality; sensitivity to conflict and conflict risks; building strong and innovative partnerships among stakeholders; and the close monitoring of both interventions and trends.8

While the definitions, frameworks and structure of the 3RP are not perfect, it is important to recognize the progress achieved so far in translating the concept of resilience into an actionable plan. This includes: (i) the formal adoption of an integrated collective regional response, with both humanitarian and development dimensions, which encourages synergies; (ii) the existence of a Sub-Regional Facility (SRF) for the Syrian Crisis9 which has endeavoured to provide tools and assistance to help guide design, planning, action, coordination, monitoring and evaluation towards the intent of this common resilience framework; (iii) the preparation of agreed upon guidance documents; (iv) the joint elaboration and adoption of a Resilience Lens which was formally included in the 2016 planning process to guide programming in both the refugee and the resilience components of the 3RP; and (v) strengthening the policy environment through the adoption of the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda.10

2.3 Clarifying some misconceptions about resilience

The points below attempt to clarify some of the misconceptions encountered in the course of interviews conducted for this study, through a set of affirmations about resilience.

1. Resilience is not in itself a development goal. While more developed societies tend to have more capacity to deal with shocks, achieving resilience is not in itself the goal of development. The development outcome

we are seeking is sustainable well-being, at the intersection of equitable and responsible environmental, economic and social development. We could say that resilience is “wrapped around” development intervention and forces it to adopt a new perspective on risk, vulnerability and capacity.

2. Resilience is not just good development: While on the surface, resilience-based interventions may well look like good development interventions, their resilience dimensions lie mostly in WHY they are undertaken and HOW they are undertaken. As explained above, the key characteristic of resilience-based programming is that it puts risk, vulnerability to risk and capacity to deal with risk at the heart of the intervention. It is not just Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) or Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) either. It includes them and expands their scope in the direction of systemic change and individual and social transformation.

8. [UNDG 2014]

9. Within the structure of the UNDP regional office in Amman

10. See note 1 above

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A DEVELOPMENT RESULT AND A RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT RESULT

• Increased agricultural production is a development outcome. It may be the result of improved extension and market access – normal development interventions. The outcome is not necessarily resilient

• Effective agricultural disaster insurance scheme is a resilience outcome. It means there is increased capacity to absorb and cope with a disaster – and thus preserve development achievements.

• Climate smart agricultural production is a resilience outcome: it is the result of increased adaptive capacity.

• More equitable access to agricultural insurance is a resilience outcome. It is the result of increased transformative capacity. (It addresses power structures and governance, which may well be part of a development intervention.)

• If an increase in agricultural production capacity is sustainable despite disturbances, it is a resilient development outcome.
3. Resilience is not a sector and there is no such a thing as standard resilience programming: we cannot add resilience to the list of sectoral things we do, nor can we “do” resilience. We do sectoral things with a Resilience Lens. Since it is highly context dependent, it is not useful to attempt to develop a standard list of resilience building activities. The only real requirement of resilience-based programming is to conduct a proper risk, vulnerability and capacity analysis and then take it into account in designing an intervention. There are some guiding principles to follow, but how to apply them has to be learnt in each situation.

4. Resilience is not something that can be achieved in one sector, by a single actor, or at one level: the social-ecological systems that are the focus of resilience building efforts are complex. Resilience building therefore requires combining the knowledge, perspectives and strengths of multiple actors working coherently in multiple sectors, at multiple levels, over different time scales, to achieve collective impact. This is elaborated further in Section 3.3 on the preparedness for resilience-based programming.
3. ASSESSING PROGRESS IN RESILIENCE-BASED PROGRAMMING

3.1 Resilience measurement

Resilience is a set of capacities to deal with shocks and stresses, and as such it cannot be measured directly. It can only be inferred from its manifestations in action. In theory, an objective measure of resilience would be the extent to which:

- Certain shocks or stresses were prevented from happening or averted or people’s exposure to them reduced (through systemic transformation and anticipation);
- The effects of shocks or stresses were mitigated or avoided (a sort of immunity, through adaptation);
- The responses to shocks were optimized and the period of recovery minimized (through absorption).

Measuring objectively and with exactitude the extent to which any of this has happened is clearly difficult, and context-dependent. Intrinsically, one measure of resilience is what doesn’t happen. But it is very difficult to say (definitively and quantitatively) what shocks or stresses were avoided, as this will always require some subjective judgement.

However, with donors and development agencies increasing their funding for resilience-enhancing interventions, there is a need to
“measure” resilience, not only for evaluation purposes, but also as a guide to design, for effective resource allocation and for mobilizing actors around a few key shared measures.

The issue of resilience measurement is the subject of some debate, and a number of approaches are being pursued, including:

- Focusing on the loss of system functionality (as in engineering practice), where there are ways of measuring the ability to resist loss in the face of shock and the speed of recovery;
- Developing indices of characteristics that are believed to lead to resilience;
- Developing predictive quantitative models of food security;
- Quantifying the cost-effectiveness of intervention in order to argue for investment in resilience instead of waiting for crisis; and
- Quantifications derived from conceptual resilience frameworks.

All of these approaches face considerable conceptual, methodological and practical challenges. Each has its limitations and cannot impose itself as “the” resilience measurement framework, and some in the humanitarian and development community have been waiting to see which approach gets the “mantle of consensual approval.” Some argue that the focus on measuring resilience through a single universal framework is misplaced, because resilience is not a “thing” to be “measured”, that it means different things in different contexts and for different people, and that this risks reducing the concept to what can be measured rather than focusing on the vulnerability of people and tailoring responses to the local context.

An alternative is to better use the existing tools that we have, first deciding what need quantification is supposed to meet (ranging from learning, to monitoring, resource allocation, accountability or advocacy), and then tailoring the means of measurement accordingly. In all cases, it is essential to specify the risks and vulnerabilities being considered, the constraints of the system under consideration, and how these constraints can be addressed. Measurement will focus on different things and use different methods in each situation.

A Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group (RM-TWG), with representation from a variety of donors, multilateral agencies, academic institutions, consulting firms and INGOs, was formed in June of 2013 and has developed useful conceptual frameworks and analytical tools for measuring resilience, but its work has made most progress in the context of food security interventions, where the well-being outcome at the household level is well-defined and measurable. Even in such a limited application, the measurement challenges are considerable, as they require measuring well-being before and after shock, as well as the shocks themselves and contextual factors.

It is still more difficult to carry out such measurement in the context of a protracted conflict and crisis involving many countries, with complex pre-crisis dynamics. In this context, resilience building efforts are directed not only at households, but also at local and national systems, and the desired outcome (state of well-being) is difficult to define with consensus. It is therefore not practical to impose a standard resilience measurement system for all 3RP interventions. Instead it is better to measure resilience taking into account:

- What risks a particular intervention is addressing;
- The vulnerabilities and capacities associated with these risks;
- The surrounding context;
- The intended outcome; and
- A few simple indicators in a good, standard M&E framework.

Within the 3RP planning and reporting network, certain indicators (for example public school/health system capacities, livelihood interventions, etc.) are currently classified as “resilience” indicators. This is a good beginning. The challenge now is to develop outcome indicators for these interventions that can show how much

11. As reviewed in [LEVINE 2014], see also [CONSTAS 2014] and [BENE 2015]
12. [LEVINE 2014]
13. See papers by the RM-TWG at the Food Security Information Network http://www.fsincop.net/topics/resilience-measurement/outputs/en
more resilient they made the individual, communities or systems they are seeking to help.

### 3.2 Preparedness for resilience-based programming

#### 3.2.1 CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE IMPACT

The 3RP is a collective enterprise aimed at collective impact. This poses challenges. It is not easy to bring together a diverse set of agencies and groups, each with their own values, organisational culture, and established operating procedures, to agree on metrics, and to overcome differing and sometimes competing perspectives.

A first requirement of resilience-based programming, is therefore to ensure that we develop the capacity for effective collective resilience-based action.

A list of ten requirements, expanded from the description of the five conditions of collective impact listed in Figure 1 above, was identified for the specific case of the 3RP. These are:

- Conceptual clarity about resilience
- Commitment to a shared agenda
- A shared measurement process
- Mutually reinforcing activities
- Collaboration mechanisms

#### 3.2.2 RESULTS OF THE SURVEY ON 3RP PREPAREDNESS FOR RESILIENCE-BASED PROGRAMMING

The level of preparedness for delivering on resilience-based programming was assessed along these ten dimensions through a questionnaire to all partners in the 3RP. Respondents were asked to rate each dimension on a scale of 1 to 5 and add a one line comment to explain their rating. The questionnaire is attached in Appendix B.

### FIGURE 1. FIVE CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE IMPACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Common agenda</th>
<th>All participants have a shared vision for change including a common understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed upon actions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Shared measurement</td>
<td>Collecting data and measuring results consistently across all participants ensures efforts remain aligned and participants hold each other accountable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mutually reinforcing activities</td>
<td>Participant activities must be differentiated while still being coordinated through a mutually reinforcing plan of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Continuous communication</td>
<td>Consistent and open communication is needed across the many players to build trust, assure mutual objectives, and create common motivation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Backbone support</td>
<td>Creating and managing collective impact requires a separate organization(s) with staff and a specific set of skills to serve as the backbone for the entire initiative and coordinate participating organizations and agencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [KANIA/KRAMER 2013]
The ratings given by each respondent along each of the ten dimensions were weighted to compute a score (0 to 100) for each dimension, and the scores were averaged for each dimension. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.

This is not a scientific or representative sample, but both the scoring and the comments that were entered provide some indication of perceptions about the level of preparedness for resilience programming. As can be seen from Figure 3, the scores given by partners in the 3RP who responded to the survey are neither very high nor very low, with an average score of 51 per cent.

The dimensions of highest performance are shared measurement and effective collaboration mechanisms, although they are both barely above the half-way mark. The perception that there is shared measurement also in general refers to the existing reporting mechanism, not that we have shared measurement of resilience, which would have been a much lower score. The dimensions of lowest performance include adequate coordination and technical support and flexible funding.

All other dimensions are similar, slightly below the 50 per cent mark, with commitment to a common agenda slightly higher than the rest. It is important to note that “Shared understanding of resilience” (Q1) is fairly low (41 percent). Most of the comments explaining a low score for this first question refer to the differences of understanding between UN agencies and INGOs on one hand and Government counterparts on the other, as well as the “twisting” of the concept to fit individual agency mandates or priorities. This must be addressed if we want to achieve more from using the concept of resilience. This is discussed further in Section 7.

### Figure 2: Scoring of Responses to Survey on 3RP Preparedness for Resilience-Based Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1_Shared Understanding of Resilience</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2_Commitment to Common Agenda</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3_Shared Measurement</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4_Mutually Reinforcing Activities</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5_Effective Collaboration Mechanisms</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6_Continuous Open Communication</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7_Systematic Collective Learning</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8_Adaptive Design and Implementation</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9_Adequate Coordination and Technical Support</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10_Flexible Funding</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1: Distribution of Complete Responses to the Survey by Type of Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Number of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Agency</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is no difference in overall average scores between INGO and UN agencies (the two largest groups of respondents), with UN agencies rating commitment (Q2) higher than INGOs and Shared Measurement (Q3) and Adaptive Design (Q9) lower than INGOs.

Clearly then, while progress has been made, much remains to be done before the 3RP partnership can be said to be delivering on collective resilience-based programming.

3.2.3 SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES

In addition to the questionnaire, several observations were made and insights garnered about the state of preparedness for resilience programming from the case studies described in Sections 4 to 6. Two of these relate to the importance of alignment and harmonization and to adaptive design and management.

- **ALIGNMENT, EFFICIENCY AND HARMONIZATION:** as discussed later in the context of aligning with and strengthening national systems (Section 5), it is important to note that alignment is as much about working with the host government as it is about aid agencies working with each other. For aid agencies, aligning means aligning together and aligning efficiently. We must therefore also ask if we are minimizing the costs of intervention and maximizing efficiency. One often-heard comment in the field is the perception by host community members that the international intervention is inefficient, wasteful and poorly managed, which contributes to feelings of resentment that add to other resentments about Syrian refugees.

- **EVALUATIONS OF INTERVENTIONS** should therefore not only examine what is done, but also how it is done and used more effectively to improve efficiency by ensuring that programmes are meeting both quality criteria and beneficiaries expectations.

- **ADAPTIVE PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT:**
  
14 Ways to improve efficiency include avoiding parallel delivery mechanisms, using common delivery mechanisms and procedures where possible, and improving coordination at the national and sub-national levels (e.g. through multi-stakeholder dialogue, integrated solutions).

several of the initiatives examined have elements of adaptive design and management. For example:

- The objectives of the “Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordanian Host Communities” programme of UNDP Jordan and its component projects are described in different ways at different times, showing a rapid evolution of understanding and continuous adaptations to design through refinement and addition of new components in response to emerging requirements and possibilities.

- The UNICEF Makani programme, highlighted in Section 4.4.1, has similarly gone through several iterations, as a result of rapid systematic evaluation and learning that has led to adaptations to the design to make it more integrated, effective and efficient.

- For FAO Lebanon the multi-year funding window provided by funding from the United Kingdom has allowed FAO to address not only the immediate response (vaccination and emergency feeding) and prevention and preparedness elements (strengthening disease surveillance, quarantine and Transboundary Animal Diseases control), but also to integrate a poultry farmer field schools program. This offers scope for learning and exchange of best practices, further enhancing farmers’ knowledge and productivity, and reinforcing their resilience to future shocks.

These and other examples point to a useful way in which to structure resilience-based intervention in the context of an emergency response: have an overall umbrella programme aligned to national priorities, within a framework agreement, but implement it through an expanding set of complementary short term projects building on each other and on their previous phases in response to evolving understanding of needs and possibilities. If donors were willing to support the overall programme through a multi-year pool of funding that can be progressively released project by project, avoiding resource mobilisation efforts in each case, it would make this adaptive management system even more effective.
3.3 The resilience lens

The second stage of assessment, after assessing the level of preparedness for resilience-based programming, as described in the preceding section, is to assess the resilience orientation of current programming, namely to answer the question “To what extent do our actions follow clear resilience principles?”

A central element in answering this question is the “Resilience Lens” which was adopted as part of the 2016 3RP planning process. Below, we first describe the tool as its stands and the results of using it in the 2016 sector matrices. We then describe some refinements that have been used in examining the case studies undertaken for this report.

3.3.1 THE CURRENT RESILIENCE LENS

The Resilience Lens was developed as a tool to

i. Identify and assess resilience activities across both components of the 3RP;

ii. Advance resilience across all population groups, sectors and countries, through adequate planning, monitoring, reporting including the development of a resilience narrative; and,

iii. Create a baseline to measure how all 3RP partners are strengthening resilience in support of increasingly integrated national plans.15

It is a simple but useful tool as it fosters reflection on three key principles of resilience-based intervention (based on the R_UNDG guidance): addressing national ownership and leadership of the response, contribution to sustainable benefits and sensitivity to social cohesion / stability issues.

It requires sector teams to answer the following three questions for each of their planned outputs in the 3RP and rate them on a scale of 1 to 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent does the planned Output (and related activities)</th>
<th>Scale: 1-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Strengthen the capacities of national/local (public) institutions and service delivery systems?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: Contribute to sustainable benefits?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Contribute to social cohesion/stability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 0=Not applicable; 1= Not at all, 5=Very strongly

The ‘score’ for each of the three questions is to be entered in the appropriate column for each output in the Sector Response Matrix and country and sector teams are also asked to consider the three questions while drafting their Vision and Response Plan section in the Country and Sector Chapter. To help with the scoring, it provides a guidance table on what to consider for each score. (See Appendix A).

The point is not simply to score the outputs, but if an honest answer yields a low score, then it should prompt some adjustment in the nature of the activities to increase their “resilience potential” either immediately or in the course of implementation. It is normal for purely humanitarian activities to have lower scores, but they are also expected to progress along a continuum of good resilience-based programming, as the nature of the activity does not depend on the actor or the source of funding, but on what it actually does to strengthen individual, community and system resilience capacities.

The tool went through several iterations, faced some resistance and was the result of negotiations and consensus. Its inclusion in the 2016 sector response matrices was left optional. Some of the resistance to the tool is due to an earlier iteration (the resilience marker) which needed much refining and consultation, the perception of the tool as a measurement or evaluation, and the resistance by some host governments to introduce a measure that they are sensitive to. Some of the resistance is more technical: the subjective nature of the rating; the need for some kind of weighting if scores are to be added up across the questions; the lack of

precision in what the ratings mean in practice, especially in the sustainable benefits component; the fact that it does not necessarily point to required improvements; and the fact that such a simple rating is not granular enough to allow for progress within a level.

It is clear from the above that the Resilience Lens, in its current form, cannot be used as a measure of progress. This, however does not mean that the lens is not useful. Indeed its usefulness is more as a design guidance tool and as a resilience narrative framework.

3.3.2 RESULTS OF USING THE RESILIENCE LENS IN 2016 PLANNING

As mentioned above, there was some resistance to the Resilience Lens, despite it finally having been adopted as a collective tool and included in the 2016 planning guidelines. Since it was left optional, only Egypt, Turkey and Iraq chose to apply the Resilience Lens in 2016 planning. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) have adopted different planning processes, with the LCRP, for example, not distinguishing between refugee and resilience activities. In addition to government sensitivities mentioned above, in Lebanon there was strong resistance to the draft resilience marker when it was presented at an OECD workshop, and this resistance has carried over to the Resilience Lens. The reasons for this resistance need to be understood and addressed if a common programming guidance and narrative framework is to be adopted by all partners in the 3RP. This is addressed in Section 7.

For the countries that chose to apply the Resilience Lens in 2016 planning, project outputs were rated on the extent to which they (i) strengthen national/local capacities and institutions, (ii) contribute to sustainable benefits, and (iii) contribute to social cohesion. These ratings can be found in the sector response matrices in each of those three country plans.

The analysis of scores indicates that out of the three countries, Turkey achieved the highest scores. On the other hand, an analysis by sector indicates that Education achieved the highest scores, as these projects often work with national systems, focus on sustainable benefits and emphasise issues of social cohesion. Overall, as illustrated in Figure 3, the resilience component rated only slightly higher than the refugee component, indicating both that humanitarian activities have some resilience programming and that activities under the resilience components still have some way to go to fully develop these features.

Despite the weaknesses of the tool described above, difficulties encountered in its application and some inconsistencies in scoring, the application of the Resilience Lens proved to be a useful exercise to identify the level of integration of resilience activities in both the refugee and resilience components.

As recommended in Section 7, steps now need to be taken, not only to generate universal support for a common tool, but also, through a process of further consultation, to refine the approach and perhaps introduce some form of auditing or peer review to compensate for the subjective nature of the assessment. Once again, it is not the score that matters, but the discussion to justify it.
3.3.3 REFINEMENTS TO THE RESILIENCE LENS FOR THE CASE STUDIES

To facilitate the description of resilience-building features of the initiatives selected for the case studies presented in this report, a few additional questions were identified under each of the three dimensions of the Resilience Lens. The order of the principles was also changed here because in describing initiatives and explaining the tool, it was found to be clearer and more logical to talk first about the nature of the intervention (what is being done to contribute to sustainability), then the nature of its design and implementation (how it is being done to foster national ownership), and finally its sensitivity to conflict and social cohesion (what effect it will have on one of the most pressing identified risks).

The questions are mostly derived from the descriptions provided in the scoring guidance table (in Appendix A) complemented by other characteristics of resilience-based intervention. For the purposes of this paper, the key questions have been refined as follows:

1. CONTRIBUTION TO SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS:
   To what extent are we: basing our intervention on a clear and regularly updated risk analysis; targeting our activities to those (individuals and institutions) most vulnerable to these risks; supporting activities that address the root causes of these vulnerabilities by strengthening absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities at all levels; bridging sectoral silos by creating synergies among sectoral interventions; learning regularly and systematically from our interventions and fostering the emergence of technological and social innovations that promote equity and environmental responsibility; and scaling up these innovations for impact?

2. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP: To what extent are we: aligning with existing national and local plans and priorities; fostering national ownership of the required responses through involvement in all stages of response and financial commitment; relying on existing capacities instead of by-passing them and helping develop the capacity to prepare and implement both the overall plans and the detailed responses; and promoting integration and partnership?

3. CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL COHESION/STABILITY: To what extent are we: attempting to understand the pre-existing and crisis-induced social dynamics and risks and their root causes; using conflict management methods to mitigate potential conflict; creating spaces of dialogue and interaction among various community

FIGURE 4. COMPONENTS OF THE REFINED RESILIENCE LENS

1.1 Risk, vulnerability and capacity analysis
1.2 Targeting the most vulnerable
1.3 Linking short-term and long-term action
1.4 Developing resilience capacities
1.5 Intersectoral linkages and synergy
1.6 Scaling up innovations for impact

2.1 Alignment with national priorities
2.2 Government involvement, ownership and leadership
2.3 Strengthening system capacity
2.4 Promoting integration and partnership

3.1 Conflict risk analysis
3.2 Conflict-sensitive design
3.3 Explicit bridging activities among groups
3.4 Explicit linking activities between groups and authorities/resources
3.5 Explicit trust-building and accurate information dissemination
3.6 Strengthening security and dispute resolution mechanisms
groups, between these groups and local authorities, and between local and higher authorities and agencies; building trust and ensuring accurate flows of information; and supporting security and mechanisms to resolve conflict and disputes?

Each of the detailed questions listed above can be defined as an element under one of the principles, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Although this refinement of the Resilience Lens was discussed in the course of many interviews, it has not benefited from collective reflection. In Section 7, the Resilience Lens and examples of its application in the case studies can be a starting point for further discussion about refinement.

3.4 Case studies

A sample of initiatives under the 3RP was taken in order to provide case studies of the ways in which principles of resilience-based programming are being applied in the 3RP. This also offers a chance to draw some lessons about how resilience-programming can be improved. Various UN agencies were requested to identify a couple of initiatives to be included in the case studies. While the initial plan was for six case studies covering all five countries in the 3RP, field visits were only possible to three countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. To increase the range of illustrations, some features of initiatives that were not part of the field visits were also included, based on suggestions or direct submissions by reviewing agencies. This resulted in a mix of approaches and depths.

The case studies and additional examples include:

- One UNDP initiative in Jordan, the “Building resilience through enhancing livelihoods and employment opportunities” project (part of the UNDP Jordan overall Programme Framework “Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordanian Host Communities”). This included interviews with UNDP staff, a focus group discussion with the Municipality of Rehab in Mafraq, interviews with beneficiaries of small business development and vocational training, interviews with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, visit to a vocational training site and interviews with three Local NGO partners (Ruwwad, Luminous Group and Jordan River Foundation).

- One UN-HABITAT initiative in Lebanon, the “Enhancing the Role of Unions of Municipalities to Respond to Refugees & Host Communities’ Needs” project focusing on supporting Regional Technical Offices (RTO) at the level of Unions of Municipalities (UoM). This included interviews with UN-HABITAT headquarters and field staff, and a focus group discussion with the Zaharany UoM, Fisheries Association, UNDP and UN-HABITAT field staff and a visit to a newly constructed fish market (a joint UNDP/UN-HABITAT initiative).

- One UNDP initiative in Lebanon, the “Lebanon Host Communities Support Project” (LHSP), which included interviews with UNDP staff, Government counterparts at the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), as well as the joint field visit and focus group discussion in Zaharany mentioned above.

- Two UNICEF initiatives in Jordan: i) the “Makani Centres” Program, which included interviews with UNICEF headquarters and field staff, a visit to Makani centres in Za’atari camp and interviews with Local NGO staff, volunteers and children; and ii) discussions with UNICEF staff about the Za’atari water project.

- UNHCR/WHO initiatives in support of the Ministry of Health in Jordan, which included interviews with UNCHR and WHO staff in Amman.

For each of the above case studies, interviews and focus group discussions were conducted...
with agency staff, national and local government counterparts, and partner NGOs and participants. Project documents and other relevant materials were reviewed.

In addition to the above case studies, documents or illustrations of resilience building features of initiatives were contributed by FAO, ILO, WFP and World Vision, as follows:

- **Description of one FAO initiative in Lebanon**, the “Emergency Vaccination, Targeted Feeding of Livestock Grazing in Areas along the Syria-Lebanon Border and poultry Farmer Field Schools (FFS)” Project.

- Illustrations from the **ILO project on “Enhancing job opportunities and livelihoods in host communities in Irbid and Ma’arat”, as part of ILO response to Syrian refugee crisis.**

- Illustrations from **WFP JORDA’N’s “Voucher programme” and its “Food For Training” project run by the National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (NAJMAH);**

- A discussion with **World Vision staff about their report “Social cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan” [WORLD VISION 2015].**

The case studies did not limit themselves to the selected initiatives, but also explored some related initiatives as appropriate for each of the partners. "Initiative" in this context can mean a whole program, or simply one element of a comprehensive program.

It is important to note that these cases studies are not intended to be comprehensive or representative, nor do they necessarily represent the best initiatives. The case studies do not include a complete reflection of all project activities or an accurate summary of achievements, and are not an evaluation of these interventions. They are only meant to illustrate how concepts from the Resilience Lens have been applied. They serve to highlight salient features of the interventions and point to potential improvements.

The following three chapters (4, 5 and 6) are organized along the three dimensions of the Resilience Lens. For each component of these dimensions, for the sake of brevity and readability, we use only a couple of examples from these initiatives to illustrate the application of the principle. This is not exhaustive, and selecting one example in one initiative does not mean that it is not found in the others.

Since many of the initiatives operate at multiple levels and have different types of resilience-building features, several of these will appear in multiple contexts in what follows. This is unavoidable and is actually a good sign that responses are comprehensive, multilayered and multipurpose.
4. INITIATIVES CONTRIBUTING TO SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS

One aspect of resilience is the need to bridge the gap between short-term emergency intervention (which caters to the immediate needs of vulnerable communities affected by a crisis) and long-term development intervention (which does not always focus on the vulnerabilities of these communities to identified risks). This can be done by orienting emergency responses towards sustainable benefits and refocusing development interventions to address vulnerability to shocks and stresses.

In this area, the Resilience Lens guidance focuses on the following variables: timescale of an intervention (from short term to medium or longer term); depth of intervention (the extent to which it tackles root causes of vulnerability); scale of intended impact (small versus large impact); and extent to which transformative change toward sustainable development is sought.

The additional questions that were posed examine to what extent we are: basing our intervention on a clear and regularly updated risk analysis; targeting our activities to those (individuals, communities and institutions) most vulnerable to these risks; supporting activities that address the root causes of these vulnerabilities by strengthening absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities at all levels; bridging sectoral silos by creating synergies among sectoral interventions; learning regularly and systematically from our interventions and fostering the emergence of technological and social innovations that promote equity and environmental responsibility; and scaling up these innovations for impact.
The illustrations are grouped here under the following headings: adopting a risk orientation; targeting the most vulnerable; linking short-term emergency action to longer-term benefits; developing resilience capacities; intersectoral integration and synergies; and scaling up innovations for impact.

4.1 Adopting a risk orientation

In a normal development intervention, the intervention is usually designed on the basis of a desired development objective. If risk is addressed at all, it is usually limited to what may prevent the intervention from being successful (external risks, internal assumptions), and it is often relegated to an appendix and rarely considered again in the life of the intervention.

One of the key characteristics of resilience-based programming is that it starts with an identification of the current and potential social, economic and environmental risks and their likely impacts on development outcomes, then it designs the intervention taking them fully into account. In essence, resilience is a capacity to embrace and deal explicitly and directly with uncertainty and change.

Most of the resilience-based interventions in the 3RP are undertaken in response to a perceived risk. The risks being considered include: the risk of refoulement; risk of conflict with host communities because of resentment that comes from perceptions of economic competition, deterioration of services, and increases in cost of living; risk of radicalisation of youth; risk of environmental degradation; the risk of a “lost generation”; the risk of exploitation of vulnerable refugees, especially in crowded urban areas; the risk of transborder contamination of animals. Nonetheless, the risk being addressed is not always explicit.

- One approach that explicitly identifies risk and uses it a starting point is UNDP Lebanon’s Map of Risk and Resources (MRR) methodology used in the context of the LHSP.

- Another illustration is UN-HABITAT’s focus on urban risk. Rapid unorganized expansion in the major coastal cities, combined with refugees settling in crowded sub-standard housing in poorly planned and serviced neighbourhoods poses major risks of abuse and conflict, but also high vulnerability to earthquakes, as illustrated in the collapse probability map for the city of Tyr (see Figure 5). A systematic risk mapping and analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and define priorities for urban planning, which is now what determines UN-HABITAT action.

- Another illustration is FAO’s focus on the risk of transborder contamination of livestock along the Syria-Lebanon border. Veterinary services in Syria have weakened because of the conflict and many refugees fleeing the violence arrive in the neighbouring countries with unvaccinated livestock, thus increasing the risk of the spread of trans-boundary animal diseases in these countries. This is particularly worrisome in Lebanon where livestock is a mainstay of the rural economy and crucially contributes to the well-being of rural communities and poverty alleviation, particularly in marginal areas bordering Syria. The response to this risk, through strengthening emergency management practices of national veterinary services, has increased access to income from livestock and nutritious animal protein. But it has also strengthened the system capacity to deal with risk in general and to analyse and respond to perceived risks.

MAP OF RISKS AND RESOURCES (MRR)

MRR is a conflict sensitive needs assessment methodology implemented to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between local stakeholders in order to identify risks, needs and resources, priorities, and possible responses. To ensure the participation of the community as a whole, Municipal Working Groups are formed involving local authorities, civil society and the private sector, for each targeted municipality.

The objective of MRR is to support coordinated interventions at municipal level through the preparation of Multi-sectorial Municipal Action Plans based on the initial MRR.
4.2 Targeting of the most vulnerable

The primary purpose of resilience-based programming is to reduce vulnerability to shocks and stresses. Resilience-based programming should therefore explicitly target the most vulnerable and increase their resilience to the identified risks. Several approaches have been used to identify the most vulnerable locations and households. For example:

- The interagency-coordination team in Lebanon has identified the 251 most vulnerable cadastres by combining data about the concentration of refugees and pre-existing poverty levels. This successful approach has been replicated in Jordan.


- The Lebanon team has followed with micro-assessments at the community level in the most at-risk cadastres.

- Similarly, the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) work done by an interagency team in Jordan helps identify the most vulnerable Syrian refugees by using a predictive model of household economic vulnerability.17


The risk analyses performed in response to the Syrian crisis have caused a shift in targeting, both geographically and in terms of target groups. For example:

- For UNDP Jordan, the focus on programming has shifted to vulnerable municipalities in the northern governorates and vulnerable Jordanians within these...
municipalities. Prior to the crisis, UNDP Jordan did not focus on the governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis and its support to micro-business development did not focus on the most vulnerable. Indeed, the selection criteria at the time prioritised those that already showed some capacity and were most likely to succeed, which normally excludes the most vulnerable.

The focus is now on chronically bypassed municipalities, the most vulnerable municipalities (Mafraq and Irbid are hosting almost 48% of refugees), and the most vulnerable unemployed youth living in these municipalities. The selection criteria for targeting participants include: households under the National Aid Fund with incomes under 190 Jordanian dinars per month; people aged 18 to 30, with a focus on new graduates; willingness to participate in labour-intensive work; commitment to save and participate in job-matching or establishing a micro-business; and gender balance.

For UNICEF Jordan, the target groups for the Makani programme are girls and boys (5 to 18 years) and young people (up to 24 years old). These are groups with specific needs and vulnerabilities, but also in possession of capacities and resources. Particular attention is paid to girls and boys who are out of school (dropouts or those who did not join school, or those who couldn’t get places in nearby schools for capacity reasons), adolescents, especially girls, disabled, engaged in labour, affected by armed conflicts, at risk of suffering from harm, survivors of GBV, heading households, unaccompanied and separated or who have other identified vulnerabilities.

Focusing on the most vulnerable does, however, pose challenges: the most vulnerable do not automatically or easily become strong. Attitudes of dependency, lack of confidence and motivation, lack of vision and initiative need to be carefully overcome through patient accompaniment. For UNDP Jordan, project partners are slowly learning how to meet these challenges. All of them had to adapt their models of intervention to adjust them to the specific needs of the target groups. Thus targeting the most vulnerable requires changing attitudes of interveners too and forces them to innovate as they strengthen resilience.

In the context of the tribal societies of Northern Jordan, prone to rivalries and nepotism, targeting must also be done with sensitivity to potential conflict. This requires wide-ranging community outreach processes, a clear communication strategy and strict transparency to ensure that all understand, and support the process of selecting beneficiaries and avoid adding tension to the existing situation. Issues of targeting and social cohesion are therefore intimately related and must be addressed in an integrated manner.

### MAKANI VULNERABILITY CRITERIA

- Drop out
- Disabled and special needs
- Juveniles
- Refugees
- Working children
- Early marriage
- Living in poverty pockets
- Living in bad economic situations
- Unemployed
- In schools with low academic performance
- NEET – not in education, employment or training
- Rehabilitation centres
- Orphans

### 4.3 Linking short-term emergency action to longer-term benefits

There is evidence that programmatic approaches are shifting from short-term emergency actions with immediate benefits to actions that are intended to bring about longer term benefits, while still responding to the evolving emergency. Often, the longer term orientation is directly connected to the short-term action and builds on it. Examples include:

- **LINKING CASH FOR WORK TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP:** The 3x6 approach in UNDP Jordan: this is a good example of building a bridge from the short-term to the longer term, with a clear view on increasing resilience
by widening the range of opportunities available to vulnerable people.

- **WATER SUPPLY AT ZA’ATARI CAMP – UNICEF JORDAN**: supplying water by truck to the Za’atri refugee camp housing more than 80,000 Syrian refugees is an ineffective short-term solution. It is expensive and time-consuming and has environmental impacts. UNICEF and its INGO partners, Mercy Corps and ACTED, working closely with the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, have developed solutions that not only meet the needs of the refugees but also provide long-term benefits to Jordanian communities and a model for sustainable water management. This includes industrial boreholes and an innovative mobile waste water treatment system that is replicable in other areas.

- **SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM – UNDP JORDAN**: similarly, UNDP Jordan has worked closely with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MOMA), municipalities, Joint Service Councils, and Governorates on an emergency response to the solid waste management crisis, but in a comprehensive way that addresses the legal framework, the landfill structure and management, the structuring of informal pickers, the potential green business associated with it and their potential connections to the employment creation initiatives. This is another good example of how an emergency response can be aligned towards long-term sustainable benefits.

- **LINKING SHORT-TERM JOB CREATION TO LONGER TERM ECONOMIC BENEFITS – ILO JORDAN**: ILO Jordan has placed its small-scale employment-intensive infrastructure programme (EIIP) designed to respond to emergency job creation needs, using a longer-term value chain / local economic development approach in the northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq. The intervention creates immediate employment and stimulates the use of local resources (labour, raw materials, contractors, local systems) whilst securing long-term asset value augmentation and opening further economic opportunities. For instance, road rehabilitation creates jobs in the short and medium term, subsequent road maintenance programs create a long-term employment opportunity, the asset value of the road improves, and host communities derive social and economic benefits from improved road access. Similar benefits are recognised in water-infrastructure improvement, building rehabilitation, and environmental protection programs.

- **STRENGTHENING SUB-NATIONAL PLANNING CAPACITY**: UNDP in both Jordan and Lebanon and UN-HABITAT in Lebanon have worked with municipalities and unions of municipalities to respond to the crises they faced due to the large influx of Syrian refugees in their communities. The approach has been not only to deal with the short-term needs but to develop planning and project implementation
capacities that lead to comprehensive local and cluster development plans, offering long-term benefit.

4.4 Developing resilience capacities

Building resilience requires developing three interrelated capacities at the individual, community and institutional levels: absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities. The case studies provide practical illustrations of this.

4.4.1 INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

Building individual resilience involves helping both refugees and host community members, especially youth, to see themselves not as victims (with no hope and no options, dependent on handouts), but as active agents of change with access to options for dealing with their situation and contributing effectively to their community. This is done by expanding both their livelihood and their educational options, by providing them with life skills and psychosocial support, by connecting them with each other (building social capital) and by engaging them in service to their communities. Although individual resilience and household resilience are not the same, especially when it comes to gender issues, for the purposes of this paper, individual resilience is taken to include household resilience.

Changing the state of mind, developing life skills and expanding access to livelihood options operate primarily in the absorptive and adaptive aspects of resilience. Beyond that, many interventions also take advantage of the opportunity to work on values, perceptions and culture, to promote individual transformation. These are prerequisites for lasting social change, and to address some of the issues that are at the root of vulnerability and conflict. This inclusion of work at the levels of values and culture is a key component leading to sustainable results.

There are thus at least three key dimensions to individual resilience: education (which includes academic education as well as life skills, vocational training, and value education for providing the incentive for service to the community); employment generation (both through job placement and self-employment); and psychosocial support (which is touched upon in life skills, but includes a greater focus on changing states of mind, increasing a sense of security and well-being, providing safe spaces for interaction and building social capital).

Many interventions in the 3RP focus on these aspects. A few examples include:

- **THE UNICEF MAKANI PROGRAMME IN JORDAN**: based on lessons learnt from child protection and education emergency response supported by UNICEF in Jordan in 2013 and 2014. After reviewing the costs and coordination of sector based interventions, UNICEF developed the Makani program, a comprehensive approach that offers well-coordinated and cost effective multisectoral services to vulnerable girls and boys in order for them to reach their full potential. As illustrated in Figure 6, a Makani centre offers an integrated programme of alternative education, skill building and psychosocial support. Each Makani should also have a community outreach component, which is linked with the services being provided at the centre. The Makani acts as a centre to refer boys and girls to other specialized services such as formal education and case management for child protection and Gender Based Violence (GBV).

  Makani supports the engagement of local networks of partners to facilitate best-in-class thinking, practices and applications necessary to enable and expedite systemic, sustainable change. This is done by creating opportunities for children and young people with unique insight into the challenges that affect their communities to team up with local experts to develop creative and innovative solutions to those challenges. Thus, instead of being passive recipients of services, are transformed into active agents of social change.

- **Through its POULTRY FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS, FAO LEBANON** has helped vulnerable farmers in the most affected communities establish semi-intensive egg production units. These help beneficiaries cover the dietary needs of their families as well as increase their income and cover the running expenses of the chicken coop, including for the purchase of extra feed. This directly affects
the resilience of individuals and households in the affected areas.

- **Vocational Training Programs** are offered by many partners in many contexts, as this is seen as essential to prepare refugees for their future life and to address employment needs of host community youth. For example:
  - In Jordan, the ILO is working to address skills for out of school youth as well as adults (both Jordanian and Syrian, female and male) through upgrading the informal apprenticeships initiatives, running parallel to improvements for the productivity of informal workshops and businesses;
  - WFP’s Food for Training project, run by the National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (NAJMAH) has supported more than 2,400 participants in receiving intensive vocational training in cooperation with the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC), building their technical skills and improving their employability. Beneficiaries receive vocational training in air conditioning, car electrics, data processing, welding, sewing, handicrafts, carpentry, sweets and pastries making, renewable energy, smartphone maintenance and many other areas. After completing the vocational training phase, participants receive two months of on-the-job training at relevant workplaces where they get to practice the skills they acquired with the VTC. To date, almost 60 percent of the participants are now either employed or have
even started their own small businesses. Almost every agency is now conducting or considering some form of vocational training in an effort to address employment and self-reliance issues. However, this proliferation of efforts tends to be fragmented and disconnected, as all agencies focus on this important element of resilience separately. To be effective, the efforts should be related to job market analysis, as was done by UNDP Jordan, and they require a more comprehensive, integrated approach. Since vocational training is so closely related to employment generation and livelihoods, one of the most urgent areas to enable resilience at the individual and household levels while reducing the risk of conflict around economic issues, it requires a much more vigorous, more comprehensive and better coordinated strategy. This is addressed in Section 7 as part of recommendations to enhance the resilience-building potential of initiatives in the 3RP.

**Changing Attitudes Through Cash for Work, Service Activities, Vocational Training and Educational Activities.**

Many of the interventions in this area operate at two levels: the primary level fulfils the immediate purpose (employment, life skills, some service activity); but around all of these concrete activities is “wrapped” a deeper level, aiming to transform values and attitudes.

For example, the cash for work component of the 3x6 programme of UNDP Jordan overcame initial reluctance by local youth to engage in activities they saw as shameful. This included addressing taboos about girls working outdoors, for example painting school buildings and similar activities, by sensitively relabelling them “volunteer service”, which made them more socially acceptable. This breakthrough, fuelled partly by the pressure of the crisis and partly by the project associating honour and dignity with work, through awareness raising and demonstration, has had a transformative effect on participants’ outlook and attitudes in life and towards each other, and has helped establish a new sense of self-worth and a new work ethic.

Similarly, the vocational training programme undertaken by partner NGOs for UNDP Jordan, has brought about many changes at the level of values and perceptions, simply by bringing youth from remote tribal areas to a central city location. In the process, they had to make explicit adjustments to their programme to deal with difficulties encountered when negative attitudes and prejudices are challenged in this way.

*Often, interveners are not prepared to deal with this higher level of change and either it remains unaddressed or receives only an unplanned response. Individual resilience could benefit greatly if this dimension is anticipated and explicitly taken into account and planned for in the design of interventions.*

4.4.2 Community Capacities

Strengthening community resilience means building unity, overcoming prejudices and divisions, and developing webs of solidarity. It builds the collective capacity to consult, work together and help each other, ensuring that all segments of society are included and valued and are able to participate creatively in community building.

Here again absorptive capacities relate to solidarity networks and conflict management; adaptive capacities relate to finding new ways of working together and new approaches to collective decision-making; and transformative capacities operate at the level of values, culture and perceptions and the interface between community and institutions.

Individual capacities are a necessary prerequisite to community resilience, as a community is made of interacting individuals. But transforming individuals alone will not result in community resilience, and the community provides the environment within which individual resilience is enhanced. They are mutually supporting processes. Service to the community is a powerful link between the two: service activities contribute to strengthening the community and they also help shape individual attitudes and behaviours that further manifest themselves in greater community cohesion. A lot of youth are eager to serve their community when they see an opportunity and know how to address it. Offering them this opportunity and enabling them to serve develops skills, changes attitudes and directs their energies. UNDP Jordan, for example, was able to tap into that reservoir through the 3x6 approach.
Much of the work in this area falls under the label of contributing to social cohesion and is therefore addressed in Section 6. Only a couple of illustrative examples from the case studies are presented here, in contexts other than those of cohesion:

- **Turkey – AFAD Community Building in the Camps**: AFAD, working closely with Turkey’s Ministry of Family and Social Policy, has taken explicit steps to build a sense of community in the camps, develop leadership and organizational capacities, and attempt to transform social relations among the refugees in the camps. Refugee communities are not necessarily harmonious and they come with all the trappings of their communities of origin: traditional patterns of leadership, animosities and prejudices, with little space for women and youth in decision making. Engaging in social and cultural activities, establishing new community structures and decision-making patterns, which include appointing women to positions of leadership in the camp structure, discussing issues of gender-based violence and other sensitive topics can help develop the transformative capacities of resilience. But here again the approach must be intentional.

- **Jordan – UNICEF Makani Program**: as mentioned earlier, the UNICEF Makani program, while it focuses mostly on individual empowerment, also has a community outreach component and fosters community building processes among the children in the Makani centres and in the community. This contributes to bonding and social capital, which are absorptive and adaptive community resilience capacities.

### 4.4.3 Institutional Capacities

The focus here is on municipal level capacities. Interventions that seek to strengthen capacity at the centre and to connect the local and national levels, while they fall under institutional resilience capacities, also concern alignment, national ownership and strengthening national systems, so they are addressed in Section 5.3.

At the local level, institutional absorptive and adaptive resilience capacities include the capacities to identify and analyse risks, to anticipate and respond to emergencies, to quickly re-establish quality services following shocks, and to identify needs and develop and implement local development plans that address these needs. The transformational resilience capacities here relate more to the relationship between communities and their local representatives, the capacities to win the trust of community members, to elicit their genuine participation and to create and maintain unity in the face of various threats.

From a complex systems perspective, the interface between community and local government is seen as the most creative area for social change, as it represents the “edge of chaos”, the interface between chaos (in the form of increased empowerment of the community which can lead to action in all directions) and order (in the form of exercise of institutional authority to guide and coordinate this action into a coherent process of social change).  

This is true under normal development conditions, and more so in times of crisis, as the crisis provides the intensity needed to disrupt existing patterns that prevent change. There is a lot to learn from a resilience-based response to emergency about what can be done in normal times, as illustrated by the following examples from the case studies:

- **UNDP Jordan and Lebanon Support to Municipalities**: perhaps the most remarkable feature of both support programs is the immense difference that a systematic focus on the development of specific capacities can make. Here again, while capacity development is not new, it is related to resilience if it derives from a risk analysis and is undertaken to address the root causes of that risk. In this case, developing the capacity of municipalities to respond to the needs of the citizens under the pressure of the influx of refugees and its negative manifestations is a clear response to risk and a permanent investment in resilience. Capacity development is not limited to soft skills, it also includes supporting with equipment and resources, the physical capacity to act. The rapid delivery of equipment is one of the most appreciated features of UNDP assistance, as it quickly helped raise the image of

18. See for example [RAMALINGAM 2008]
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municipalities and build the trust of their constituency.

Patiently empowering the municipalities to connect to the community and adopt mechanisms of consultation, communication and transparent resource allocation that overcome tendencies to cater to one’s own group or tribe, again prompted by the need for emergency action, is creating new pathways of good governance at the local level. This is transformational, and if carefully catered to and expanded, it can lead to large-scale changes in the system.

■ IMPROVING THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT – ILO JORDAN: In Jordan, the ILO carried out business environment assessments and public-private dialogue forums to stimulate the creation of a conducive environment for enterprise development and job creation. Institutional support for the creation of this environment takes the form of capacity building for employment services and the establishment of Local Economic Development (LED) Committees. The committees comprise representatives of all main local departments, such as the Department of Labour, Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and some local charities /civil society organisations. Here again, sustainable institutional structures emerge in response to emergency needs and will have the capacity to respond to similar situations in the future. In the process, new linkages are established between stakeholders who are learning to work together effectively.

■ RESPONDING AT THE CLUSTER LEVEL – UN-HABITAT REGIONAL TECHNICAL OFFICES (RTO) SUPPORT IN LEBANON: while empowering municipalities to respond at the local level is essential, it is not sufficient and it may also not be the most effective, efficient or sustainable way to respond. There are many things that are better done at the cluster level. The appropriate level of clustering is still a matter of heated debate, ranging from an informal cluster of nearby municipalities, to a formal union of municipalities, to the district level or even the governorate level. This is highly dependent on the reality of governance in each country and it is better to experiment with various approaches to fully understand the implications of each.

One good example is UN-HABITAT’S support for the Regional Technical Offices (RTO) at the level of Unions of Municipalities (UoM) in Lebanon.

■ LARGE MUNICIPALITY LEARNING TO RESPOND – GAZIANTEP, TURKEY: at the other end of the spectrum is an example of the relationship between institutional capacity and resilience. The municipality of Gaziantep in Turkey, near the Syrian border saw its population increase from 1.8 million to 2.2 million due to the influx of about 350,000 out-of-camp Syrian refugees, an increase projected for a period of 15 years that happened in two years. Like all other affected municipalities, Gaziantep suffered from a shock to its sewage and solid waste services, and to other municipal services, and the addition of 7,000 vehicles from Syria to its roads.

The response of Gaziantep has been remarkable in many ways, as it was able to accommodate this surge and cater to the needs of the refugees with its own resources and by collaborating closely with the Governorate and national agencies. The success of the response is due to a

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number of factors, which include:

- **Perceptions and attitudes.** First, as mentioned later in the context of social cohesion, local authorities do not see the Syrian refugees as a burden and they have welcomed them as *guests*, showing them hospitality as a matter of religious belief and obligation. Second, while there have been disturbances caused by refugees and other problems that had to be dealt with, they are generally *viewed as assets* and valuable resources as there are many professionals and trained people among them. Third, there is a sense of pride about not needing outside help and being able to respond independently. Fourth, the refugees are given the same status as vulnerable citizens: no additional structures were developed to deal with the refugees. Instead they have been absorbed in the normal social services that were expanded rapidly to meet demand.

- **Close collaboration of all services that are responding in an integrated manner under the leadership of the Governorate and the Mayor:** For example, the municipality has established community centres that offer integrated services with representations from five government agencies: police, family services, health, religious affairs and education. These centres provide services and also serve as referral centres.

- **Close relationship with Syrian leaders:** both the Governor and the mayor are in close contact with leaders in the Syrian refugee community, meeting with them monthly, identifying needs jointly and responding to them in a timely way. Neither the mayor nor the governor see any social cohesion issues.

- **Adaptation of responses:** for example, the initial response to providing for education through vacant facilities was inadequate and in consultation with the Ministry of Education, a better solution involving two shifts and employing Syrian teachers and a curriculum more adapted to the Syrian children was adopted; another example is the addition of vocational training to the services offered and the community centres, as well as Turkish language training.

- **Systematic use of data for targeting:** to better understand the needs of a dispersed refugee population, as part of the overall needs of all vulnerable groups in the city, the municipality has launched a systematic census of all households, starting with the periphery, which includes detailed socio-economic data, and has developed software to rapidly analyse it and identify priority areas for intervention, a form of social risk mapping. It has also hired 35 people to conduct this data collection, a project that may take a couple of years to complete.

All of the features of the response illustrate a possible end result for institutional resilience capacity building efforts in other places. Ideally, the result of resilience building should be municipalities able to absorb and respond to shocks on their own, even if requiring the infusion of additional resources.

While this response is remarkable, it is not coordinated with efforts of the international community, which are seen as peripheral. As discussed further below in the context of national ownership, the international community now has a challenge to find an appropriate role for itself and ways of working that promote collaboration with national authorities. All is not necessarily rosy in the national response and there is room for improvement, but first a new kind of working relationship needs to be established. This is discussed further in Section 5.2.

4.5 **Intersectoral integration and synergies**

Systems are complex and the issues to be addressed are by nature multi-sectoral. The response to address them must therefore also eventually be complex and multisectoral. However, intersectoral integration does not mean the integrated programs of the past, which have often failed because they attempted to address everything simultaneously and
started out with too much complexity. In the more recent understanding of complex systems, it is advocated that solutions should start simply, but with the understanding that they will evolve progressively and in an adaptive way to become increasingly complex and multi-sectoral. Complex responses will be “emergent”.

In the case studies reviewed, there is some evidence of cross-sectoral integration and synergy of activities, both with individual agencies including multiple mutually reinforcing sectors or levels in their interventions and multiple agencies reinforcing each other’s initiatives in the same or different sectors. In both cases cross-sectoral collaboration can lead to a multiplicative effect on the benefits and impact of interventions.

For example:

- **IN JORDAN**, the response to the solid waste management crisis also analysed the solid waste value chain, identified business opportunities related to that value chain, structured and organized informal pickers, connected potential green businesses associated with waste management to the employment creation initiatives, and conducted environmental education;

- **IN LEBANON**, FAO’S RESILIENCE STRATEGY
encompasses four mutually supportive spheres of action: i) support vulnerable and affected people coping with the impact of the crisis and protect their livelihood asset base for future self-reliance – “Prepare and respond”; ii) promote prevention and impact mitigation measures – “Apply risk and vulnerability reduction measures”; iii) support information, monitoring and analysis networks on food and nutrition security – “Watch to safeguard”; and iv) institutional strengthening for building regional, national and local capacities, as well as related policy frameworks to scale up and sustain the risk management and crisis recovery efforts – “Govern risk and crisis”. This integrated strategy allows it to develop various aspects of resilience as a coherent whole and to maximize opportunities for strategic partnerships in each of the areas;

- **In Turkey**, the harmonious, coordinated multisectoral integration of responses from all concerned ministries and municipalities under the authority of the Governorate of Gaziantep described in Section 4.4.3 above is an excellent example of the synergies, effectiveness and efficiency of intervention that can be achieved when such real multisectoral integration, constant communication, close coordination and collective learning and adaptation exist. The secret of that success probably lies in the fact that there exists an unquestioned authority to coordinate. This is also probably the greatest obstacle to the coordination of international intervention elsewhere, as no such authority exists, unless it is exercised by strong government leadership;

- **In Lebanon**, the UN-HABITAT RTO structure described in Section 4.4.3 is serving as an entry point for multi-sectoral interventions that support the Union of Municipalities’ priorities. A UN-HABITAT field officer drew the diagram illustrated in Figure 7 to explain the many benefits of the RTO structure as a support for multi-sectoral programming, as it has supported the activities of a large range of actors. For example, the UN-HABITAT RTO in Zaharany collaborated with UNDP to undertake the design for and manage the implementation of the construction of a fish market, an economic development project identified through the UNDP municipal planning process support programme. Similarly, several UNICEF water and sanitation projects, for example, were supported by the RTO.

The diagram also shows how the complexity of integration evolves over time. What started out as a purely physical support (engineering, construction), has evolved into a capacity to support social initiatives and they are now realizing that there is also a need to support economic activities. The secret of success here, as in case of Gaziantep mentioned above, is that the Union provides the authority necessary to coordinate actions within its jurisdiction. The capacity of the RTO can thus evolve from a purely technical function to also supporting a coordination function. It is possible to foresee a capacity to undertake joint assessments, joint participatory mobilisation, joint monitoring and evaluation, and joint learning. Besides the cost effectiveness of avoiding duplication, potential synergies can much more readily be identified and, as the capacity of the RTO increases, it strengthens national ownership and sustainability as this is foreseen as a permanent structure with links to various line ministries.

### 4.6 Scaling up innovations for impact

A key characteristic of resilient systems is their ability to learn and innovate. Learning and innovation is important, but if the innovations remain at a small scale, they will have no impact on resilience. It is therefore important not only to have systematic learning processes but to also scale up successful innovations.

Examples of learning and scaling up include:

- **UNICEF Jordan Makani Program**: the Makani programme was the result of systematic learning and innovation. Once the integration of the various components that make up the programme proved effective, UNICEF moved rapidly to scale up the programme to cover the whole country.
The Makani initiative is currently aiming to reach 90,000 children at risk in over 200 centres through a network of 60 partners. The programme can be scaled up rapidly because it does not require a new infrastructure. It offers a clear, structured and consistent set of programmatic interventions to partners already running centres with some of these elements.

- **THE UNDP LEBANON/MOSA MRR METHODOLOGY**: after proving effective, has also been taken to scale with an aim to reach 200 municipalities, with more than 1 million vulnerable people supported to access improved services. The programme can be scaled up rapidly because it offers a clear, easy to implement, effective package.

- **THE FAO FARMER FIELD SCHOOLS (FFS) in Lebanon** are based on an innovative, participatory and interactive learning approach in which farmers are empowered to direct the learning process. Groups of 25-35 farmers meet regularly to consult and make decisions on project implementation, with the support of facilitators. Twenty five FFS were created so far, reaching 1,500 farmers, and the approach has proven its potential to address emergency needs rapidly while establishing a sustainable learning and knowledge generation and sharing process combining local knowledge and international best practice. Providing spaces for learning and knowledge generation that allow for the interaction of multiple sources of knowledge is a critical element of resilience building.
In the first dimension (Sustainability), the focus was on WHAT is being done to foster resilience. In this dimension (Alignment), the focus is more on HOW it is being done. In this area, the Resilience Lens guidance focuses on the following concepts: degree of alignment with national plans and priorities; extent of linkage with national/local institutions and delivery systems; degree of involvement of national/local authorities in planning, implementation and M&E; capacity building; and the level of national funding of activities.

Alignment, national ownership, harmonization, result orientation and mutual accountability are all principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration, and they have recently been applied to the context of the Syrian Crisis through the formulation of the five guiding principles of the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda:

1. Increase synergies between humanitarian and development investments and approaches
2. Prioritize the dignity and self-sufficiency of affected populations
3. Reinforce, don’t replace, local capacities
4. Generate new and inclusive partnerships to build resilience, foster innovation, and promote relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency
5. Safeguard social cohesion to foster resilience and cooperation.

While these elements are proclaimed and adopted in principle, they are not always translated into practice. It is important to note that alignment is as much about working with the host government as it is about aid agencies working with each other. For aid agencies, aligning means aligning together and aligning efficiently. This is why it is so important that the operating methods of aid agencies are adapted and that the dimensions of preparedness for resilience programming discussed in Section 3.3 are addressed. It is impossible to arrive at true alignment with national priorities if there is no harmonization of external assistance. It is often at the level of external assistance that the problem with national ownership lies, as individual agency vested interests and rigidities can result in fragmented responses that undermine national ownership. This also goes far beyond implementing agencies, to the attitudes and practices of donors.

Key obstacles to overcome are suspicion and mistrust: from the international community, it is suspicion of real motives of government players, political self-interest, corruption and the like; from the host governments, it is often suspicion of intentions of international interveners, fear of criticism, and a reaction to what is often perceived as colonial attitudes. This mistrust often leads to by-passing national systems, which then further weakens national roles and capacity and strengthens the vicious circle. In a situation of crisis, pressure to deliver justifies expediency: by-passing is common in the name of emergency. To some extent, competition and rivalry among UN agencies and among donors, even if not outwardly acknowledged, exacerbates the issue. Harmonization, alignment and national ownership are thus intimately related.

The resilience approach calls for breaking the patterns that are at the root of the continued vulnerability of people and systems, when issues of governance and aid delivery are not addressed. True partnership requires profound transformation of the approach to aid at all levels: vision, organizational culture, roles and systems and procedures. Here again, this is true in the context of normal development, but crisis heightens the need to overcome obstacles and may allow solutions to emerge that were not possible under normal circumstances.

Aligning to national systems strongly depends on the context, both at the national and the sub-national levels. For example, situations range from very weak remote by-passed municipalities as in Northern Jordan, to relatively strong and independent municipalities and Unions in the absence of strong central government in Lebanon, to strong central government, governorates and municipalities in Turkey. In each situation, the actions to be taken differ substantially, as illustrated in the following examples from the case studies.

### 5.1 Aligning with national priorities

Aligning the response to the crisis with national priorities is not simply a question of quoting an item from a national strategic document and showing that the activity connects to it. This can always be easily done. Aligning, in the context of a crisis and within a resilience framework, requires a more substantive and creative approach. As mentioned earlier, a crisis provides opportunities to address issues that could not be addressed or were slow to be addressed under normal circumstances.

Part of resilience thinking in the context of a crisis of this kind is therefore to identify a few transformative entry points in the dynamics of the underlying national system and to align emergency intervention to them, using the crisis as an opportunity to carve out new pathways of transformation that can have a substantial trigger effect on the dynamics of the underlying system and move it toward greater resilience and an improved sustainable development path. This combines the concept of alignment to national priorities with the concept of transformative capacities needed for resilience.

There are many examples in the case studies reviewed of how this can be done, consciously or unconsciously. For example:

- **UNDP Support for Waste Management in Jordan.** An improved waste management system has been on the agenda of the government, but with slow progress.
Because of the intensity caused by the crisis and the need to take immediate action, as mentioned earlier in the context of bridging short-term and long-term action (Section 4.3), it was possible to use the emergency response to address a long standing national priority, which includes moving forward the legislative agenda and the modifying the structure of the system.

**Supporting Decentralization in Lebanon:**

municipalities and unions, UNDP and UN-HABITAT. The contribution to strengthening institutional resilience at the local level has also been mentioned above in Section 4.4. When perceived in the context of aligning with transformational entry points in a stalled national agenda, the process acquires a much deeper and more significant dimension: it helps advance a decentralization agenda from the bottom up by demonstrating what can happen with the infusion of resources at the sub-national level. When linked with national level processes, it burns new pathways of decentralized governance that can help accelerate the national agenda.

**The ILO in Jordan**

works closely with the Jordanian government, donors, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations to coordinate livelihood and employment interventions in communities hosting Syrian refugees. The response, embedded in the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), is articulated within the Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) priorities in Jordan and helps further its objectives by: i) building the resilience of host communities in order to facilitate access to employment and livelihood opportunities; ii) strengthening institutional capacity and coordination mechanisms at local, regional and national levels to combat unacceptable forms of work (with a focus on child labour); and iii) supporting policy development to ensure an employment-rich national response, embedded in the principles of decent work. Thus the imperative of decent work is advanced through an aligned response to the crisis.

In these examples and many others, elements of the initiatives are aligned to transformational entry points in the dynamics of the underlying system. To achieve the desired impact, however, it is essential to have this framework in mind in order to see and seize opportunities. It often takes only a few simple adjustments to how things are done in order to maximize the impact of the interventions.

**5.2 Government involvement, ownership and leadership**

National ownership has been most successful when it was possible to overcome the key obstacles mentioned above, suspicion and mistrust, in the context of a non-threatening issue of common interest. The most appropriate approach depends on the context. Current situations range from, at one end, by-passing the national system and direct delivery by aid agencies (in the name of emergency) with minimal national funding, to the other end, complete leadership, ownership and funding by the government that leaves very little room for the international community to find a role for itself. Both ends are challenging and require adopting different strategies to support government ownership and leadership. For example:

**In Lebanon,** as described above, UNDP pioneered the use of the MRR methodology and its associated intervention, in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). While the effort was initially led by UNDP, providing an effective model and working closely with MOSA has resulted in a profound change of ownership and leadership. MOSA has now completely appropriated the approach and taken over its leadership, has made it its policy, even modified it to tailor it to its needs, has created new positions at the sub-national level to better implement it and has invested its own funds. This has also strengthened MOSA’s role as the ministry in charge of the coordination of the response to the Syrian Crisis.

Another good example of Government led response in full collaboration with humanitarian and development partners that also bridges the divide between emergency response and longer term development needs is the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) programme led by
the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), which aims to ensure that 470,000 vulnerable school-aged children are able to access quality formal and non-formal educational. RACE further seeks to improve the quality of learning for all children in Lebanon. The strategy serves as the basis for the educational component of Lebanon’s crisis response plan (LCRP).

- **Turkey is at the other end of the spectrum.** The situation in Turkey is quite different from that in the other countries in the 3RP as Turkey is a much larger, much richer country than the other major recipients of Syrian refugees and sees itself as a donor country, not a recipient of aid. In Turkey the government has, from the beginning, taken full ownership and leadership of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis and has established a field coordination structure at the governorate level under the leadership of provincial governors, with the field presence of AFAD and the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and other concerned ministries, and it prides itself in its strong national response. The Government has contributed over 8 billion dollars to the refugee crisis, compared to which resources contributed by the international community are minimal. Accordingly, the efforts of the international community are not seen as critical and government authorities have adopted a “benevolent” attitude toward these efforts.

For its part, the international community has a new challenge: how to approach a government that has total ownership of its response, that has its own coordination structure separate from that of the international community, with little meaningful interaction, and which has excluded it (out of security or other concerns) from the data collection and analysis process upon which programme design is normally based? This is a new situation for an international community not accustomed to this level of ownership, and it requires defining new roles under these circumstances. International partners are slowly discovering that this new role centers more on innovation and knowledge sharing and that a productive relationship requires building trust. Those that have understood this new orientation have been able to make a valuable contribution. For example:

- **UNHCR** was able to respond to the Government of Turkey’s request for knowledge on international standards for drafting refugee legislation and to provide specific assistance in drafting such legislation. UNHCR Turkey has set up a policy development unit to provide such assistance to the Government.

UNHCR is also helping the Government share Turkey’s experience at the international level, thus building on a sense of national pride that helps to strengthen the relationship between an international agency and the government.

- **UNICEF** was able to support the Provincial Action Plans for education, which is one of the few examples in Turkey of where the international community have received space to work with the Government on prioritizing. The plans aim to strengthen the resilience of the education system and schools at the provincial level by the provision of incentives and

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20. See for example [MEHE 2015]
5. Initiatives Aligning with and Strengthening National Systems

5.1 Training and Education

Trainings for Syrian Volunteer Teachers, establishment of new double-shifts for Syrian children; construction of new education centers; provision of student and school supplies; and maintenance and renovation costs for existing and new schools serving Syrian children. The Ministry of National Education and UNICEF are collaborating to scale up the joint efforts and develop provincial actions plans for all the provinces where high number of Syrians are living.

- Concern International replicated its experience from Lebanon about how to engage men and boys to fight domestic violence and shared the results with local authorities who are very appreciative and plan to scale it up and introduce it in schools. Also, having built a trusting relationship with local authorities, it is now able to access data collected by Government partners and engage in joint planning activities.

These examples show that trust can be built and an effective working relationship can be established if sufficient time and attention is given to building these and if there is a specific innovation or global experience that can usefully be contributed to the partnership. When this happens, defences go down and new areas of cooperation can more easily be identified. For example, while AFAD is confident about its camp intervention, it is not so sure how to respond to the non-camp population and is open to dialogue and international experience on that matter.

5.3 Strengthening system capacity

Supporting local and sub-national capacities has already been described above in Section 4.4.3. We focus here on **supporting capacity at the national level and linking the national and sub-national levels**.

Many efforts have been made within the 3RP to strengthen the capacity of national systems to respond to the crisis in an organized, coordinated and effective way and much has been achieved at that level. All the national plans in the 3RP are nationally owned plans and the degree on national ownership and capacity in the generation and coordination of these plans has increased substantially, as evidenced by the nature of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2016 (LCRP) and the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis 2016-2018 (JRP 2016-18). The response of the government of Turkey has already been mentioned above.

While building risk management, planning, response, and coordination capacity at the national level is important, it is not sufficient to bring about resilience in the system. An important resilience concept is that building resilience requires action at multiple scales, geographic, administrative and temporal and this requires the “layering” of responses, both in time and level. A related resilience concept is that different types of risk need to be addressed at different levels. It is therefore not sufficient to focus on one of the levels separately: building resilience requires strengthening the connections between action at local, sub-regional and national levels.

In considering the management of the emergency response in the context of resilience building at multiple levels, it is useful to borrow from the worldwide experience in MDG acceleration. In 2010, when attention was focused on how to accelerate achievement of lagging MDGs, recognizing that progress in lagging areas required a clear break from business as usual, UNDP adopted a “Breakthrough Strategy” and developed an “MDG acceleration framework” (MAF), a kind of emergency response which has had positive effects in many countries21. The MAF involves identifying bottlenecks along a service delivery “supply chain” from the policy level to the community level (as illustrated in Figure 8) and working in partnership with all levels of government, civil society and private sector in removing these blockages. Because it is an emergency, in that case, the pressure to achieve MDGs by 2015, the sense of urgency allows removing obstacles and burning new pathways towards effective decentralization.

The key to success is also identifying entry points at each level of the chain, finding champions who will commit to trying new ways, and to aligning incentives for change.

21. See for example [UNDP 2010a], [UNDP 2010b], [UNDP 2010c], [UNDP 2011] and [UNDP 2012]
A striking example of this process at work in the context of the Syrian crisis is UNDP’s collaboration with MOSA in the municipal support programme in Lebanon. The transfer of ownership and leadership from UNDP to MOSA has already been described above. This has led MOSA to realize that it needed strong presence at the sub-national level to coordinate local activities and it has therefore created a new layer of staff at the governatorate level responsible for this activity. This has now been institutionalized as a decentralized structure within the ministry and helped to bring MOSA closer to the municipalities and enhance its capacity for action at the sub-national level. This also lays one path for effective decentralisation, one of the identified transformational entry points.

A similar example of connecting the centre to the local level is the water and waste management supported by UNDP in Jordan: in this case, to deal with the local issue, the “system boundaries” had to be extended to include the highest levels of MOMA all the way down to the informal garbage pickers and community volunteers, in the kind of “policy and programme supply chain” illustrated in Figure 9. Thus the capacity of the system to operate as a whole is progressively being enhanced. What is learned around one concrete action can easily be replicated to other areas.

In Jordan, UNHCR and WHO are both supporting the capacity of the Ministry of Health to respond to the impact of the Syrian crisis on health services through a number of rapid concrete projects (such as burn units, lab infrastructure, blood banks) to build the system’s absorptive capacity. This is now slowly changing into longer term capacity to collect and analyse data, evidence based decision-making, development of prioritized plans and emergency response capacity.

In Jordan, UNICEF has been working closely with the Jordan Ministry of Water Resources to strengthen the capacity for risk analysis, i.e. its data and mapping capacities, a crucial capacity linked to the fact that Jordan environment is fragile and water catchment systems are key for resilience in water management. Also, as a result of the technical support provided by UNICEF to the Government and sector partners, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) interventions featured prominently in key planning documents, such as the Jordan Response Plan.

In Turkey, YOBIS, a complementary education management information system to monitor Syrian students, teachers, and classrooms was developed jointly by UNICEF and the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). The system allows monitoring Syrian refugee children school attendance as well as collecting other information on education process, child health and social-economic status of a child’s family. This provides a good basis for qualitative and quantitative analysis of education opportunities provided to Syrian children and their education outcomes as well as for assessment of unmet needs and existing capacity gaps.

In Lebanon, FAO’s intervention in response to the immediate risk of trans-border contamination mentioned above, has also resulted in the strengthening of national capacities of veterinary services professionals in the fields of good emergency management practices, epidemiological surveillance for transboundary animal diseases, biosecurity, disease recognition and diagnosis.

National Child Protection Systems are also being consolidated in several countries, again driven by the emergency needs but resulting in permanent systemic changes.

All of the above examples, and many more, point to the resilience-building potential of initiatives taken in response to the Syrian crisis. Initiatives can have a lasting effect on the capacity of the national systems to anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises in the future, as well as transforming these systems and their connection to grass-roots processes for service delivery. This also increases communities’ trust in the ability of national institutions to respond to their needs, which is one factor in social cohesion.
5.4 Promoting integration and partnership

Responding to emergencies often also requires integration of the responses of several line ministries, especially in the social area. Sometimes this can be easier to achieve in the context of a crisis than under normal circumstances. Here again, a resilience approach builds on the requirements of emergency response to establish new ways of working and to foster new mindsets among line ministries. This can carry over into more coherent development interventions.

- One such example is the “Integrated Social Services Delivery at the Territorial Level” initiative of UNDP Lebanon. Seeing that municipalities in a cluster have common needs, particularly in health, which can be responded to in an integrated rather than fragmented way, and following the success of a pilot initiative, UNDP made a formal agreement with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), the Ministry of Education (MEHE) and the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM). The agreement and associated initiatives seek to replicate the pilot on a large scale and to influence collaboration structures and policy development at the national level, helping to support sub-national integration and delivery of services.
6. INITIATIVES CONTRIBUTING TO SOCIAL COHESION AND STABILITY

One of the motivations for adopting a resilience approach in the response to the Syrian crisis is to minimize the risk of conflict between refugees and host communities and avoid any potential destabilization in the host countries. For the government of Lebanon, for example, the situation is perceived to be so potentially explosive that resilience has simply been equated with stabilization. Most of the resilience initiatives therefore have, implicitly or explicitly, contributing to social cohesion and stability as an underlying objective.

In this area, the guidance on the Resilience Lens focuses on whether activities are sensitive to social cohesion/stability concerns and the extent to which they take measures to prevent or mitigate social tensions in impacted communities.

The additional questions identified in the refined lens include the extent to which initiatives are: attempting to understand the pre-existing and crisis-induced social dynamics and risks and their root causes; using conflict management methods to mitigate potential conflict; creating spaces of dialogue and interaction among various community groups, between these groups and local authorities, and between local and higher authorities and agencies; building trust and ensuring accurate flows of information; and supporting security and conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Some interventions contribute to social cohesion indirectly by addressing the root causes of potential conflict, such as improving municipal and other services thereby establishing trust in local and national government, or expanding the livelihood options of host community members thereby relieving the economic pressures they...
are feeling. Others directly address issues of perceptions, feelings and relationships by engaging refugees and host community members in some form of dialogue or consultative process, or fostering joint sports, cultural and artistic activities. Often, both types of intervention are required. At the very least, all initiatives should adopt a “do no harm” approach, be aware of how they themselves might contribute to conflict, and adopt specific measures to minimize that risk.

Most of the initiatives reviewed addressed social cohesion in an indirect way, and while there are many examples of initiatives that address social cohesion directly, it was not possible to include them in the course of this study. This section therefore does not include all the aspects of social cohesion described above. The illustrations are grouped here under three headings: understanding social dynamics and risks, indirect approaches and direct approaches.

6.1 Understanding social cohesion dynamics and risks

Social cohesion programming requires understanding the related social dynamics and risks. Several studies have been conducted to inform social cohesion programming. Examples include:

- **World Vision** conducted an exploration of the factors underlying social tensions between Syrian refugees and host communities in Jordan and Lebanon. It found that the main drivers of social tensions include “structural causes that predate the Syrian crisis (such as high levels of poverty, resource scarcity, and lack of municipal capacity to deliver basic services), socio-economic causes (such as differences in religious, cultural, and social norms between refugee and host communities), and proximate causes (such as decreasing access to affordable quality housing, economic competition over jobs, and the role of international aid in terms of perceptions of fairness, equity, and corruption)”22. It also found that other factors, such as perceptions of effectiveness and equity of access to humanitarian aid, and the way issues are framed in the media, can play strong roles in exacerbating tensions.

Tentative recommendations suggest that “relevant humanitarian agencies, civil society groups, and national governments should adopt cross-sector, area-based approaches that support, work through, and ultimately empower a range of local actors; include both refugee and host communities in the design and implementation of equitable solutions to alleviate tensions; communicate better with refugee and host communities to improve transparency and accountability; and liaise with community leadership and security officials in order to resolve disputes and settle tensions arising from service provision access and economic competition”23.

- The UNHCR/UNDP Joint Secretariat also published a study on determinants of social cohesion which proposes a framework for assessing outcomes of social cohesion work including the display by individuals and groups of identified elements of socially cohesive behaviour (belonging and participation), and the existence of conditions for socially cohesive society (equality of opportunities, recognition and legitimacy).24

6.2 Indirect approaches to social cohesion

Social cohesion requires the development of all three resilience capacities (absorptive, adaptive and transformative) at the individual, community and institutional levels, as described in Section 4.4.

We have seen in Section 4.4.2 that strengthening community resilience is building unity, overcoming prejudices and divisions, developing webs of solidarity and the collective capacity to consult, work together and help each other, ensuring that all segments of society are included and valued and are able to participate creatively in community building. We have also seen in Section 4.4.3 that institutional resilience includes the capacity of institutions to engage

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22. [WORLD VISION 2015]
23. Ibid.
with the community, win its trust and support, elicit its genuine participation, maintain its unity and guide and coordinate its action. These two sets of capacities are part of the social transformation called for by the resilience discourse, which operates at the creative interface between order and chaos. Finally, we have also seen in Section 4.4.1 that a prerequisite to this social transformation is the individual transformation that comes from empowering community members and changing mindsets. All of these are mutually reinforcing and must be addressed together.

The objective of social cohesion and stabilization will therefore be achieved naturally if the individual, community and institutional capacities described in Section 4.4 are effectively developed, if they are “wrapped” around any sectoral intervention that addresses any concrete needs, because they cannot be developed directly and they cannot be developed in a vacuum.

For example:

- The explicit purpose of the UNDP Jordan “Building resilience through enhancing livelihoods and employment opportunities” project and the overall programme that it is a part of is to mitigate increasing tensions between Syrian refugees and affected Jordanian host communities in the Governorates of Mafraq and Irbid, both to preserve the humanitarian protection space for Syrian refugees and to support Jordanian host communities to increase their absorption capacity and protect their development path. The risk of conflict that motivates programme design is addressed mainly by increasing the capacity of the municipalities to respond and by providing employment opportunities for vulnerable Jordanians affected by the refugee influx. The programme does not include explicit social cohesion activities to mitigate potential tensions between refugees and host communities as it targets only host communities. However, a very conscious effort is made to avoid the risk of conflict within highly divided tribal host communities by ensuring that the selection criteria for beneficiaries are well understood and largely diffused and that the selection process is absolutely transparent.

- WFP’s voucher programme in Jordan, while it is aimed at refugees in a humanitarian assistance mode, is designed to ensure benefits to the local economy in order to promote social cohesion and stability. The programme has injected over USD 440 million into the Jordanian economy since the start of the operation with the creation of over 350 jobs and widespread investment in retail infrastructure.

- The ILO in Jordan is supporting job creation in collaboration with the cooperatives unions in the Mafraq governorate, including for the cultivation and production of medicinal plants in greenhouses, for both Syrian refugees and host communities. While farming is a good source of income in the Northern Governorate, lack of investment in the area has led to increased unemployment and poverty among Jordanians. The dire economic situation has been exacerbated by Syrian refugees settling in the area. Three greenhouses have been procured to make it possible for families to cultivate thyme. Coop members are also being trained on technical aspects of this work. The products will be processed and marketed locally. The project is expected to generate an income for the families and to contribute to build trust between the communities and reduce the potential for tensions.

- The UNDP Lebanon “Lebanon Host Communities Support Project” also has conflict prevention as a motivation and it addresses this primarily by enhancing the capacity of municipalities to respond to priority needs and engaging all stakeholders, refugees and host communities, in a collective risk assessment and planning process. A rare systematic effort was made here to document the impact of the programme on reducing tensions, as illustrated in Figure 9.

The figure illustrates well the main findings of research to date:

- Social tensions between Lebanese and Syrians have reduced.
- People feel they can approach
municipalities and they are increasingly trusted to listen to grievances and solve problems.

- Municipalities are re-envisioning their role to go beyond infrastructure and service delivery to include brokering and resolving social tensions.

### 6.3 Direct approaches to social cohesion

As mentioned above, most case studies reviewed only had indirect approaches to social cohesion, or a combination as illustrated above. However, the following example from Turkey is worth mentioning.

- In Turkey, there is to date remarkably little tension, and potential conflict between refugees and host communities is not seen by Turkish authorities as an issue. All officials pointed to the use of the Quran to promote positive values of hospitality and attitudes towards the refugees (by using the concept of “Ansar and Mohajjer” – how the people of Medina received the refugees). This message of hospitality and obligation is used effectively and permeates the attitudes towards refugees.

There are many other direct approaches to social cohesion not covered in the case studies reviewed here. Examples include:
Mercy Corps’ Community Action Groups in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon: The initiative aims at creating community-based conflict management with a model that focuses on ‘interest-based negotiation’ and incorporates mediation and non-violent communication as tools to peacefully resolve violent disputes. It aims to build skills of community leaders to be agents of change in their communities – with a particular focus on their role in mitigating risks of local conflict between refugee and host communities.

UNDP Lebanon’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme, which has been in operation since 2008, directly addresses dialogue, peace building and conflict prevention. While its primary purpose was to address the underlying causes of conflict and tensions in Lebanon to reduce sectarian and communal divides and the risks of conflict relapse, it has been modified and expanded to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis. For example, the project engaged with Wadi Khaled area through a series of trainings for teachers and municipalities on peace building and conflict resolution to better enable them to address the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanese host communities and help the community in becoming more equipped to face the new challenge and manage the crisis. Dialogue platforms at the national level and strengthening the rule of law and community policing are other elements of the programme that directly contribute to reducing the risk of conflict.
7. CONCLUSION: ENHANCING THE RESILIENCE-BUILDING POTENTIAL OF 3RP INTERVENTIONS

It is clear from the illustrations above that many 3RP interventions, in both their “refugee” and their “resilience” components, have resilience-building features; that valuable lessons about what resilience-based programming means in practice are being learned; and that creative approaches, with wide-ranging impact, are being adopted and scaled up. For example, agencies in Turkey are supporting a strong nationally led and owned response by adapting interventions towards innovation and knowledge-sharing. In Lebanon opportunities are being taken to devise new mechanisms to bring technical assistance and coordination of line ministries to the sub-national level, benefiting decentralized governance. In addition, innovative models of community engagement focusing on the assessment of risks and resources have been adopted and modified by government agencies. In Jordan, integrated programming, inter-agency collaboration and adaptive planning and implementation are being used to build synergies between supporting municipal capacities, creating new livelihoods and developing more environmentally sustainable processes.

It is clear, too, that the Resilience Lens, with the refinements proposed in this document, seen as a narrative “resilience reading” tool rather than a measurement tool, can be useful for shaping the resilience contribution of an initiative, analysing and highlighting its resilience-building features, and guiding resilience programming. It is fairly straightforward to apply to any intervention, it helps consider systematically various aspects that contribute to resilience building, and people at all levels were able to relate to the
framework, when presented in this way. The Resilience Lens has helped to highlight the need to: i) develop individual, community and institutional capacities as a coherent whole, realising that they are mutually reinforcing; ii) include the absorptive, adaptive and transformative aspects of these capacities at each of these levels; iii) integrate sectoral approaches within and among initiatives; and iv) operate simultaneously at the local, sub-national and national levels and connect them effectively.

However, it is also evident from the responses to the questionnaires and research for this report that the levels of understanding about resilience and the levels of preparedness for collective action need still to be increased. While many initiatives have resilience-building features, these are not necessarily intentional or even perceived as such by implementers caught in the heat of the action: it takes a trained external eye to identify some of the resilience-building features of an initiative and these often had to be pointed out or reflected back to staff. This points to the benefit of taking a step back every now and then and looking at the initiative under way from a resilience perspective. It would therefore be good to strengthen the discussion among 3RP partners about resilience, raise more awareness and work towards greater unity of vision and action. As part of this, the appropriate relationships between alignment, national ownership and leadership, integrated and adaptive programming, and the modes of operation of aid agencies, need to be considered and duly understood.

As this report has shown, existing initiatives can have perceived and unperceived elements of resilience-building, and there can be additional ways to adapt existing initiatives to the goal of building resilience. This requires being aware that activities can often operate at both an immediate primary level of intervention to address a concrete need as well as at a higher, more subtle level “wrapped” around that action. The primary level is often connected to absorptive and adaptive capacities; the higher level often has to with transformative capacities that operate at the level of values, culture, structures and systems. To maximize the resilience building impact, initiatives need to consciously operate at both levels. **Often a simple adjustment to what is being done can have a far reaching transformative impact.** This is not always known ahead of time, but it does often emerge from the actions within a particular initiative.

Such opportunities need to be seen and seized rapidly. This requires: awareness of the principles of resilience programming and clarity about what it means to apply them; observation, dialogue, exchange of experiences, and collective learning; resilience monitoring and evaluation; adaptive design and management; increased willingness for collective multisectoral programming; and flexible multi-year funding.

### 7.1 Recommendations

The recommendations presented here are for concrete steps to improve application of the 3RP resilience principles and to enhance the resilience-building potential of its interventions.

**(i) Clarify that the resilience framework applies to both the refugee and resilience components of the 3RP**

As mentioned in the introduction, while the distinction between the two components in the 3RP is required for some agencies to be able to track against their core mandate, it is important to recognize **that resilience is not a programming area but a programme lens that applies to both humanitarian and development interventions.** Resilience is not achieved at the cost of continued humanitarian activities. Resilience programming should not be associated with funding sources, type of agency or sector. Humanitarian agencies, while fulfilling their core mandates, can be challenged to do things differently to link their work with the strengthening of resilience capacities; development agencies are challenged to connect their work to the emergency response and build a bridge to these same capacities. The more they share their experience and work together, the more effective the collective response will be.

Short of changing the name of the “resilience” component, which may prove difficult, at the very least a simple clear and consistent message about resilience as a programming lens and how it applies to both components should be diffused widely.
(ii) Adopt a common resilience narrative tool

While the Resilience Lens currently used in the 3RP was the result of consensus among 3RP partners and included in the programming guidelines for 2016, its weaknesses (described in Section 3.3), the resistance to its use and the fact that it was left optional, have limited its impact.

The refined Resilience Lens used in this report was found to be a useful tool to develop a resilience narrative and help practitioners identify and improve the resilience-building features of their initiatives. It should not be viewed as a measurement tool. However, at this point, the dimensions illustrated in Figure 4, are only a proposal. It needs a formal consultation process and the adoption of an agreed common framework to describe what resilience programming means in practice in the 3RP, probably through a workshop or series of workshops.

This will go a long way towards unifying understandings about resilience-based programming. With the diffusion of this report and the case studies it contains, it should be possible to bring about stronger unity of vision and action for resilience.

(iii) Agree upon and develop the 3RP resilience monitoring and evaluation system

The refined Resilience Lens proposed above is not a measurement tool but a programming guide and narrative tool. Some kind of common measurement of the outcomes of resilience-building activities is still needed. This report has focused on some aspects of resilience assessment (discussed in Section 3). However, theories of change and monitoring and evaluation need to be discussed further, and more common tools need to be developed and adopted. Such discussion has started, but needs to be concluded. Resilience outcome measures are likely to focus on building resilience at the individual, community and institutional levels. A workshop or a series of workshops could help with discussing and agreeing a suitable monitoring and evaluation system.

(iv) Adopt a systematic collective learning process about resilience-based programming in the 3RP

A key factor of collective impact is constant collective learning, which allows exchange of experience of successful innovations, and facilitates diffusion, testing and scaling up of innovative approaches. Such a dynamic learning system needs to be adopted. It can be done by:

- Quarterly learning-sharing meetings within and across sectoral teams to discuss resilience-building efforts and lessons learned about maximizing their resilience-building potential;
- A narrative section in the 3RP quarterly progress reports highlighting this learning; and
- A platform to share best practice in resilience-based programming in the 3RP (perhaps following up on the 2015 Resilience Development Forum).

(v) Seek opportunities for integrated programming, in particular in employment creation

Opportunities for joint assessment and programming in selected geographical areas or along various “service delivery supply chains” (as illustrated in Figure 8) should be explicitly sought out. Joint programming does not necessarily mean a common project, but can also be progressively adjusting existing approaches and projects to make them more coherent and more generative of resilience.

One area, where an integrated programming effort is needed is employment programming. This is currently a concern of many agencies and an urgent need of refugees and host communities. As discussed in this report, many partners are looking to vocational training and small business development to address this issue, but they are doing so in a piecemeal way and without a supportive policy environment.

The co-hosts’ declaration from the “Supporting Syria and the Region Conference” held in London in February 2016 confirmed that the “lack of economic opportunity is damaging for refugees and their host communities” and welcomed “the bold commitment of host governments to open up their labour markets to
refugees, alongside their determined efforts to create new jobs for their own populations, and to improve regulation and the investment climate in their countries.”

This opens the policy environment to address the issue comprehensively. What is needed now is collaborative programming in this area, with partners taking on specific roles to the benefit of the overall response. Roles include labour market and value chain analysis, for private sector engagement, vocational and life skills curriculum development, promotion of innovative technologies, green business, alternative energy solutions and the “Making Markets Work for the Poor” (M4P) approach.

(vi) Adopt more flexible funding mechanisms which support adaptive design and implementation

As discussed in Section 3.2 flexible funding mechanisms can help to allow multi-year programmes to adapt to support complementary short-term projects which build on each other and on their previous phases. This in turn helps programmes to respond promptly to changes in needs and possibilities. Suitable funding mechanisms can mean pooling funding and simplifying procedures, which can reduce duplication of efforts to mobilise resources. The 2016 London conference on Syria has widened the space for multi-year programming and more flexible funding mechanisms and partnerships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


“Building Resilience in Response to the Syria Crisis – Integrated Project Portfolio”, UNDP, RBAS, August 2015

“Stabilization & Resilience In Protracted, Politically-Induced Emergencies: A Case Study Exploration of Lebanon”, UNDP and Mercy Corps, 2015


# APPENDIX A: GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR SCORING: RESILIENCE LENS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent does the planned Output (and related Activities):</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1: Strengthen the capacities of national/local institutions and service delivery systems to respond to the crisis?</td>
<td>Activities have no link with (national/local) institutions and delivery systems</td>
<td>Activities do make some use of national/local institutions and delivery systems but national/local authorities are not meaningfully involved in planning &amp; implementation, and M&amp;E</td>
<td>Activities are aligned with national plans/priorities, rely upon national/local service delivery systems and national/local authorities play (or are foreseen to play) a meaningful role in planning, implementation and M&amp;E</td>
<td>Activities are aligned with national priorities and plans, use national/local systems and build their capacity, and are implemented in partnership with national/local authorities</td>
<td>Activities are in line with national priorities and plans, implemented and funded jointly with national and local actors such as municipalities and line ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2: Contribute to sustainable benefits?</td>
<td>Activities deliver only short-term benefits for impacted populations and communities</td>
<td>Activities have limited and mostly indirect long lasting development benefits</td>
<td>Activities have large but mostly indirect long lasting development benefits</td>
<td>Activities have direct long lasting development benefits (e.g. activities directly contribute to tackle some of the root causes of vulnerability)</td>
<td>Activities promote transformational change towards inclusive and sustainable development in all its dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3: Contribute to social cohesion/stability in impacted communities?</td>
<td>Activities do not consider potential impacts on social cohesion/stability in impacted communities</td>
<td>Activities are somewhat sensitive to social cohesion/stability concerns in impacted communities, but do not involve specific measures to address these issues</td>
<td>Activities are designed so as to prevent/mitigate social tensions in impacted communities (for instance, they are informed by conflict analysis, contain specific measures regarding community dialogue etc....)</td>
<td>Activities contribute in a direct and substantial manner to supporting social cohesion/stability in impacted communities</td>
<td>The output/activities have social cohesion as a primary objective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE ON 3RP STATE OF RESILIENCE-PROGRAMMING PREPAREDNESS

The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess the state of preparedness for resilience / stabilization-based programming in the regional response to the Syrian crisis. This is assessed along 10 dimensions that are thought to be important to achieve collective impact.

To better analyze responses to the questionnaire, we first need a few details:

Where do you work? □ Jordan □ Lebanon □ Egypt □ Turkey □ Iraq

Who do you work for? □ UN Agency □ Government □ I/NGOs □ Bi-lateral donor □ Other

Based on your knowledge of planning and action processes and projects and activities designed and implemented in connection to the regional response to the Syrian crisis (3RP and/or related national response plans such as LCRP or JRP), do you agree that:

There is a shared understanding about what resilience / stabilization means in the context of the response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) in your country:

☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Somewhat Disagree ☐ Somewhat Agree ☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Don’t Know

Why? ______________________________________________________________________________

The partners in the response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) are committed to a common resilience /stabilization agenda:

☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Somewhat Disagree ☐ Somewhat Agree ☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Don’t Know

Why? ______________________________________________________________________________

The response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) has a shared measurement process that allows all to jointly assess progress toward resilience / stabilization programming:

☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Somewhat Disagree ☐ Somewhat Agree ☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Don’t Know

Why? ______________________________________________________________________________

The activities undertaken by partners are mutually reinforcing toward resilience / stabilization programming:

☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Somewhat Disagree ☐ Somewhat Agree ☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Don’t Know

Why? ______________________________________________________________________________

The response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) has clear and effective collaboration mechanisms to strengthen resilience / stabilization programming:

☐ Strongly Disagree ☐ Somewhat Disagree ☐ Somewhat Agree ☐ Strongly Agree ☐ Don’t Know

Why? ______________________________________________________________________________
There is **continuous and open communication** among partners in the response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) to promote resilience / stabilization programming:

- [ ] Strongly Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Agree  - [ ] Strongly Agree  - [ ] Don't Know

Why? ____________________________________________________________

The partners in the response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) are involved in **systematic collective learning** to strengthen resilience / stabilization programming:

- [ ] Strongly Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Agree  - [ ] Strongly Agree  - [ ] Don't Know

Why? ____________________________________________________________

**Design and implementation is adapted regularly** and rapidly to changing circumstances to adjust to learning about resilience /stabilization programming:

- [ ] Strongly Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Agree  - [ ] Strongly Agree  - [ ] Don't Know

Why? ____________________________________________________________

There is **adequate coordination and technical support at the national and regional levels for implementing resilience / stabilization programming** in the context of the response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP):

- [ ] Strongly Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Agree  - [ ] Strongly Agree  - [ ] Don't Know

Why? ____________________________________________________________

The response to the Syrian crisis (3RP, LCRP or JRP) has **flexible funding** that allows to rapidly adjust resilience / stabilisation programming to changing circumstances:

- [ ] Strongly Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Disagree  - [ ] Somewhat Agree  - [ ] Strongly Agree  - [ ] Don't Know

Why? ____________________________________________________________